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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Investigating Microinsurance Issues by Using Laboratory Experiments  
to Evaluate the Welfare of Insurance 
 
 
by 
 
Jia Min Ng 
 
April 10, 2017 
 
 
Committee Chair: Glenn W. Harrison 
 
Major Academic Unit: Risk Management and Insurance 
 
 
Over the past decade microinsurance (MI) has grown to be a key risk mitigation tool to help the 
poor in developing countries step out of poverty. It is now estimated that the global market has 
grown from 78 million individuals in 2007 to 263 million in 2013, and the potential MI market could 
be over 3 billion policies, generating over US$30 billion in annual premium revenue (Leach, Ncube 
and Menon [2014]). However, there are barriers to reaching that potential market size. Many MI 
projects have been launched to offer the poor the opportunity to further manage their risk, but there 
are problems that stand in the way of scaling and sustaining these pilot programs that only reach out 
to small numbers (Smith and Watts [2009]).  
I contribute to this literature by measuring how insurance impacts an individual’s welfare. 
Purchasing insurance is a risky choice: there is a certain upfront payment of premium for an 
uncertain future payout, and hence one’s risk and time preferences need to be taken into account in 
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order to evaluate individual welfare of decisions to purchase insurance or not. Welfare of an 
insurance product depends on an individual’s specific risk preferences. Someone who is more risk 
averse (loving) may dislike (prefer) the large variance in possible future outcomes more, and value 
the option of purchasing insurance which would reduce that variance more (less). By using 
economic theories of risk preferences to quantify the certainty equivalent when insurance is 
purchased, I explicitly account for the individual’s risk preferences when evaluating the value of the 
insurance product.  
Existing literature has used insurance take-up as a proxy for how beneficial insurance is to 
individuals, assuming that individuals would only purchase insurance if they thought having 
insurance was better for them than not having insurance. This revealed preference argument only 
gives us a possible starting point for the welfare evaluation of insurance when we study actual 
behavior. When an individual’s risk preferences are used to calculate consumer surplus (CS) to 
measure the expected welfare gain of insurance, however, the welfare effect can be quantified, rather 
than be limited to a qualitative evaluation when take-up is used. It will also be possible to tell if 
purchasing (not purchasing) insurance can result in a negative (positive) expected welfare gain, since 
it is possible for the calculated CS from an actual insurance purchase to be negative. Efficiency is 
also used as another measure of the expected welfare gain of insurance. It provides a natural 
normalization of CS for the actual insurance choices made for each individual by comparing it to the 
maximal expected CS for that individual. I use this methodology of measuring individual welfare to 
study the impact of a simple indemnity product (Chapter 1), basis risk in index insurance (Chapter 
2), and the impact of non-performance risk of the insurer (Chapter 3). The efficiency measure can 
be used to compare the welfare impact in one chapter against the welfare impact in another chapter, 
to see if, for instance, the impact of basis risk on welfare is larger than the welfare impact of contract 
non-performance risk. 
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I have chosen to focus on lab environments in my thesis so that I can ensure the maximum 
“internal validity” on my methodological applications of theory to evaluate welfare. In this sense the 
lab data can be viewed as “theory with numbers,” but where the numbers refer to real, incentivized 
behavior. I list two examples of complications in the field. First, due to concerns about time and 
subject-comprehension level constraints in field experiments, ascertaining subjects’ risk preferences 
for insurance is typically done through hypothetical surveys or simple tasks where risk preferences 
cannot be structurally estimated on the individual level. Second, it is difficult to obtain all the data in 
the field that would allow us to estimate the experimental parameters required to define the 
insurance contract. These estimates would be needed to set up the decision context the individual 
faces in a field experiment. In comparison, my approach provides a way to structurally identify the 
behavioral basis of sub-optimal insurance decisions. My hope is to see insights from this type of lab 
environment used to guide field applications.  
Chapter 1 illustrates the application of economic theory to the welfare evaluation of 
insurance policies in a controlled laboratory experiment. Economic theory is used to evaluate the 
expected welfare gain from insurance products on offer to individuals. If the risk preferences of the 
individual, and subjective beliefs about loss contingencies and likelihood of payout are known, there 
is a certainty equivalent of the risky insurance policy that can be compared to the certain insurance 
premium. This simple logic extends to non-standard models of risk preferences, such as those in 
which individuals exhibit “optimism” or “pessimism” about loss contingencies in their evaluation of 
the risky insurance policy.  
This chapter describes the methodology of estimating the risk preferences of individuals 
from one task, and separately presenting the individual with a number of simple indemnity insurance 
policies in which loss contingencies are objective. Hence subjective beliefs about loss contingencies 
do not need to be considered. The expected consumer surplus gained or foregone from observed 
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take-up decisions is then estimated. The efficiency of decisions made by each individual is also 
estimated. There is striking evidence of foregone expected consumer surplus and efficiency from 
incorrect take-up decisions. Take-up, which is commonly used as a metric for welfare evaluations of 
insurance products, is shown to not be a good indicator of the expected welfare gain from 
insurance. 
Chapter 2 extends the methodology from Chapter 1 to estimate the welfare of index 
insurance. An index insurance product will only fully compensate for a loss based on a 
predetermined and objective index, and not whether the individual experiences a loss. Index 
insurance was conceived to be a product that would simplify the claim settlement process and make 
it more objective, reducing transaction costs and moral hazard. However, index insurance also 
exposes the insured to basis risk, which arises because there can be a mismatch between the index 
measurement and the actual losses of the insured. It is not easy to predict the direction in which 
basis risk is going to affect insurance demand even, even under Expected Utility Theory, in contrast 
to the clear and strong predictions for standard indemnity insurance products. Index insurance can 
be theoretically conceptualized as a situation in which the individual faces compound risk, where 
one layer of risk corresponds to the potential individual’s loss and the other layer of risk is created 
by the potential mismatch between the index measurement and the actual loss. Experimental 
evidence shows that people exhibit preferences for compound risks that are different from 
preferences exhibited for their actuarially-equivalent counterparts.  
This chapter studies the potential link between index insurance demand and attitudes 
towards compound risks. It tests the hypothesis that the compound risk nature of index insurance 
induced by basis risk negatively affects both the demand for the product and the welfare of 
individuals making take-up decisions. The impact of basis risk on insurance take-up and on expected 
welfare is studied in a laboratory experiment with an insurance frame. It measures the expected 
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welfare of index insurance to individuals while accounting for their risk preferences, and structurally 
decomposes the sources of the welfare effects of index insurance. The results show that the compound 
risk in index insurance significantly decreases the welfare of index insurance choices made by 
individuals. The behavioral inability to process compound risks decreases welfare when there is a 
compound risk of loss, whereas loss probability, basis risk and premium only impact the welfare of 
insurance choices when the risk of loss is expressed in its reduced, non-compound form. Take-up, 
again, is not a reliable indicator of welfare. Furthermore, I show that take-up is not a useful proxy 
for guiding policy to improve welfare, as the drivers that significantly affect take-up are different 
from the drivers that significantly affect welfare measures. 
Chapter 3 applies the methodology for estimating the welfare effects of insurance to the 
effects of allowing for non-performance risk of insurance providers. Non-performance lies at the 
heart of much of the regulation that insurance companies face. Consumers’ concerns about non-
performance of the insurance provider have also been viewed as a possible explanation for low 
demand of microinsurance. This chapter provides a behavioral evaluation of the welfare effects of 
non-performance risk, keeping close to the canonical theoretical framework of Doherty and 
Schlesinger [1990].  
The hypothesis tested in this chapter is that the presence of non-performance risk negatively 
impacts not just take-up of insurance but also the welfare of the insurance choices made. The results 
show that take-up is significantly lower when there is non-performance risk, but more importantly 
the percentage of “incorrect” choices is significantly lower. There is a significant reduction in 
efficiency, the preferred measure of welfare in this instance, when there is non-performance risk.  
This chapter also tests if violations of the Reduction of Compound Lotteries axiom or accounting 
for individual’s subjective beliefs on non-performance risk could impact this decrease in take-up and 
welfare. When we relax the Reduction of Compound Lotteries assumption in our estimation of risk 
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preferences and calculation of consumer surplus, violations of the axiom do not significantly impact 
the welfare of insurance choices made by individuals who are exposed to non-performance risk. 
Allowing for subjective beliefs over non-performance risk does not significantly impact the welfare 
of insurance choices. Take-up once again is not a reliable proxy for welfare, and the drivers of take-
up are again not the same drivers of welfare. These results provide a structural behavioral insight to 
inform normative policy design in the presence of non-performance risk. 
This thesis has established a methodology to structurally estimate the expected welfare 
benefits of an insurance product on an individual level in the laboratory. A natural progression from 
here is to apply this methodology in a field experiment. It is one thing to say that the laboratory and 
the field are complements, but how does one take findings from the laboratory to the field?  
The first point to note is that there are indeed some general lessons from these laboratory 
experiments that can pose as warnings for claims made in the field. One important lesson across all 
three chapters is that there are limitations to just using take-up as the metric to evaluate new or 
modified insurance products. Apart from the theoretical fact that observation of take-up does not 
allow one to quantify the size of any expected gain in consumer surplus, the results show that take-
up can even be a misleading proxy for the sign of welfare. If take-up cannot be a good proxy for the 
behavior observed in the lab, it would require a huge leap of faith to be able to assume it would do 
so in the field. 
The second point to note is that different field policy questions would require different lab 
experiment designs to answer them, but these lab experiment designs can now build upon the 
experiments in this thesis. For instance, how effective are different policies such as enhanced 
disclosures, requirements for greater reserving, and so on, at improving solvency risk? We would 
require a regulatory “production function” generating a solvency risk to answer this field policy 
question, and the experiments for this thesis did not delve into that. But it would be a simple matter, 
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in theory and in the lab, to extend the designs to allow certain (costly) inputs into some production 
function that would generate the solvency risk and then assess the cost-benefit ratio of policies that 
would alter these inputs. Similarly, many interventions to improve the “literacy” with which subjects 
approach index insurance products can be easily and efficiently be tested first in the lab. 
The third point to note is that evaluation of welfare effects of insurance in the field requires 
(artefactual) field experiments. This thesis does not claim that the lab experiments in this thesis are 
externally valid with respect to levels of risk aversion and types of risk preferences expected in the 
field. This thesis adds value by providing a blueprint for identifying the types of information needed 
in the field. Furthermore, there is evidence that the stakes in the lab are not perfectly integrated with 
wealth outside the lab, hence there is no universal empirical support for the claims that subjects in a 
lab setting behave intrinsically differently than field subjects because “the stakes are low,” although 
they may be true for certain populations (Andersen, Cox, Harrison, Lau, Rutström and Sadiraj 
[2016], Harrison, Lau, Ross and Swarthout [2016]). 
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Chapter 1  
 
 
 
 
Evaluating the Expected Welfare Gain from Insurance 
 
by Glenn W. Harrison and Jia Min Ng† 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT.  
 
Economic theory tells us how to evaluate the expected welfare gain from insurance products on 
offer to individuals. If we know the risk preferences of the individual, and subjective beliefs about 
loss contingencies and likelihood of payout, there is a certainty equivalent of the risky insurance 
policy that can be compared to the certain insurance premium. This simple logic extends to non-
standard models of risk preferences, such as those in which individuals exhibit “optimism” or 
“pessimism” about loss contingencies in their evaluation of the risky insurance policy. We illustrate 
the application of these basic ideas about the welfare evaluation of insurance policies in a controlled 
laboratory experiment. We estimate the risk preferences of individuals from one task, and separately 
present the individual with a number of insurance policies in which loss contingencies are objective. 
We then estimate the expected consumer surplus gained or foregone from observed take-up 
decisions. There is striking evidence of foregone expected consumer surplus from incorrect take-up 
decisions. Indeed, the metric of take-up itself, widely used in welfare evaluations of insurance 
products, provides a qualitatively incorrect guide to the expected welfare effects of insurance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
† The content of this chapter has been published in Journal of Risk and Insurance, 83(1), 2016, 91-120. 
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1.1 Introduction 
 
Consider the humble question of the welfare valuation of some new insurance product, such as the 
“micro-insurance” products being offered and promoted in developing countries. In general these 
policies currently are evaluated by the metric of product take-up.1 Although take-up is easy to 
measure, it does not automatically reflect the existence or size of the welfare gain of the insurance 
product to the insured. An insurance product usually involves the individual2 giving up a certain 
amount of money ex ante some event in the expectation of being given some money in the future if 
something unfortunate occurs. Welfare evaluation therefore generally requires that one knows risk 
and time preferences of the individual, since the benefits of the product are risky, and in the future, 
while the costs are normally3 certain and up front. We must also know the subjective beliefs that the 
individual used to evaluate possible losses.4  
                                                 
 
1 Many recent field experiments that evaluate alternative insurance products focus exclusively on take-up as a 
proxy for welfare: for example, see Giné, Townsend and Vickrey [2007], Giné, Townsend and Vickrey [2008], 
Cole, Giné, Tobacman, Topalova, Townsend and Vickrey [2013], Dercon, Hill, Clarke, Outes-Leon and 
Taffesse [2014], Cole, Stein and Tobacman [2014], Banerjee, Duflo and Hornbeck [2014] and Cai, Chen, Fang 
and Zhou [2014]. Virtually no attempt is made to design products that reflect the risk preferences of 
individuals. One example of the casual nature of judgments in this area comes from Giné, Townsend and 
Vickrey [2008; p. 544, italics added], describing how the premium was set: “The policy premium was initially 
benchmarked on projected payouts using historical rainfall data (at least 25 years of data for each rain gauge 
were used). The premium was calculated as the sum of the expected payout, 25 percent of its standard 
deviation, 1 percent of the maximum sum insured in a year, plus a 25 percent administrative charge and 10.2 
percent government service tax. In some cases the premium dictated by this formula was then reduced, 
because it was believed to exceed farmers’ willingness to pay.” After all of the formal actuarial arithmetic, we 
scratch our heads and just change things based on some hunch. To justify being puzzled by low take-up, 
Banerjee, Duflo and Hornbeck [2014; p.292] refer to “evidence of a strong need for health insurance,” but by 
this all they mean is evidence that average health expenditures exceed the typical premium by a factor of 8.9 = 
4670/525. Such expenditures always exhibit significant skewness, with many at zero, affecting the welfare 
evaluation of the insurance product. Appendix E details the various welfare metrics used in applied evaluation 
of insurance products.  
2 One could extend this approach to consider the social welfare evaluation of insurance products for groups 
of individuals, such as households, villages or even nations.  
3 Some insurance products in developing countries spread the premium payments over the life of the 
contract. 
4 There is an unfortunate tendency in many academic evaluations of insurance purchase to assume that 
individuals somehow know the probabilities that are estimated or guessed at by actuaries. 
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Of course, there is a “revealed preference” argument that if the product is (not) taken up it 
was perceived to be a positive (negative) net benefit. But that is only the starting point of any serious 
welfare evaluation, particularly if one wants to quantify the size of the welfare effect. What if the 
subjective beliefs were biased, in the sense that the individual would revise them if given certain 
information? What if the evaluation of the product used some criteria other that Expected Utility 
Theory (EUT)? What if the individual simply made a mistaken decision, given beliefs and risk 
preferences? Invoking this revealed preference argument implies that one could never find a negative 
welfare from any insurance decision! 
 Instead of making a priori assumptions about those preferences that are likely to be wrong, 
we can use controlled experiments to estimate individual preferences, valuations and beliefs, and use 
those estimates in the welfare evaluation of insurance policies. Laboratory experiments provide the 
ideal environment to set out all of the information and behavior we need to observe in order to 
draw inferences about welfare5. Once we move to the field and consider naturally-occurring data, we 
will then immediately realize what information is missing if we want to make interesting welfare 
evaluations. In this sense, laboratory and field experiments are complements (Harrison and List 
[2004]). 
 Section 1.2 presents the basic theory of insurance demand to be tested. Section 1.3 draws 
implications for the design of experimental tasks to evaluate welfare. Section 1.4 presents the 
laboratory design needed to minimally address the question, and section 1.5 presents the results. 
Section 1.6 reviews limitations of the exercise and immediate extensions, and section 1.7 concludes. 
                                                 
 
5 Appendix D reviews previous laboratory experiments on insurance demand. 
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1.2 Theory 
1.2.1 Decision-Making Models 
Assume that agents behave as if using an EUT or Rank Dependent Utility (RDU) model. These two 
variants are sufficient to illustrate the issues of interest here, and can be extended to other models. 
Assume that utility of income is constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), defined by 
 U(x) = x(1-r)/(1-r) (1) 
where x is a lottery prize and r≠1 is a parameter to be estimated. Thus r is the coefficient of CRRA 
for an EUT individual: r=0 corresponds to risk neutrality, r<0 to risk loving, and r>0 to risk 
aversion. 
 Let there be J possible outcomes in a lottery defined over objective probabilities. Under 
EUT the probabilities for each outcome x j , p(x j), are those induced by the experimenter, so 
expected utility (EU) is simply the probability weighted utility of each outcome in each lottery i: 
 EUi = ∑j=1,J [ p(x j) × U(x j) ]. (2) 
 
The RDU model of Quiggin [1982] extends the EUT model by allowing for decision weights 
on lottery outcomes. The specification of the utility function is the same parametric specification (1) 
considered for EUT.6 To calculate decision weights under RDU one replaces expected utility defined 
by (2) with RDU: 
 RDUi = ∑j=1,J [ w(p(x j)) × U(x j) ] = ∑j=1,J [ w j  × U(x j) ] (3) 
where 
 w j  = (p j  + ... + p J) - (p j + 1  + ... + p J) (4a) 
for j=1,... , J-1, and 
                                                 
 
6 To ease notation we use the same parameter r because the context always make it clear if this refers to an 
EUT model or a RDU model. 
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 wj = (p j) (4b) 
for j=J, with the subscript j ranking outcomes from worst to best, and (p) is some probability 
weighting function. 
 We consider three popular probability weighting functions. The first is the “power” 
probability weighting function considered by Quiggin [1982], with curvature parameter : 
  (p) = p (5) 
So  ≠1 is consistent with a deviation from the conventional EUT representation. Convexity of the 
probability weighting function when >1 is said to reflect “pessimism” and generates, if one assumes 
for simplicity a linear utility function, a risk premium since (p) < p  for all p and hence the “RDU 
EV” weighted by (p) instead of p has to be less than the EV weighted by p. 
 The second probability weighting function is the “inverse-S” function popularized by 
Tversky and Kahneman [1992]: 
 (p) = p / ( p + (1-p) )
1/
 (6) 
This function exhibits inverse-S probability weighting (optimism for small p, and pessimism for 
large p) for <1, and S-shaped probability weighting (pessimism for small p, and optimism for large 
p) for >1. 
 The third probability weighting function is a general functional form proposed by Prelec 
[1998] that exhibits considerable flexibility. This function is 
 (p) = exp{-(-ln p)}, (7) 
and is defined for 0<p≤1,  >0 and  >0. When  =1 this function collapses to the Power function 
(p) = p. 
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1.2.2 Welfare Gain Evaluation 
If the subject is assumed to be an EUT type, the consumer surplus (CS) of the insurance decision is 
calculated as the difference between the certainty equivalent (CE) of the EU with insurance and the 
CE of the EU without insurance. CS is calculated the same way using the RDU instead of EU if the 
subject was a RDU type.7  
Assume a simple indemnity insurance product, which provides full coverage in the event of a 
loss. We assume an initial endowment of $20, with a 10% chance of a $15 one-time loss occurring. 
If an individual purchased the insurance, she could avoid the loss with certainty by paying the 
insurance premium up front. There are four possible payoff outcomes. If no insurance is purchased, 
the individual keeps her $20 if no loss occurs, but is only left with $5 if there is a loss. If insurance is 
purchased, the individual keeps $20 less the premium if no loss occurs, and still keeps $20 less the 
premium if the loss does occur.  
Using the decision-making models discussed above, the EU or RDU across the two possible 
states, loss or no loss, can be calculated for each choice, to purchase or not to purchase insurance. 
The CE from the EU or RDU of each choice can be derived, and the difference between the CE 
                                                 
 
7 Mossin [1968] and Smith [1968] showed that if a decision maker is a risk-averse EU maximizer and 
insurance is actuarially fair, then full insurance is optimal. Since the loading is normally positive in practice, 
this means that only partial coverage should be observed in practice. Mossin [1968; p. 558] was aware that 
people choose full coverage quite often, and offered several explanations for this behavior: people behave 
irrationally and do not bother to calculate the optimal coverage; there can be uncertainty around the value of 
the insured asset; and people might overestimate the probability of the loss. Additionally, this theoretical 
result may or may not hold depending on the subjects’ preference representation. For instance, Razin [1976] 
analyzed insurance demand using the minimax regret criterion suggested by Savage [1951], and showed that if 
a subject follows this criterion it is optimal to buy full coverage even if the insurance contract is not actuarially 
fair. Briys and Loubergé [1985] demonstrated that if an individual follows the Hurwicz [1951] criterion then 
the individual does not insure at all or buys full insurance even if the insurance loading is positive. On the 
other hand, Lee and Pinches [1988] showed that by introducing risk aversion to the Hurwicz criterion, partial 
insurance can also be optimal. Machina [1995][2000; p. 56] showed that Mossin’s full coverage result does 
hold in a very general non-EU framework that assumes probabilistic sophistication. He also recognizes that 
the robustness of this under his generalized non-EU framework depends heavily on the insured’s subjective 
probability of a loss coinciding with the probabilities used to price the insurance in actuarially-fair terms. 
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from choosing insurance and the CE from not choosing insurance would then be the expected 
welfare gain of purchasing insurance for that individual.   
Figure 1.1 shows how this CS from purchasing insurance would vary for an EUT individual 
following the above example, for premiums ranging from $0.01 to $4.50. Each bar shows the CS for 
a CRRA coefficient ranging from 0.3 to 0.7, typical values expected for a risk averse EUT individual 
in an experiment. We see that the CS is larger if the individual is more risk averse, which follows 
from the fact that more risk averse individuals are willing to pay more for insurance. As premiums 
increase, CS becomes negative, showing that there is a threshold premium above which the subject 
would experience negative expected welfare from purchasing the insurance product.   
 
Figure 1.1 Consumer Surplus Across EUT CRRA Coefficients 
 
 
 
 Figures 1.2 and 1.3 show the same graph, but for RDU using an inverse-S probability 
weighting function and a power weighting function, respectively. For both models  ranges from 0.7 
to 1.3, and the CRRA coefficient is held constant at 0.6. As  increases, CS decreases when the 
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inverse-S probability weighting function is used, but CS increases when the power function is used. 
Assigning the right decision making model, even from this basic set of EUT and RDU 
specifications, is important for measuring individual welfare evaluation. In general, estimating the 
right risk parameters for the individual, conditional on the decision making model, will also affect 
the identification of the correct decision as well as the opportunity cost of that decision. 
 
Figure 1.2 Consumer Surplus Across Inverse-S Probability Weighting Parameter (r=0.6) 
 
 
1.3 Design Implications 
In order to evaluate the welfare gain of an individual from insurance conditional on their risk 
preferences, we need information to determine the following: the classification of the best 
descriptive decision-making model for the individual, the risk attitudes of the individual given the 
decision-making model, the type of insurance contract the individual is considering, as well as details 
of the potential loss the individual is insuring against. This information set includes the loss 
probabilities the individual is using to access the value of the insurance contract. 
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Figure 1.3 Consumer Surplus Across Power Probability Weighting Parameter (r=0.6) 
 
 
  
In this illustration we only consider RDU as a sole alternative to EUT. The individual is 
classified with the model that best fits their risk preferences. This approach can easily be extended to 
include other decision-making models, as discussed in section 1.6. For each decision-making model 
we are considering, the risk parameters specific to that model are estimated using maximum 
likelihood methods described by Harrison and Rutström [2008].8 
 To keep the theory and design in this experiment transparent we use a plain vanilla 
indemnity insurance contract. An ex ante premium is paid to fully insure a loss should it occur, when 
it occurs. This approach can be readily extended to investigate the welfare gain from other insurance 
contracts. 
                                                 
 
8 These maximum likelihood methods have a long tradition in experimental economics, such as Camerer and 
Ho [1994; §6.1], Hey and Orme [1994] and Holt and Laury [2002; §III]. Any econometric method that can 
produce consistent estimates of the structural parameters of the model, along with standard errors, will 
suffice. Alternative approaches are reviewed in Harrison and Rutström [2008; §2]. 
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 Lastly, to run this experiment we will also need to know about the potential loss the 
insurance protects against. The wealth amounts for each possible state of nature in this experiment 
are given, assuming no asset integration with wealth outside the laboratory setting. While the loss 
probability is clearly given to the subjects in this laboratory experiment, if this experiment was 
conducted in the field the loss probability might not be objectively clear to the subject. Of course, 
each subject in the laboratory could still interpret the objective probability subjectively, but that is 
accounted for in the probability weighting function of the RDU model. It is also possible that in the 
field an actuarial probability estimate of loss might exist, but is unknown to the subject.  
 Our laboratory experiment allows us to control for time preferences by resolving all 
uncertainty about the effects of insurance purchase in the same session. In general one would need 
to add some task to measure time preferences along with risk preferences, following Andersen, 
Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008][2014]. Indeed, Hansen, Jacobsen and Lau [2012] use data from 
these experiments to evaluate the present value of willingness to pay for actual insurance products in 
Denmark, explicitly allowing for time preferences. They “map” estimated risk and time preferences 
to certain demographic characteristics for the individuals purchasing actual insurance products, and 
allow for RDU risk preferences as well as EUT risk preferences. They are forced to assume that 
individuals know and use the true loss rate for auto, home and house insurance claims.9   
1.4 Experiment 
The theoretical framework we have employed implies that we need two experimental tasks in order 
to evaluate welfare from observed take-up. One task is to elicit risk preferences defined over lottery 
choices, and the other task is to elicit insurance choices of the individual. 
                                                 
 
9 They infer that the present value of willingness to pay is marginally higher than the actuarial expected value 
under EUT, and significantly higher under RDU. Of course, if subjective loss beliefs differ from the actuarial 
loss probabilities assumed, these results could imply any expected welfare gains or losses. 
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 We recruited 111 subjects from a database of students across several undergraduate colleges 
from Georgia State University. All sessions were conducted in 2014 at the ExCEN experimental lab 
of Georgia State University. Each subject received a show-up fee of $5, and no specific information 
about the task or expected earnings prior to the session. Each subject undertook both tasks, making 
80 binary choices across lotteries in the risk task, and 24 binary choices in the insurance task. The 
insurance task always came first, and subject paid out for it prior to the risk task choices.10 Each 
subject was told that one of the 80 risk choices and one of the 24 insurance choices would be 
selected at random for payment. A standard survey was used to collect individual demographic 
characteristics. Appendix A contains all instructions. 
 Each subject is asked to make 80 binary choices between lotteries with objective 
probabilities, using a standard “pie display” interface. After all decisions were made one of the 80 
choices was chosen at random to be played out in accordance with the choices of the subject. Under 
EUT this experimental payment protocol provides incentives for truthful binary choices.11  
 The battery of lottery pairs is carefully selected for our purpose of identifying if the 
individual subject behaves consistently with EUT or some probability-weighting alternative such as 
RDU.12 Loomes and Sugden [1998] pose an important design feature for common ratio tests of 
                                                 
 
10 We adopted this ordering and payment of tasks so that one could say that the estimated risk preferences 
were elicited independently of the insurance task. One could certainly study the empirical effect of order 
effects in the obvious manner, although our prior is that this is likely to be empirically unimportant. Paying 
subjects for the first task prior to the second task ensured that any “wealth effect” was from a known datum, 
rather than a subjective estimate based on lottery choices. Using data from 63 subjects each making 60 binary 
choices in the gain domain from Harrison and Rutström [2009], one can directly test if a known initial wealth 
increment affects (pooled) risk preferences. In their design each subject received a randomly generated wealth 
increment, between $1 and $10 in $1 increments. Using their statistical specifications, there is no significant 
effect of these wealth increments on estimated risk preferences using EUT or RDU models. 
11 Harrison and Swarthout [2014] discuss the evidence for this experimental payment protocol, particularly 
when drawing inferences about RDU models. Their findings just make our classifications of subjects as EUT 
or RDU more conservative with respect to EUT (i.e., we are more likely with this payment protocol to 
classify subjects as RDU than if the protocol had no effect). 
12 Given that the insurance choices only used a probability of 0.1 for the risky outcome, one might have used 
a more restrictive battery that just focused on that probability. However, we wanted to have a “standard 
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EUT: variation in the “gradient” of the EUT-consistent indifference curves within a Marschak-
Machina (MM) triangle. The reason for this is to generate some choice patterns that are more 
powerful tests of EUT for any given risk attitude. Under EUT the slope of the indifference curve 
within a MM triangle is a measure of risk aversion. So there always exists some risk attitude such that 
the subject is indifferent, and evidence of common ratio violations has virtually zero power (EUT 
does not, then, predict 50:50 choices, as some claim). All of the lottery pairs implied by their battery 
have one or both lotteries on the “border” of the MM triangle. 
 “Border effects” arise in tests of EUT when one nudges the lottery pairs in common ratio 
tests and common consequence tests into the interior of the MM triangle, or moves them 
significantly into the interior. The striking finding is that EUT often performs better when one does 
this. Actually, the evidence is mixed in interesting ways.13 Camerer [1992] generated a remarkable 
series of experiments in which EUT did very well for interior lottery choices, but his data was 
unfortunately from hypothetical choices. These lotteries were well off the border. These lotteries can 
be contrasted with those in Camerer [1989] that were on the border, and where there were 
significant EUT violations. But Harless [1992] found that just nudging the lotteries off the boundary 
did not improve behavior under EUT for real stakes. So one natural question is whether the 
common ratio tests lead to EUT not being rejected when we are in the interior triangle, and to EUT 
being rejected when we are have choices on the boundary. This seems to be the conclusion from 
Camerer [1989][1992], but it is not as clean as one would like. We therefore generated 40 
“boundary” pairs and 40 “interior” pairs with exactly the same common ratios, making 80 pairs in 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
battery” where properties for estimating RDU models had been demonstrated, and that battery employed a 
wide range of probabilities. 
13  “Event splitting” tasks arose out of test of boundary effects, but are different. They arise when separating 
an event which yields a particular (positive) outcome into two (or more) sub-events increases the 
attractiveness of the lottery offering that outcome, despite the fact that the likelihood of the outcome 
occurring remains unchanged. They were first noted by Starmer and Sugden [1993] and Humphrey [1995].  
13 
   
all. 
 The specific lottery parameters employed are documented in Appendix B. Prizes were $10, 
$30 and $50 in both lotteries. Each subject received the chosen lotteries in random order, to mitigate 
any possible order effects. Left-right presentation order was also randomized, as well as the 
ascending and descending order of presentation of prizes in terms of the dollar value of the prizes. 
 Every random event determining payouts was generated by the rolling of one or more dice.  
These dice were illustrated visually during the reading of the instructions, and each subject rolled 
their own dice. 
 In the insurance task subjects were asked to express their binary willingness to pay for 
insurance against a potential loss. The set-up of each decision was similar to Laury, McInnes and 
Swarthout [2009]: each subject is given an initial endowment, the amount of a potential loss and the 
probability of the loss occurring. In our experiment these amounts were set at $20, $15, and 10% 
respectively, for all decisions. Subjects were asked if they would like to purchase insurance for full 
indemnity for a premium. The premium offered across decisions ranged from $0.20 to $4.80 in 20 
cent increments. These premia were offered to each subject in a random order.   
 Figure 1.4 shows the interface the subjects used for the insurance choices. The experiment 
was programmed and conducted with the z-Tree software developed by Fischbacher [2007]. The 
choices were described to the subjects as follows: 
In this lottery, there is a 10% chance you will experience a loss of fifteen dollars ($15) that 
corresponds with the red portion of the pie, and a 90% chance you will experience no loss 
($0) that corresponds with the green portion of the pie. Since you start out with $20, this 
means there is a 90% chance your earnings remain at $20, but there is a 10% chance you will 
lose $15, which would leave you with $5.  
 
You are given the option to buy insurance to protect yourself against the potential loss in 
this lottery. You should decide if you want the insurance before you know if a loss will 
occur. In this example, the insurance will cost you $2.20. This is full insurance, meaning if 
you purchase the insurance and a loss should occur, the insurance will cover the full loss, 
and your net earnings will be your initial earnings of $20 less the price paid for the insurance 
14 
   
($2.20), which is $17.80. If you choose to purchase insurance and there was no loss you 
would still need to pay for the $2.20 insurance, and your net earnings will be $17.80. 
 
 
One choice out of the 24 insurance choices made by the subject was selected at random to 
be played out to calculate the subject’s actual payoff. In this experiment only the premium amount 
was varied across the choices: initial endowment, loss probability and loss amount were kept 
constant. These choices could all be varied to include different features of insurance products such 
as deductibles and coinsurance.  
In addition to the information identified above, we need to make a theoretical assumption 
that we can indeed identify risk preferences independently of the insurance choice under evaluation. 
The reason is deceptively simple: in our setting there is almost always some assumption about risk 
preferences that can rationalize any insurance decision as generating a positive expected welfare 
gain.14 It could be that the only models of risk preferences that can rationalize certain decisions 
require some normative departure from EUT, as in Hansen, Jacobsen and Lau [2012] and 
Barseghyan, Molinari, O’Donoghue and Teitelbaum [2013] who stress the role of “probability 
distortions” akin to the RDU models we consider. But in order to identify an expected welfare loss, 
one must conceptually have some independent measure of risk preferences. 
 
                                                 
 
14 There are settings where this is not true, such as where observed insurance behavior appear to violate 
elementary requirements of all of the models of risk preferences we consider here, such as 1st order stochastic 
dominance. Or they imply a priori implausible levels of risk aversion, as in Sydnor [2010]. We have concerns 
that many studies of naturally occurring insurance choices do not know the subjective loss probabilities that 
guided purchase decisions, and of course that is one good reason to start the welfare evaluation of insurance 
in a controlled experiment in which these can be induced. Some have attempted to measure risk preferences 
by observing naturally occurring insurance choices when there are controlled variations in contract features 
such as deductibles. But one must invariably make strong assumptions about the perception of losses: for 
instance, Cohen and Einav [2007; p. 746] note that “Two key assumptions – that claims are generated by a 
Poisson process at the individual level, and that individuals have perfect information about their Poisson 
claim rates – allows us to use data on (ex post) realized claims to estimate the distribution of (ex ante) claim 
rates.” Again, we view our controlled laboratory experiments as consistent with some of the conclusions of 
this behavioral insurance literature, but with far greater control of potential confounds. 
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Figure 1.4. Insurance Purchase Choice Interface 
 
 
 
 We make the simplest possible assumption here, that the risk task identifies these risk 
preferences for the individual, and then we use those estimated risk preferences to evaluate expected 
welfare gains or losses of that individual’s insurance choices. An alternative assumption, of course, is 
that risk preferences for the same individual differ between our risk task and our insurance task, for 
whatever “framing” reason one might think of. This assumption might be correct, and indeed would 
be implied conceptually if we find, as we do, that risk preferences in the risk task do not explain 
every insurance choice. But note how that assumption is logically required if we are ever to declare 
some insurance purchase a mistake – we need to have some separate metric for declaring what is 
and is not a mistake than the choice itself. We consider ways to slightly weaken this assumption 
later, to evaluate the robustness of our analysis of behavior. 
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1.5 Results 
1.5.1 Risk Preferences 
To evaluate RDU preferences we estimate an RDU model for each individual. We consider the 
CRRA utility function (1) and one of three possible probability weighting functions defined earlier 
by (5), (6) and (7). For our purposes of classifying subjects as EUT or RDU it does not matter which 
of these probability weighting functions characterize behavior: the only issue here is at what 
statistical confidence level we can reject the EUT hypothesis that (p) = p. 
 Of course, if the sole metric for deciding if a subject were better characterized by EUT and 
RDU was the log-likelihood of the estimated model, then there were be virtually no subjects 
classified as EUT since RDU nests EUT. But if we use metrics of a 10%, 5% or 1% significance 
level on the test of the EUT hypothesis that  (p) = p, then we classify 39%, 49% or 68%, 
respectively, of the 102 subjects with valid estimates as being EUT-consistent. Figure 1.5 displays 
these results using the 5% significance level. The left panel shows a kernel density of the p-values 
estimated for each individual and the EUT hypothesis test that (p) = p; we use the best-fitting 
RDU variant for each subject. The vertical lines show the 1%, 5% and 10% p-values, so that one can 
see that subjects to the right of these lines would be classified as being EUT-consistent. The right 
panel shows the specific allocation using the representative 5% threshold. So 5% of the density in 
the left panel of Figure 1.5 corresponds to the right of the middle vertical line at 5%.  
1.5.2 Sample Subject Analysis 
Risk 
We use the results from a single subject, subject 8, to illustrate the impact of risk preferences on the 
expected welfare gain from insurance. We first have to determine if subject 8 should be classified as 
an EUT or RDU decision-maker. The log-likelihood value calculated for RDU (-52.3) is better than 
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the log-likelihood of the EUT model (-53.0), so the subject would be classified as RDU with Prelec 
probability weighting function by this metric. The difference in log-likelihoods, however, is 
numerically quite small. Once we test for the subject being EUT, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected at the 10%, 5% or even 1% significance level, since the p-value is 0.5.  
 
Figure 1.5 Classifying Subjects as EUT or RDU 
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 Figure 1.6 graphically displays the estimates of the risk parameters of each model for EUT 
and RDU. The utility curves show that subject 8 had a modestly concave utility function under both 
EUT and RDU specifications. The utility function is more concave under RDU implying, ceteris 
paribus the effect of probability weighting, greater risk aversion under RDU. Of course, under RDU 
risk aversion does not just depend on the curvature of the utility function.  
The bottom right graph of Figure 1.6 shows the Prelec probability weighting function, the 
best-fit model based only on log-likelihood criteria. Comparing the weighted probability based on 
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the estimates for  and  against the objective probabilities implies that the subject would 
overestimate the probabilities of the highest and lowest ranked outcomes, particularly the highest 
ranked outcome. This overweighting can be clearly seen in the right panel of Figure 1.7, which 
shows the impact of subject 8’s probability weights on the decision weights for equi-probable 
outcomes. The subject would overestimate the loss probability, and would be willing to pay a higher 
premium to purchase the insurance. The estimated parameters for the RDU Inverse-S model also 
reflect the same qualitative finding. The probability weighting estimate for the RDU Power model, 
in the top right hand corner of Figure 1.6, however, indicates that the subject would be optimistic, 
which would lower how much she should be willing to pay for insurance ceteris paribus the curvature 
of the utility function.  
 
Figure 1.6 Estimated Risk Parameters for Subject #8 
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Figure 1.7 Prelec Probability Weighting and Implied Decision Weights 
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Consumer Surplus 
The expected welfare gain from purchasing insurance in this model depends on how the individual 
is classified, as well as the individual’s risk preferences given their classification. The maximum 
premium to be paid, given a certain potential loss and a certain insurance product, is affected by 
one’s risk preferences. The classification of EUT or RDU will not only affect the breakeven price of 
the insurance for the individual, it will also affect the opportunity cost of the insurance decision. 
Table 1.1 shows the CS calculated for varying premia across the different behavioral models, should 
subject 8 choose to purchase insurance. For each decision, the subject started with an initial 
endowment of $20, a 10% chance of losing $15, and any insurance purchase would fully cover the 
loss. The choices are binary, where a 1 indicates that the subject chose to purchase insurance and a 0 
indicates that the subject chose not to. 
 If the CS is positive in columns 5 to 8 of Table 1.1, the correct choice would be for the 
subject to purchase insurance, assuming the subject’s risk behavior adheres to that model. For 
instance, since the sample subject 8 is classified as EUT at the 5% significance level, based on the 
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results in the EUT column, the optimal choice would be for the subject to purchase insurance if the 
premium was below $1.80, but not to purchase insurance if the premium was $1.80 or higher. We 
refer to this as the switch point of an individual’s decision. 
 The varying levels of risk aversion the subject displays can be seen in the premium level at 
which the subject should switch her insurance purchase decision according to her risk preferences. If 
the subject was classified as RDU Prelec or RDU Inverse-S, the subject would be relatively more 
pessimistic by overweighting the probability of a loss, compared to the same person being classified 
as EUT. This is reflected in the larger expected welfare gain from insurance under these two models, 
seen in the higher switch points, $2.40 and $3.00 respectively.  
Using different models to model the subject’s risk preferences could lead to different 
recommendations for insurance purchase.  For subject 8, within the premium range of $1.40 to 
$2.80, the different models recommend different insurance decisions. For purchase decision 10, with 
a premium of $2, basing the decision on the RDU Inverse-S and RDU Prelec models, the correct 
decision would be for subject 8 to purchase insurance. However the correct decision would be for 
him to not purchase insurance if the subject was classified as EUT or RDU Power. Even for a 
smaller premium, where the correct decision should unanimously be to purchase insurance, the 
expected CS amount would differ across the different models. If the subject makes an incorrect 
decision, we can calculate the size of the foregone CS according to each decision-making model, 
hence this information from the smaller premia should not be ignored. 
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 Table 1.1 Ex ante Consumer Surplus across Classifications for Subject 8 
 
 
 
 
 
Premium  EUT RDU Power RDU Inverse-S RDU Prelec 
Number ($) Choice ($) ($) ($) ($) 
1 .2 1 1.57 1.11 2.72 2.13 
2 .4 1 1.37 .91 2.52 1.93 
3 .6 1 1.17 .71 2.32 1.73 
4 .8 0 .97 .51 2.12 1.53 
5 1 1 .77 .31 1.92 1.33 
6 1.2 1 .57 .11 1.72 1.13 
7 1.4 1 .38 -.08 1.53 .94 
8 1.6 1 .17 -.29 1.32 .73 
9 1.8 1 -.02 -.48 1.13 .54 
10 2 1 -.23 -.69 .92 .33 
11 2.2 1 -.43 -.89 .72 .13 
12 2.4 1 -.63 -1.09 .52 -.07 
13 2.6 0 -.82 -1.28 .33 -.26 
14 2.8 1 -1.02 -1.48 .13 -.46 
15 3 0 -1.22 -1.68 -.07 -.66 
16 3.2 0 -1.43 -1.89 -.28 -.87 
17 3.4 0 -1.63 -2.09 -.48 -1.07 
18 3.6 1 -1.82 -2.28 -.67 -1.26 
19 3.8 0 -2.02 -2.48 -.87 -1.46 
20 4 1 -2.22 -2.68 -1.07 -1.66 
21 4.2 0 -2.42 -2.88 -1.27 -1.86 
22 4.4 0 -2.63 -3.09 -1.48 -2.07 
23 4.6 0 -2.82 -3.28 -1.67 -2.26 
24 4.8 1 -3.03 -3.49 -1.88 -2.47 
 
 
1.5.3 Actual Purchase Decisions  
Individual-Level 
Expected welfare gain is foregone if the subject chooses to purchase insurance when that decision 
has a negative CS, and similarly when the subject chooses not to purchase insurance when the 
decision has a positive CS. Figure 1.8 compares the expected welfare gain from each decision to the 
actual decisions made by subject 8, based on her EUT classification. It shows that the subject has 
foregone $10.37 out of a possible $31.36 of expected welfare gain from insurance. Subject 8’s total 
expected welfare gain for all 24 decisions was $10.62; hence the efficiency for subject 8, in the spirit 
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of the traditional definition by Plott and Smith [1978], is 33.9%. In this experiment the efficiency is 
the expected CS given the subject’s actual choices and estimated risk preferences as a percent of 
total possible expected CS given her predicted choices and estimated risk preferences. The efficiency 
metric is defined at the level of the individual subject, whereas the expected welfare gain is defined at 
the level of each choice by each subject. In addition, efficiency provides a natural normalization of 
expected welfare gain on loss by comparing to the maximal expected welfare gain for that choice 
and subject. Both metrics are of interest, and are complementary. 
Figure 1.9 shows the CS from the decisions that another sample subject 70 has made. 
Subject 70 is classified as RDU Prelec, and theory predicts that the subject’s switch point, the point 
where she should change her decision from choosing to purchase insurance to choosing not to 
purchase insurance, should occur at the $1.20 premium. Instead the subject has delayed the switch 
point to when the premium is $2.20. This delay has contributed to the foregone expected welfare 
gain totaling $5.10 from the decisions with smaller premium amounts. Subject 70’s total possible gain 
from all decisions was $40.86; hence her total expected welfare gain was $30.66 and efficiency of her 
choices was 75.0%. 
 
Aggregate-Level 
Expanding this analysis to look across all subjects, Figure 1.10 shows the kernel density of the 
expected CS of each decision made. We find that 49% of decisions made resulted in negative 
predicted CS. The distribution of expected CS from these results is similar to the distribution if the 
insurance purchase decision was randomized. If insurance was randomly purchased, 50% of decision 
made would result in negative predicted CS, and average expected welfare gain would not be 
significantly different from $0. Although the average expected welfare gain of $0.27 from actual 
decisions made is statistically greater than zero at a p-value of less than 0.001, there are still a large 
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proportion of decisions where take-up is not reflecting the welfare benefit of the insurance product 
to the individual. The efficiency of all decisions made is only 14.0%.  
 
Figure 1.8 Consumer Surplus Based on Subject 8’s Choices Across Premiums, 
EUT Classification 
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Figure 1.9 Consumer Surplus Based on Subject 70’s Choices Across Premiums, 
RDU Prelec Classification 
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Figure 1.11 shows the distribution of efficiency of decisions made by each individual. The 
modal efficiency is slightly less than 50%, and a significant proportion of individuals make decisions 
that result in negative efficiency. In other words, these subjects have made choices that resulted in a 
larger expected welfare loss than the choices that resulted in any expected welfare gain. 
How different are observed choices from those that one would expect if subjects chose to 
purchase insurance at random? We randomly decide 1,000 times whether each subject would 
purchase or not with a probability of ½ for each outcome, and not surprisingly find that the 
corresponding distributions of Figures 1.10 and 1.11 are symmetric around zero and bell-shaped. 
For the efficiency measure this immediately indicates that our welfare calculations provide different 
estimates than if subjects chose at random, since the observed distribution in Figure 1.11 is skewed, 
with a mean of 0.13 and a median of 0.24. For the welfare measures we cannot say at this aggregate 
level if there is any difference from our welfare estimates. But it is easy to show that our welfare 
estimates allow one to identify systematic differences in efficiency for certain subjects. For instance, 
black subjects are 10.4 percentage points (pp) more likely to make an insurance take-up decision 
with a positive welfare gain, with a 95% confidence interval between 2.6 pp and 18.3 pp. As a result, 
their welfare gain from insurance decisions is $0.55 higher per choice, with a 95% confidence 
interval between $0.07 and $1.04. This insight is not obtained, by definition, if all decisions are made 
at random. 
Figure 1.12 shows the breakdown of the number of insurance decisions that were predicted 
to lead to take-up or not, compared to the actual take-up. The predictions for each subject reflect 
the best model of risk preferences for that subject. Only 881 out of the 2,448 insurance purchase 
decisions, or a third of the decisions were predicted to lead to take-up, however 62% or 1,509 of the 
actual decisions made were to purchase insurance. More actual decisions were made to purchase 
insurance than to not purchase insurance regardless of predicted decisions. Fisher’s Exact test, 
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however with a p-value of less than 0.001 for this two-sided test shows that we can reject the null 
hypothesis of no significant difference in predicted and observed take-up.  
 
Figure 1.10 Consumer Surplus Based on Subject 70’s Choices 
 
0
.05
.1
.15
.2
D
en
si
ty
-10 -5 0 5 10
Consumer Surplus ($)
N=2,448. Actual decisions made
Figure 10: Distribution of Consumer Surplus
 
 
Figure 1.11 Distribution of Efficiency of Choice 
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The black bar in Figure 1.12 shows the predicted choices consistent with what was observed, 
and the grey bars show the predicted choices that were inconsistent with what was observed. If 
“take-up” is a reliable metric for evaluating welfare, even at the crude level of “getting the sign right” 
about purchase decisions, the black bars should account for the bulk of decisions. They do not. 
There are 909 decisions out of the 2,448 decisions made where subjects chose to purchase insurance 
which resulted in foregone expected welfare gain. From a policy-making point of view, it is critical 
to look into the factors that contribute to this significant proportion of negative social welfare gain 
and what can be done to shrink it, either by reducing the size of the distribution in Figure 1.10 on 
the left, or by shifting the entire distribution towards the right.  
Our approach allows us to say something about what types of decisions led to welfare losses, 
and if we can identify certain demographics that are more likely to make those types of decisions. To 
illustrate, consider the welfare losses that arise from excess take-up: someone deciding to purchase 
insurance when our analysis implies a welfare loss from that decision. Out of all purchase decisions, 
60% were associated with a welfare loss. Of those, women have a 9.8 pp higher chance than men of 
making such “excess purchase” errors, with a 95% confidence interval between 0 pp and 20 pp; 
when we consider the marginal effect of gender, controlling for other demographics, this estimated 
effect is 11.8 pp with a 95% confidence interval between 1 pp and 23 pp. In principle, this type of 
information allows one to structure interventions to improve decisions by targeting certain 
demographic groups and certain types of errors. 
1.5.4 Bootstrap 
These calculations of expected welfare are conditional on estimates of risk preference, which in turn 
have estimated standard errors. We allow for these errors in the estimates and bootstrap the effects 
on calculated welfare. Using the bootstrapped calculated welfare to predict the beneficial insurance 
choice, Figure 1.13 shows the comparison of the actual take-up to the bootstrapped predicted 
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choices at a 99% significance level. There is a slight difference from the results when point estimates 
were used. Out of the 939 choices to not purchase insurance, 6 more decisions were estimated to 
result in foregone expected welfare gain, but 34 less decisions out of the 1,509 decisions to purchase 
insurance were estimated to result in foregone expected welfare gain. 
 
Figure 1.12 Proportion of Actual Take-Up to Predicted Choices 
 
 
 
Assuming a multivariate normal distribution on the risk parameters, 500 draws on the risk 
parameters for each individual were used to calculate the expected CS for each decision. Each 
decision was tested to determine if they were statistically significantly “incorrect.” In other words, 
for decisions where insurance was actually purchased, was the expected CS significantly negative? 
And if insurance was not actually purchased, was the expected CS significantly positive? 
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Even after allowing for bootstrapping of the calculated welfare, the conclusion remains the 
same. Given the best-fitting decision-making model and risk preferences, a significant proportion of 
decisions made result in negative expected welfare gain. 
 
Figure 1.13 Proportion of Actual Take-Up to Bootstrapped Predicted Choices 
 
 
 
1.6 Implications, Extensions and Limitations 
1.6.1 Implications  
Even though coming from deliberately stylized laboratory tasks, where one can methodologically 
examine behavior under controlled conditions, these results have significant implications for the 
evaluation of insurance products. 
Many evaluations of insurance products use the metric of take-up, as we noted in our 
motivation. We have shown that this simply generates the wrong answer: many people take up a 
product when they should not, and fail to take it up when they should. Of even greater significance, 
take-up is silent on the size of the welfare cost of sub-optimal decisions. Even if it managed to 
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“sign” the correct and incorrect decisions, we have no way of determining if a large fraction of 
incorrect take-up decisions is de minimis in terms of consumer welfare. 
It follows that anyone that attempted to “nudge” behavior towards more take-up could very 
easily be nudging people in the wrong direction in consumer welfare terms. It is presumptuous to 
assume that the subjective guesses of actuaries can be used to substitute for the subjective 
evaluations of individual agents, but that presumption is implied by evaluations that solely determine 
success by increased take-up and the presumption that every decision-maker is a risk averse EUT 
type. This general methodological problem with nudges is well-known, and acknowledged by the 
original proponents of the approach: for instance, see Thaler and Sunstein [2008; ch. 17]. 
From a normative perspective, a great deal of attention has been devoted to design better 
insurance products. We argue that comparable attention should be devoted to designing better 
insurance decisions.15 Of course, what many behavioral economists call better products, worthy of a 
regulatory nudge here or there, are really better decision scaffolds to facilitate better decisions. We 
see no tension here, just the need to have a clear and structured ability to say something about the 
welfare effect of product innovations per se and the decision process surrounding the product. 
1.6.2 Understanding Behavior Towards Other Insurance Products 
This approach of measuring expected welfare gain can easily be extended beyond the current basic 
indemnity product. Other features of insurance, such as deductibles and coinsurance, can be 
modeled in to see how they affect the expected welfare gain and if take-up accurately reflects these 
preferences per standard predictions. Alternative insurance products can also include index 
                                                 
 
15 Grüne-Yanoff and Hertwig [2015] distinguish boosts from nudges along the same lines. We do not see 
these as mutually exclusive, but the distinction is a useful one if only to “nudge” behavioral economists away 
from only thinking about “tricks” to exploit presumed behavioral biases. 
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insurance to investigate how well this model works for basis risk, insurance that covers catastrophic 
risk, or insurance that covers relatively high probability, low loss risks. 
One strength of our approach is that one can rigorously identify which axioms of a 
normative model of risk preferences fail when one observes expected welfare losses. For instance, 
are the subjects that suffer losses when faced with an index insurance product those for whom the 
Reduction of Compound Lotteries axiom fails behaviorally? Precise characterizations of such 
failures can be identified in experiments (e.g., Harrison, Martínez-Correa and Swarthout [2015]), just 
as the lottery battery employed here allows us to identify behavioral failures of the Compound 
Independence axiom. Thus our approach provides a way to structurally identify the behavioral basis 
of sub-optimal insurance decisions.  
1.6.3 Source Independence 
One of the maintained assumptions of our approach is the assumption that we can independently 
estimate risk preferences from one task and use those risk preferences to infer the welfare gain or 
loss from insurance choices. We discussed earlier why some such assumption is needed from a 
conceptual, logical, methodological level if one is to undertake normative evaluations. To 
operationalize this assumption in simple manner we used 80 binary lottery choices to measure risk 
preferences and applied them to 24 binary insurance choices. 
 One way to relax this assumption slightly is to estimate risk preferences with the 80 choices 
over lotteries and 23 of the 24 insurance choices, and use those risk preferences to infer the welfare 
gain or loss from the 1 “hold-out” insurance choice. Then repeat this exercise for each of the other 
23 insurance choices, in each case just leaving out of the estimation sample the single insurance 
choice being evaluated. This jacknife-inspired approach does not remove the assumption of having 
separate measures of risk preferences in order to assess welfare gain or loss, but it does significantly 
weaken it. 
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 More generally, for normative evaluations we do not just seek the “best descriptive model” 
of risk preferences. Obviously we would like the normative metric to be a good descriptive model, 
but it must also be possible to use it to make welfare evaluations with some known normative basis. 
1.6.4 Skewness Risk Preferences 
One important feature of many insurance contracts of interest is that the distribution of payouts is 
highly skewed, with protection generally only provided for extreme tail events. In this case it is 
particularly important to pay attention to models of risk preferences that allow flexible evaluation of 
those rare events. At the risk of some simplification, and only under EUT, we can associate the 
aversion to skewness of outcomes with the 3rd derivative of the utility function (prudence) and 
aversion to kurtosis of outcomes with the 4th derivative (temperance).16 If it is skewness we care 
about, then simple utility functions such as CRRA will do a poor job of characterizing risk 
preferences. 
This issue is of paramount importance in field evaluations of many proposed index 
insurance products for rainfall. Giné, Townsend and Vickrey [2007] evaluate the distribution of 
expected payouts for a product that has been extensively studied in the literature, and that is in many 
ways typical. They pose the issue well (p.1248): 
Does the insurance contract pay off regularly, providing income during periods of 
moderately deficient rainfall? Or does it operate more like disaster insurance, infrequently 
paying an indemnity, but providing a very high payout during the most extreme rainfall 
events? Our evidence suggests the truth is closer to the second case. 
 
                                                 
 
16 The association is not precise, even if helpful to nudge research away from a dogmatic focus on variance in 
outcomes and towards variability of outcomes. Recent interest originated in attempts to formalize the concept 
of “downside risk aversion” by Menezes, Geiss and Tressler [1980]. Brocket and Kahane [1992], Chiu 
[2005][2010] and Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger [2006] provide careful statements of the connection between 
concepts of risk aversion and preferences over moments. The title of §4 of Brocket and Kahane [1992] is as 
blunt as one can be in terms of general statements: “Uʺ <0 and U‴ >0 Are Not Related to Variance 
Avoidance or Skewness Preference.” 
32 
   
They later calculate the distribution of payout amount and the rank of the payout in terms of size. 
They find that 
The payout is zero up to the 89th percentile, indicating that an indemnity is paid in only 11% 
of [rainfall season] phases. The 95th percentile of payouts is around Rs 200, double the 
average premium. In a small fraction of cases (around 1%) the insurance pays the maximum 
indemnity of Rs 1,000, yielding an average return on the premium paid of 900%. [This 
finding] suggests that the [...] policies we study primarily insure farmers against extreme tail 
events of the rainfall distribution. 
 
Of course, such events are what we have many insurance products for, but they have sharp 
implications for the need to use flexible models of risk preferences to undertake reliable welfare 
evaluations in the domain of practical interest in the field. 
1.6.5 Other Models of Risk Preferences or Uncertainty Aversion 
Our approach to evaluating expected welfare gain of insurance from reported beliefs can be readily 
extended beyond EUT or RDU to any model of risk preferences that allows a welfare evaluation. 
The one constraint, and it is an important one, is to determine the parameters of the appropriate 
models for an individual independently of the elicitation of insurance preferences. 
In terms of alternative models of risk aversion, alternatives such as Cumulative Prospect 
Theory (Tversky and Kahneman [1992]) or Disappointment Aversion (Gul [1991]) could be applied. 
More challenging is to extend the approach to consider “uncertainty aversion,” as defined by 
Schmeidler [1989; p. 582] and often referred to as “ambiguity aversion.” For instance, the “smooth 
ambiguity model” of Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji [2005] would be relatively straightforward, as 
would the α-maxmin EU model of Ghiradoto, Maccheroni and Marinacci [2004], generalizing the 
maxmim EU model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989]. 
It would not be appropriate, however, to consider any descriptive model of behavior 
towards risk that did not allow a welfare evaluation. Even if such models were descriptively more 
accurate than models that allow a welfare evaluation, if they do not imply some measure of 
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consumer surplus then they are of no value for normative evaluation of insurance. As it happens, we 
do not believe that these heuristic-based models are at all impressive descriptively, but that is 
another debate for another day.17 
1.6.6 Field Experiments 
The experiment conducted was deliberately limited to the laboratory, where the probability of loss 
was given. If the experiment was run in the field, additional tasks would be required to estimate the 
subjective loss probabilities to the individual. 
An additional feature of the field, in developed countries and particularly in developing 
countries, is the added risk of non-performance. The chance that insurance companies will not 
deliver on their contracts as promised is not a casual one, as anyone that has spent any time in 
developing countries can attest. A practical example of these problems is explained by Banerjee, 
Duflo and Hornbeck [2014; p. 297]: 
And as it turns out, SKS clients were correct ex post in not wanting to purchase this particular 
health insurance policy. Implementation of the insurance was mismanaged by the 
partnership of SKS and ICICI-Lombard. In our sample of clients, few claims were 
submitted and very few clients received any reimbursement. By the endline survey, and in 
our regular monitoring data, very few people report using insurance, largely because clients 
were never given documentation to be able to use the insurance or clients did not know how 
to use the insurance. There is no particular reason to think that this was expected by SKS 
clients ex ante, at least beyond the normal pessimism in developing countries about the 
prospects of formal health insurance. By the time the product was voluntary, however, these 
failures were probably quite obvious and could explain why only 29 people [out of roughly 
5,000] purchased insurance voluntarily. The fact that client pessimism was well-grounded 
suggests that offering products that do work, and letting people experience them, should 
come before trying to solve issues like adverse selection that can only arise once insurance 
actually delivers a valuable service. 
 
We mention these problems because we have a relatively rich theory of the implications of 
default risk for the demand for insurance (Doherty and Schlesinger [1990]), as well as evidence that 
                                                 
 
17 For instance, the popular “priority heuristic” of risky choices proposed by Brandstätter, Gigerenzer and 
Hertwig [2006] has an appalling predictive power, as shown by Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2010; 
§7]. 
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“compound risks” provide a particularly acute source of behavioral problems for individuals 
(Harrison, Martínez-Correa and Swarthout [2015]). These problems can be studied in the laboratory, 
in stylized fashion, before one dives into the complications of the field. 
1.6.7 What Should the Normative Metric Be? 
Our statement of efficiency losses takes as given the type of risk preferences each individual 
employs, and uses that as the basis for evaluating welfare effects of insurance decisions: periculum 
habitus non est disputandum. One could go further and question if the RDU models themselves 
embody an efficiency loss for those subjects we classify as RDU. Many would argue that RDU 
violates some normatively attractive axioms, such as the independence axiom. Forget whether that 
axiom is descriptively accurate or not. If RDU is not normatively attractive then we should do a 
calculation of CS in which we only assume EUT parameters for subjects: we could estimate the EUT 
model and get the corresponding CRRA coefficient estimate (we would not just use the CRRA 
coefficient estimate from the RDU specification). Then we repeat the calculations. For subjects best 
modeled as EUT there is no change in the inferred CS, of course.  
This issue raises many deeper issues with the way in which one should undertake behavioral 
welfare economics. For now, we take the agnostic view that the risk preferences we have modeled as 
best characterizing the individual are those that should be used, in the spirit of the “welfarism” 
axiom of welfare economics. Even though the alternatives to EUT were originally developed to 
relax one of the axioms of EUT that some consider attractive normatively, it does not follow that 
one is unable to write down axioms that make those alternatives attractive normatively.  
We view this methodological issue as urgent, open, and important. There is a large, general 
literature on behavioral welfare economics, including Bernheim [2009], Bernheim and Rangel [2009], 
Manzini and Mariotti [2012][2014], Rubinstein and Salant [2012], Salant and Rubinstein [2008] and 
Sugden [2004]. Our general concern with this literature is that although it identifies the 
35 
   
methodological problem well, none provide “clear guidance” so far to practical, rigorous welfare 
evaluation with respect to risk preferences as far as we can determine. 
1.7 Conclusions 
The laboratory is the correct place to start the welfare evaluation of insurance products, since it 
provides the best chance of controlling the environment and becoming an actual behavior. Every 
issue that one might have with the manner in which theory is implemented in the laboratory has the 
same force in the field, but is usually buried by the added weight of confounds that cannot be 
controlled easily in the field. We have already noted several issues that would arise as we extend our 
analysis, in terms of complications to the tasks from more interesting insurance products, and the 
modeling of risk preferences and subjective beliefs. As a way of illustrating how one might 
operationalize an answer to this question, then, the laboratory is the appropriate place to begin. The 
only sense in which the laboratory is limited is the nature of the population from which we sample, 
and there are obvious solutions to those concerns that are well developed in the literature on 
“artefactual field experiments” (e.g., Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2010]). 
We also view the laboratory as the appropriate place to “wind tunnel” the normative welfare 
evaluation of new products or decision scaffolds. Figures 1.10 and 1.11 stand as explicit, rigorous 
“target practice” for anyone proposing nudges or clubs to improve welfare from insurance 
decisions.  
Our approach has one methodological perspective that might seem alien to many of the 
currently popular applied evaluations in economics: the use of theory. We reject as incomplete the 
claim that one can study welfare effects without theory, or with minimal use of theory (Harrison 
[2011a]). Nor can one study any claims of causality that involve latent constructs, such as welfare, 
without the explicit or implicit use of theory (Harrison [2011b][2014]). We show, in fact, that 
conclusions about causality or welfare that try to avoid using latent constructs from theory, such as 
36 
   
those focusing on insurance take-up as the metric of evaluation, can generate the wrong conclusions. 
The methodological reason for this conclusion is that one needs behavioral latent theoretical 
constraints at the beginning and end of the causal chain being evaluated: risk preferences and 
expected welfare. 
Substantively we provide a clear decomposition of the efficiency losses that come from 
people making poor decisions about insurance products. We find significant welfare losses from the 
insurance decisions individuals make. Now begins the exciting task of scientifically considering ways 
to reduce those behavioral welfare losses. 
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1.8 Appendix A: Instructions 
1.8.1 Risk Preferences 
Choices Over Risky Prospects 
 
 This is a task where you will choose between prospects with varying prizes and chances of 
winning. You will be presented with a series of pairs of prospects where you will choose one of 
them. There are 50 pairs in the series. For each pair of prospects, you should choose the prospect 
you prefer to play. You will actually get the chance to play one of the prospects you choose, and you 
will be paid according to the outcome of that prospect, so you should think carefully about which 
prospect you prefer. 
 
 Here is an example of what the computer display of such a pair of prospects will look like. 
 
 
 
  
The outcome of the prospects will be determined by the draw of a random number between 
1 and 100. Each number between, and including, 1 and 100 is equally likely to occur. In fact, you will 
be able to draw the number yourself using two 10-sided dice. 
 
 In the above example the left prospect pays five dollars ($5) if the number drawn is between 
1 and 40, and pays fifteen dollars ($15) if the number is between 41 and 100. The blue color in the 
pie chart corresponds to 40% of the area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be 
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between 1 and 40 and your prize will be $5. The orange area in the pie chart corresponds to 60% of 
the area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be between 41 and 100 and your 
prize will be $15. When you select the lottery to be played out the computer will tell you what die 
throws translate into what prize. 
 
 Now look at the pie in the chart on the right. It pays five dollars ($5) if the number drawn is 
between 1 and 50, ten dollars ($10) if the number is between 51 and 90, and fifteen dollars ($15) if 
the number is between 91 and 100. As with the prospect on the left, the pie slices represent the 
fraction of the possible numbers which yield each payoff. For example, the size of the $15 pie slice 
is 10% of the total pie. 
 
 Each pair of prospects is shown on a separate screen on the computer. On each screen, you 
should indicate which prospect you prefer to play by clicking on one of the buttons beneath the 
prospects.  
 
 After you have worked through all of the pairs of prospects, raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come over. You will then roll two 10-sided die to determine which pair of 
prospects will be played out. Since there is a chance that any of your 50 choices could be played out 
for real, you should approach each pair of prospects as if it is the one that you will play out. Finally, 
you will roll the two 10-sided dice to determine the outcome of the prospect you chose. 
 
 For instance, suppose you picked the prospect on the left in the above example. If the 
random number was 37, you would win $5; if it was 93, you would get $15. If you picked the 
prospect on the right and drew the number 37, you would get $5; if it was 93, you would get $15. 
 
 Therefore, your payoff is determined by three things: 
 
 by which prospect you selected, the left or the right, for each of these 50 pairs; 
 by which prospect pair is chosen to be played out in the series of 50 such pairs using two 10-
sided die; and 
 by the outcome of that prospect when you roll the two 10-sided dice. 
 
 Which prospects you prefer is a matter of personal taste. The people next to you may be 
presented with different prospects, and may have different preferences, so their responses should 
not matter to you. Please work silently, and make your choices by thinking carefully about each 
prospect. 
 
 All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the $7.50 show-up fee that you receive just for 
being here, as well as any other earnings in other tasks. 
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1.8.2 Insurance Choices 
Choices Over Insurance Prospects 
 
In this task you will be asked to make a series of insurance decisions. For each decision, you 
will start off with an initial amount of money. You will then be presented with the probability and 
value of a potential loss, as well as the price of the insurance you could purchase to avoid that loss. 
You have to decide if you want to purchase the insurance that would protect you if that loss should 
occur. There are 24 such decisions to be made in this task. After all the decisions have been made, 
you will actually get the chance to play out one of the insurance decisions you make. You will be 
paid according to the outcome of that event, so you should think carefully about how much the 
insurance is worth to you. 
 
Here is an example of what your decision would look like on the computer screen. 
 
 
 
In this lottery, there is a 10% chance you will experience a loss of fifteen dollars ($15) that 
corresponds with the red portion of the pie, and a 90% chance you will experience no loss ($0) that 
corresponds with the green portion of the pie. Since you start out with $20, this means there is a 
90% chance your earnings remain at $20, but there is a 10% chance you will lose $15, which would 
leave you with $5.  
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You are given the option to buy insurance to protect yourself against the potential loss in 
this lottery. You should decide if you want the insurance before you know if a loss will occur. In this 
example, the insurance will cost you $2.20. This is full insurance, meaning if you purchase the 
insurance and a loss should occur, the insurance will cover the full loss, and your net earnings will be 
your initial earnings of $20 less the price paid for the insurance ($2.20), which is $17.80. If you 
choose to purchase insurance and there was no loss you would still need to pay for the $2.20 
insurance, and your net earnings will be $17.80. 
 
 Each decision you have to make is shown on a separate screen on the computer. For each 
decision, you should indicate your choice to purchase, or not purchase the insurance by clicking on 
your preferred option, then clicking the ‘OK’ button.  
 
 We will use die rolls to play out the probabilities. After everyone has worked through all of 
the insurance decisions, please wait in your seat, an experimenter will come to you. You will then roll 
a 30-sided die to determine which insurance decision will be played out. Since there are only 24 
decisions, you will keep rolling the die until a number between 1 and 24 comes up. There is an equal 
chance that any of your 24 choices could be selected, so you should approach each decision as if it is 
the one that you will actually play out to determine your payoff. Once the decision to play out is 
selected, you will roll the 10-sided die to determine the outcome of the lottery. If a 0 is rolled on the 
die, a loss event has occurred. If a number 1 to 9 is rolled, then there is no loss. 
 
Based on the example given in the display above, here is a summary of the outcomes of your 
insurance choices: 
 
Die Roll Without Insurance With Insurance 
- Initial earnings are $20. Initial earnings are $20. 
- Nothing paid for insurance. Price of insurance, $2.20, paid 
0 Loss occurs in the lottery. $15 
loss incurred, net earnings will be 
$5. 
Loss occurs in the lottery. 
Insurance will cover the loss, 
earnings less insurance price will 
be $17.80. 
1 - 9 No loss occurs. Net earnings will 
be $20. 
No loss occurs. Earnings less 
insurance price will be $17.80.  
 
Therefore, your payoff is determined by three factors: 
 
 whether or not you chose to buy insurance for each of the 24 decisions; 
 the decision selected to actually be played out using a 30-sided die; and 
 whether or not there is a loss based on the die roll from a 10-sided die. 
 
 Whether or not you prefer to buy the insurance is a matter of personal taste. You may 
choose to buy insurance on some or all of your 24 choices, or none of the choices. The people next 
to you may be presented with different insurance prices, and may have different preferences, so their 
responses should not matter to you. Please work silently, and make your choices by thinking 
carefully about each prospect. 
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 All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the show-up fee that you receive just for being 
here, as well as any other earnings in other tasks. 
 
 Are there any questions? 
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1.9 Appendix B: Risk Lottery Parameters  
Table 1.2 Risk Lottery Parameters 
 
Left Lottery 
 
Right Lottery 
Lottery ID Prize 1 Probability 1 Prize 2 Probability 2 Prize 3 Probability 3 
 
Prize 1 Probability 1 Prize 2 Probability 2 Prize 3 Probability 3 
              ls1_rl $10 0 $30 0.25 $50 0.75 
 
$10 0.15 $30 0 $50 0.85 
ls2_rl $10 0.15 $30 0.25 $50 0.6 
 
$10 0.3 $30 0 $50 0.7 
ls3_rl $10 0 $30 0.5 $50 0.5 
 
$10 0.3 $30 0 $50 0.7 
ls4_lr $10 0.15 $30 0.25 $50 0.6 
 
$10 0 $30 0.5 $50 0.5 
ls5_lr $10 0.15 $30 0.75 $50 0.1 
 
$10 0 $30 1 $50 0 
ls6_lr $10 0.6 $30 0 $50 0.4 
 
$10 0 $30 1 $50 0 
ls7_lr $10 0.6 $30 0 $50 0.4 
 
$10 0.15 $30 0.75 $50 0.1 
ls8_lr $10 0.9 $30 0 $50 0.1 
 
$10 0.75 $30 0.25 $50 0 
ls9_rl $10 0 $30 0.2 $50 0.8 
 
$10 0.1 $30 0 $50 0.9 
ls10_rl $10 0.1 $30 0.8 $50 0.1 
 
$10 0.5 $30 0 $50 0.5 
ls11_lr $10 0.5 $30 0 $50 0.5 
 
$10 0 $30 1 $50 0 
ls12_rl $10 0 $30 1 $50 0 
 
$10 0.1 $30 0.8 $50 0.1 
ls13_rl $10 0.5 $30 0.4 $50 0.1 
 
$10 0.7 $30 0 $50 0.3 
ls14_rl $10 0.4 $30 0.6 $50 0 
 
$10 0.7 $30 0 $50 0.3 
ls15_rl $10 0.4 $30 0.6 $50 0 
 
$10 0.5 $30 0.4 $50 0.1 
ls16_lr $10 0.9 $30 0 $50 0.1 
 
$10 0.8 $30 0.2 $50 0 
ls17_rl $10 0 $30 0.25 $50 0.75 
 
$10 0.1 $30 0 $50 0.9 
ls18_rl $10 0.1 $30 0.75 $50 0.15 
 
$10 0.4 $30 0 $50 0.6 
ls19_rl $10 0 $30 1 $50 0 
 
$10 0.4 $30 0 $50 0.6 
ls20_rl $10 0 $30 1 $50 0 
 
$10 0.1 $30 0.75 $50 0.15 
ls21_lr $10 0.7 $30 0 $50 0.3 
 
$10 0.6 $30 0.25 $50 0.15 
ls22_lr $10 0.7 $30 0 $50 0.3 
 
$10 0.5 $30 0.5 $50 0 
ls23_lr $10 0.6 $30 0.25 $50 0.15 
 
$10 0.5 $30 0.5 $50 0 
ls24_rl $10 0.75 $30 0.25 $50 0 
 
$10 0.85 $30 0 $50 0.15 
ls25_lr $10 0.1 $30 0 $50 0.9 
 
$10 0 $30 0.3 $50 0.7 
ls26_rl $10 0.2 $30 0.6 $50 0.2 
 
$10 0.4 $30 0 $50 0.6 
ls27_lr $10 0.4 $30 0 $50 0.6 
 
$10 0.1 $30 0.9 $50 0 
ls28_rl $10 0.1 $30 0.9 $50 0 
 
$10 0.2 $30 0.6 $50 0.2 
ls29_rl $10 0.5 $30 0.3 $50 0.2 
 
$10 0.6 $30 0 $50 0.4 
ls30_lr $10 0.6 $30 0 $50 0.4 
 
$10 0.4 $30 0.6 $50 0 
ls31_rl $10 0.4 $30 0.6 $50 0 
 
$10 0.5 $30 0.3 $50 0.2 
ls32_lr $10 0.8 $30 0 $50 0.2 
 
$10 0.7 $30 0.3 $50 0 
ls33_rl $10 0 $30 0.4 $50 0.6 
 
$10 0.1 $30 0 $50 0.9 
ls34_rl $10 0.1 $30 0.6 $50 0.3 
 
$10 0.25 $30 0 $50 0.75 
ls35_rl $10 0 $30 1 $50 0 
 
$10 0.25 $30 0 $50 0.75 
ls36_rl $10 0 $30 1 $50 0 
 
$10 0.1 $30 0.6 $50 0.3 
ls37_lr $10 0.5 $30 0.2 $50 0.3 
 
$10 0.4 $30 0.6 $50 0 
ls38_lr $10 0.55 $30 0 $50 0.45 
 
$10 0.4 $30 0.6 $50 0 
ls39_rl $10 0.5 $30 0.2 $50 0.3 
 
$10 0.55 $30 0 $50 0.45 
ls40_lr $10 0.7 $30 0 $50 0.3 
 
$10 0.6 $30 0.4 $50 0 
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Left Lottery 
 
Right Lottery 
Lottery ID Prize 1 Probability 1 Prize 2 Probability 2 Prize 3 Probability 3 
 
Prize 1 Probability 1 Prize 2 Probability 2 Prize 3 Probability 3 
              ls1i_rl $10 0.03 $30 0.2 $50 0.77 $10 0.12 $30 0.05 $50 0.83 
ls2i_rl $10 0.18 $30 0.2 $50 0.62  $10 0.27 $30 0.05 $50 0.68 
ls3i_lr $10 0.27 $30 0.05 $50 0.68  $10 0.03 $30 0.45 $50 0.52 
ls4i_lr $10 0.12 $30 0.3 $50 0.58  $10 0.03 $30 0.45 $50 0.52 
ls5i_rl $10 0.06 $30 0.9 $50 0.04  $10 0.12 $30 0.8 $50 0.08 
ls6i_lr $10 0.54 $30 0.1 $50 0.36  $10 0.06 $30 0.9 $50 0.04 
ls7i_rl $10 0.18 $30 0.7 $50 0.12  $10 0.54 $30 0.1 $50 0.36 
ls8i_lr $10 0.84 $30 0.1 $50 0.06  $10 0.78 $30 0.2 $50 0.02 
ls9i_lr $10 0.08 $30 0.04 $50 0.88  $10 0.05 $30 0.1 $50 0.85 
ls10i_rl $10 0.2 $30 0.6 $50 0.2  $10 0.45 $30 0.1 $50 0.45 
ls11i_rl $10 0.1 $30 0.8 $50 0.1  $10 0.45 $30 0.1 $50 0.45 
ls12i_lr $10 0.08 $30 0.84 $50 0.08  $10 0.05 $30 0.9 $50 0.05 
ls13i_lr $10 0.65 $30 0.1 $50 0.25  $10 0.55 $30 0.3 $50 0.15 
ls14i_lr $10 0.65 $30 0.1 $50 0.25  $10 0.45 $30 0.5 $50 0.05 
ls15i_lr $10 0.48 $30 0.44 $50 0.08  $10 0.44 $30 0.52 $50 0.04 
ls16i_rl $10 0.83 $30 0.14 $50 0.03  $10 0.88 $30 0.04 $50 0.08 
ls17i_lr $10 0.08 $30 0.05 $50 0.87  $10 0.04 $30 0.15 $50 0.81 
ls18i_lr $10 0.38 $30 0.05 $50 0.57  $10 0.14 $30 0.65 $50 0.21 
ls19i_lr $10 0.38 $30 0.05 $50 0.57  $10 0.04 $30 0.9 $50 0.06 
ls20i_rl $10 0.02 $30 0.95 $50 0.03  $10 0.08 $30 0.8 $50 0.12 
ls21i_rl $10 0.62 $30 0.2 $50 0.18  $10 0.68 $30 0.05 $50 0.27 
ls22i_lr $10 0.66 $30 0.1 $50 0.24  $10 0.54 $30 0.4 $50 0.06 
ls23i_rl $10 0.52 $30 0.45 $50 0.03  $10 0.58 $30 0.3 $50 0.12 
ls24i_lr $10 0.81 $30 0.1 $50 0.09  $10 0.77 $30 0.2 $50 0.03 
ls25i_lr $10 0.08 $30 0.06 $50 0.86  $10 0.02 $30 0.24 $50 0.74 
ls26i_rl $10 0.25 $30 0.45 $50 0.3  $10 0.35 $30 0.15 $50 0.5 
ls27i_lr $10 0.35 $30 0.15 $50 0.5  $10 0.15 $30 0.75 $50 0.1 
ls28i_lr $10 0.18 $30 0.66 $50 0.16  $10 0.12 $30 0.84 $50 0.04 
ls29i_rl $10 0.53 $30 0.21 $50 0.26  $10 0.58 $30 0.06 $50 0.36 
ls30i_lr $10 0.55 $30 0.15 $50 0.3  $10 0.45 $30 0.45 $50 0.1 
ls31i_lr $10 0.48 $30 0.36 $50 0.16  $10 0.42 $30 0.54 $50 0.04 
ls32i_lr $10 0.78 $30 0.06 $50 0.16  $10 0.72 $30 0.24 $50 0.04 
ls33i_lr $10 0.08 $30 0.08 $50 0.84  $10 0.02 $30 0.32 $50 0.66 
ls34i_lr $10 0.22 $30 0.12 $50 0.66  $10 0.13 $30 0.48 $50 0.39 
ls35i_lr $10 0.2 $30 0.2 $50 0.6  $10 0.1 $30 0.6 $50 0.3 
ls36i_rl $10 0.02 $30 0.92 $50 0.06  $10 0.08 $30 0.68 $50 0.24 
ls37i_lr $10 0.48 $30 0.28 $50 0.24  $10 0.44 $30 0.44 $50 0.12 
ls38i_rl $10 0.45 $30 0.4 $50 0.15  $10 0.5 $30 0.2 $50 0.3 
ls39i_lr $10 0.54 $30 0.04 $50 0.42  $10 0.52 $30 0.12 $50 0.36 
ls40i_rl $10 0.65 $30 0.2 $50 0.15  $10 0.68 $30 0.08 $50 0.24 
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1.10 Appendix C: Maximum Likelihood Point Estimates  
Table 1.3 Maximum Likelihood Point Estimates 
 
ID Classification EUT RDU Inverse-S RDU Power RDU Prelec 
  r r  r  r  
         
1 RDU Inverse-S 0.1968 -0.6212 2.8051 -0.8507 2.4608 -0.7238 2.3322 1.0617 
2 RDU Power 0.8868 0.8379 1.3509 0.9541 0.1071 . . . 
3 RDU Prelec 0.5306 . . . . -1.5427 4.4693 0.4611 
4 EUT 0.0037 . . . . . . . 
5 RDU Prelec 0.1770 -0.8191 3.6307 -0.6869 2.4926 -1.8834 3.6609 0.4876 
6 EUT 0.0923 0.0901 1.0229 -0.2572 1.5114 -0.3780 1.5761 0.8304 
7 RDU Inverse-S . 0.9816 1.3554 . . . . . 
8 EUT 0.3233 0.2893 0.7857 0.5118 0.6530 0.4642 0.6956 0.7426 
9 EUT 0.1810 . . . . . . . 
10 EUT 0.5704 0.5686 1.0492 0.5258 1.0971 0.5901 0.9924 1.1440 
11 EUT 0.1723 -0.1909 1.9801 -0.4033 1.7887 0.2470 2.3717 6.6754 
12 RDU Prelec 0.4096 0.4093 1.0236 0.6635 0.5504 0.7599 0.3979 1.3534 
13 EUT 0.8852 0.8976 1.0668 0.9617 0.3007 . . . 
14 RDU Prelec 0.6505 0.6423 1.3392 . . 0.8569 0.7790 1.7646 
15 EUT 0.6843 . . 0.6804 1.0082 . . . 
16 RDU Prelec 0.2117 0.1284 0.6264 0.0549 1.2607 -3.1195 4.6824 0.2669 
17 EUT 0.6717 0.3164 3.7333 0.3217 2.6514 0.4527 3.8177 1.3549 
18 RDU Power . . . 0.8717 0.4338 . . . 
19 RDU Prelec 0.5920 0.5393 1.3424 . . 0.8348 0.4975 1.7807 
20 EUT 0.2529 0.2154 1.2458 0.1341 1.1820 0.2559 1.0527 1.1921 
21 RDU Prelec 0.7232 0.6545 1.3867 . . 0.8685 0.8355 1.7452 
22 RDU Prelec -0.3745 -0.8009 1.5983 -0.8874 1.5546 -3.0351 3.1022 0.3471 
23 EUT 0.7460 0.7751 0.9039 . . . . . 
24 EUT -0.0869 -0.0886 0.8989 -0.0478 0.9527 -0.1911 1.0677 0.8462 
25 EUT 0.3446 0.3441 0.9632 0.4446 0.8271 0.4600 0.8064 1.0238 
26 EUT 0.6921 0.6874 1.0276 0.6102 1.1686 0.6291 1.1584 1.0953 
27 EUT 0.0285 -0.0697 1.5487 0.4042 0.5632 . . . 
28 RDU Prelec . . . -2.0277 1.4217 -8.2198 6.6867 0.1463 
29 EUT 0.6680 0.6114 0.8307 . . 0.8654 0.3380 0.7513 
30 RDU Prelec -0.0821 -0.0807 1.0096 0.4976 0.4289 0.7930 0.1548 1.8337 
31 EUT 0.6040 0.4965 1.7279 0.4046 1.4399 0.6458 1.1508 1.5153 
32 RDU Prelec . 0.7276 1.2759 . . 0.9756 0.0979 3.1528 
33 EUT 0.5635 0.3925 1.7439 0.3915 1.3350 0.6245 1.0629 1.7266 
34 RDU Power . . . 0.9130 0.6907 . . . 
35 RDU Prelec 0.0912 -0.2039 1.8437 . . 0.4926 0.7545 1.9317 
36 EUT 0.5020 0.5020 0.9943 0.6525 0.6775 0.6844 0.6205 1.2293 
37 RDU Prelec -0.5325 -1.0770 1.8699 -1.1545 1.7698 -4.5321 4.3645 0.3017 
38 EUT 0.5921 0.5743 1.2669 -0.8599 4.7639 -0.4745 17.1746 2.2849 
39 EUT 0.6226 0.6684 2.0096 0.6054 1.0757 0.7837 2.4177 1.7065 
40 EUT 0.2718 0.2336 1.2374 0.2703 1.0023 0.4351 0.8141 1.3425 
41 EUT 0.6951 0.6733 0.8943 0.8121 0.5597 0.8320 0.5121 0.8746 
42 RDU Prelec 0.8190 0.8626 1.2351 0.9322 0.2692 0.9057 0.3590 1.1156 
43 EUT 0.7601 0.6239 1.4294 0.9293 0.1907 0.9774 1.0135 4.7932 
44 EUT 0.5432 0.0956 2.2419 -0.0125 1.8895 . . . 
45 EUT -0.0235 -0.0874 1.3397 -2.8740 4.3179 -2.5502 4.8990 1.3546 
46 RDU Prelec 0.1206 -0.1965 1.8223 -0.5795 1.7829 0.4441 0.7888 2.3210 
47 RDU Inverse-S . -1.6555 3.3310 -1.6331 2.7143 -1.6916 4.4361 6.1368 
48 RDU Prelec -0.2039 -0.5541 1.5967 -0.6154 1.3751 0.4724 0.4451 2.0798 
49 RDU Prelec 0.2103 0.1893 0.8626 0.4315 0.6387 0.3857 0.6846 0.8857 
50 RDU Inverse-S -1.0825 -3.7558 3.5504 . . 0.3788 0.4666 3.0191 
51 EUT 0.6161 0.6075 0.9562 0.7156 0.7278 0.7136 0.7294 0.9876 
52 EUT 0.1891 0.1789 1.0798 0.1782 1.0158 0.2744 0.9088 1.1721 
    
 
    
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ID Classification EUT RDU Inverse-S RDU Power RDU Prelec 
  r r  r  r  
         
53 EUT 0.8663 0.9682 1.9548 0.8317 1.2998 . . . 
54 EUT 0.4169 . . . . . . . 
55 RDU Prelec 0.4142 0.4156 1.0331 0.6287 0.5830 0.6318 0.5800 1.0256 
56 RDU Prelec 0.8839 0.8604 1.0594 . . 0.9892 0.1478 3.1507 
57 EUT 0.1942 . . . . . . . 
58 EUT -0.6461 -0.6854 1.2255 -0.9142 1.2212 -0.7815 1.1518 1.0635 
59 EUT -0.3664 -0.5741 1.4918 -1.4995 1.7083 0.3527 0.5362 1.7709 
60 EUT 0.4212 . . . . . . . 
61 EUT 0.6019 0.5773 2.0325 0.5941 1.0316 0.9190 1.9498 3.6259 
62 RDU Prelec 0.4636 0.4027 0.7555 0.6748 0.5071 0.6272 0.5903 0.7529 
63 RDU Inverse-S . 0.9351 1.0596 . . . . . 
64 RDU Prelec . 0.7247 1.3306 . . 0.9429 0.0723 2.3838 
65 EUT 0.8087 0.6755 1.5288 . . 0.7647 1.1498 1.4579 
66 RDU Prelec 0.4687 0.8349 0.3803 . . -2.3454 5.6302 0.4852 
67 RDU Inverse-S 0.3209 0.2761 0.7121 0.4375 0.7772 0.2161 1.0738 0.5671 
68 RDU Inverse-S 0.4450 0.0741 0.5372 0.5206 0.5938 0.2036 0.9635 0.4164 
69 EUT 0.1042 0.0271 1.3157 -0.0616 1.2034 . . . 
70 RDU Prelec 0.7977 0.6384 1.5623 0.5000 1.4779 0.7033 1.5260 1.5840 
71 RDU Prelec 0.7584 0.5781 1.4704 . . 0.7880 1.2251 1.9618 
72 EUT 0.6857 . . 0.8125 0.5521 . . . 
73 EUT 0.3061 0.3056 1.0255 0.2354 1.1186 0.2194 1.1332 0.9740 
74 RDU Prelec -0.4461 -0.5055 1.2935 -0.6424 1.1446 0.1599 0.6336 1.4969 
75 EUT -0.0272 -0.3892 2.0114 -1.3166 2.3701 -0.1851 1.8981 2.2582 
76 EUT 0.7799 0.6320 1.3723 . . 0.8742 0.6073 2.2881 
77 RDU Prelec 0.2483 0.0871 1.5995 -0.0297 1.3753 0.4478 0.9350 1.9402 
78 RDU Prelec 0.3497 0.2577 1.4301 0.3238 1.0386 0.6844 0.5769 1.8181 
79 RDU Prelec 0.6446 0.6076 1.3777 . . 0.9574 0.4211 3.1279 
80 EUT 0.7557 . . 0.7394 1.0269 . . . 
81 RDU Prelec 0.4568 0.3881 1.3630 . . 0.7529 0.5701 2.1033 
82 EUT 0.6110 0.6037 0.9685 0.7767 0.5558 0.7801 0.5448 0.9598 
83 EUT 0.2083 -0.2427 2.4335 -0.2182 1.7159 -0.8234 2.3375 0.6118 
84 EUT 0.6861 0.7453 0.6882 0.7644 0.7315 0.7941 0.6332 0.8432 
85 EUT -0.3014 -0.3682 1.2288 -0.3810 1.0833 -0.3370 1.0555 1.0583 
86 EUT -0.1910 -0.2286 0.8628 -2.5972 3.5067 . . . 
87 RDU Prelec -0.4293 -0.4658 0.4568 -0.4270 0.9871 -2.4999 3.2754 0.2464 
88 RDU Prelec 0.0777 0.0778 0.9995 -0.1938 1.3783 -1.3937 2.6617 0.4566 
89 RDU Prelec -0.4294 -0.3952 0.6149 -0.2675 0.8418 -3.5191 3.3460 0.1590 
90 RDU Prelec 0.6027 0.6095 1.2164 0.8828 0.3224 0.8276 0.4387 1.3169 
91 RDU Prelec -0.4153 -0.4725 1.2179 -0.4669 1.0383 0.3338 0.4790 1.8251 
92 RDU Inverse-S 0.6252 0.4370 1.9734 0.4445 1.3659 0.5507 1.2100 1.2178 
93 EUT 0.1155 0.1134 1.0174 0.2476 0.8243 0.4248 0.6258 1.4242 
94 RDU Prelec 0.1656 0.1255 1.2601 0.2026 0.9502 0.4461 0.6883 1.3907 
95 EUT -0.2697 -0.3786 1.2107 -0.3544 1.0819 0.0980 0.6772 1.7410 
96 RDU Prelec 0.1460 0.0133 0.7263 0.7116 0.2217 0.6359 0.2968 0.8284 
97 RDU Prelec 0.4681 0.4653 0.8330 0.0829 1.9070 -0.2905 2.3660 0.7091 
98 RDU Prelec 0.4748 0.1393 1.9745 -0.0289 1.7935 0.3473 1.3459 1.5838 
99 RDU Inverse-S . 0.9872 1.3814 . . . . . 
100 EUT 0.1251 . . . . . . . 
101 RDU Prelec 0.8111 0.7987 1.2578 0.9855 0.0600 0.9420 0.2127 1.3096 
102 RDU Prelec 0.3747 . . . . -2.1075 5.9313 1.0571 
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1.11 Appendix D: Literature Review of Experimental Studies  
McClelland, Schulze and Coursey [1993] 
 
McClelland et al. [1993] conducted laboratory experiments with real payments to see if insurance 
behavior is fundamentally different for low-probability events than for high-probability events. Their 
first study involved manipulating the probability of loss from very high (0.9) to very low (0.01), while 
keeping the size of the monetary loss fixed at $4. They used Vickrey auctions, where 8 subjects at a 
time bid for insurance against the loss scenarios, and the top 4 bidders receive the insurance at the 
cost of the 5th highest bid. The loss was determined by drawing a chip from a bag, and the result of 
that event applied to all subjects. The mean bids of the insurance converged at the expected value of 
the insurance for most probabilities of loss.  
 The results from the very low probabilities show bimodal behavior from the subjects: they 
either buy zero insurance or they bid much higher than the expected value. Their second study 
shows that this result continues to hold for a larger loss amount, or even as subjects gain experience. 
Risk preferences were not taken into account, and McClelland et al. [1993; p. 110] note that risk 
preferences could possibly help explain their results: 
Thus, at least for low probabilities, another theory such as [EUT] or [Prospect Theory] must 
be employed to explain the apparent oversensitivity to small probabilities observed in our 
experiments. 
 
 
Irwin, McClelland and Schulze [1992] 
 
Irwin et al. [1992] explore the effects of hypothetical versus real money and experience on insurance 
purchasing behavior. They make use of the same Vickrey auction as in McClellend et al. [1993], but 
set the number of draws at 50 or 150 for each subject with a fixed loss probability of 0.01 for all 
draws. Following McClelland et al. [1993], they claim the expected value of the lottery as the optimal 
cost of insurance and do not take into account the risk preference of the individual. Their results 
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show that the bimodal result from McClelland et al. [1993] was less pronounced if hypothetical 
rewards were used, as there was an increased number of very low and very high bids, and that there 
is some effect of having more than one round in the experiment.  
 
Ganderton, Brookshire, McKee, Stewart and Thurston [2000] 
 
Ganderton et al. [2000] disagree with the conclusion McClelland et al. [1993], and do not observe 
the bimodal distribution of bids for very low probability losses. They attribute the difference in 
results to differences in their experimental set-up. They employ a more complex decision setting to 
reflect naturally-occurring disasters, and extract insurance choices from subjects in an extensive form 
game. Subjects face compound lotteries: each subject is first exposed to 3 possible outcomes (no 
event, a low probability event and a very low probability event), then if a loss event has occurred 
each subject could experience either a small loss or a large loss. A subject could randomly face any 
treatment from 18 parameter combinations across 5 insurance cost levels for a random number of 
rounds and periods.  
Ganderton et al. [2000] examined how insurance purchasing behavior would vary for varying 
insurance costs, just as in our experiment. However, they used subject’s choices from choices over 
lotteries with constant mean payoffs but increasing variance to infer risk preferences, and used the 
method of Cameron [1988] to predict willingness to pay from regression, rather than the implied 
CE. 
As predicted by EUT, the results in their econometric models show that insurance purchase 
will be less likely when the cost of insurance is high, when the expected loss is low, and when the 
individual’s wealth increases. But their results also show that repeated exposure to loss events results 
in a negative effect on insurance demand. They also show that subjects are relatively more sensitive 
to the low probability of a loss, rather than to the size of the potential loss. These results cannot be 
explained by EUT. 
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Laury, McInnes and Swarthout [2009] 
 
The methodology for the insurance task in our experiment followed Laury, McInnes and Swarthout 
[2009]. They tested the belief that individuals tend to underinsure against catastrophic events with a 
low probability and high loss, relative to higher-probability, low-loss events (Kunreuther, Novemsky 
and Kahneman [2001]). Their purpose was to undertake a systematic study of the effect of the 
probability of a loss on insurance purchase decisions. This focused on whether subjects were more 
or less likely to purchase insurance as the probability of loss increased, while holding constant the 
expected value of the loss and the insurance load. 
In the first part of their study they replicated the results from Slovic et al. [1977], a widely-
cited laboratory study of insurance purchasing decisions even though all tasks were hypothetical. As 
much as possible, they replicated the survey that elicited willingness to purchase actuarially fair 
insurance for up to 8 different situations. The probability of loss was presented in terms of draws of 
orange and white balls from an urn, ranging from 0.0001 to 0.5. The loss amount and insurance 
price were expressed in points, and payments were hypothetical, even though the subjects were 
asked to treat the gambles as actual gambles. The loss amount was varied so that the expected loss 
and insurance price was kept at 1 point across all decisions. As Figure 1.14 shows, subjects in their 
replication were more inclined to purchase insurance than those in the original study. The main 
result from Slovic et al. [1977], however, was still replicated: the percentage of subjects purchasing 
insurance increases as the probability of a loss increases.  
Laury et al. [2009] then conducted a new experiment to test if those results would hold if real 
money and incentive-compatible procedures were used to incentivize the subjects. This is the 
standard procedure that our experiment uses to elicit insurance preferences. Laury et al. [2009] 
varied the choices the subjects would make by loss probability (0.01, 0.10), premium load (0.8, 1.0, 
4.0), and expected value of loss ($0.15, $0.30, $0.60). The loss probabilities of 1% and 10% were 
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chosen because they could be implemented in a laboratory setting, and so that there was a 
substantial expected change in proportion of subjects purchasing insurance between the two 
probabilities (based on results from the previous experiment).  Varying the load on the actuarially-
fair premiums allows testing of the robustness of results against the premium size. 
 
Figure 1.14 Comparison of Replication to Slovic et al. [1977] Results 
 
 
   
Taking into account the within-subjects, full-factorial design of the three varying factors, 
each subject was asked to make a choice for each of the 18 insurance decisions, with an initial 
endowment of $60 for each decision. The experiment had 40 subjects receiving an actual payment, 
while 37 subjects did the experiment receiving a hypothetical payment.  
 Employing the exact conditional McNemar test, a nonparametric procedure, they find that 
the results in this experiment conflict with Slovic et al. [1977]. Specifically, they find that the earlier 
finding that more insurance is purchased as the probability of loss increases is not reflected when real 
rewards are used. In fact, the results of Laury et al [2009] show that significantly less insurance is 
purchased as the loss probability increases. They also showed that less insurance was purchased 
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when the payments were hypothetical, but that the same pattern still holds. These results can be seen 
in Figure 1.15. 
Figure 1.15  McNemar Test Results 
 
  
Employing a panel probit model to the data also gave similar results. Demographics were 
not found to have significant impact on purchase rates. Both hypothetical payments and premium 
loading were found to decrease purchase rates at the 5% significance level. Laury et al. [2009] have 
shown that incentives matter for correctly inferring behavior in experiements. When real, high-
consequence losses were implemented, there was no evidence of underinsurance of low probability 
losses. This experiment shows that subjects overestimating the low-probabilities are not the reason 
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why individuals tend to under-insure against low-probability high-loss events, relative to high-
probability loss-loss events, if indeed they do.  Laury et al. [2009] focus on how insurance decisions 
were affected by low-probability high-loss events relative to high-probability low-loss events, while 
holding expected loss and premium loading constant. Our experiment varies only the premium 
while holding the loss probability and loss amount constant, but it applies the subjects’ estimated 
risk models to evaluate the expected welfare gains from insurance decisions.  
 
Additional Literature 
 
Laury and McInnes [2003] considered insurance purchases in which subjects actually received real 
rewards, but they did not elicit risk attitudes. They comment (p.228) that the fact that a majority of 
subjects decided to purchase the actuarially fair insurance is consistent with them being risk averse, 
and that this is in turn consistent with the evidence from virtually every comparable experiment.18  
 Schade, Kunreuther and Koellinger [2012] consider the purchase of insurance against the 
loss of a valuable object. They are motivated by deviations from EV in elicited WTP for insurance 
products noted by previous studies. Their review (p. 534) correctly notes that risk aversion can 
explain these extreme choices: 
There is empirical evidence that many individuals exhibit behavior that implies that 
they are either unconcerned or extremely risk averse when deciding whether to 
purchase insurance against events that have a small probability of occurring [...] The 
unconcerned individuals are not willing to pay a penny even if premiums are 
subsidized, whereas those who appear to be highly risk averse opt for premiums that 
are more than 10 times the expected loss. 
 
Their experiments have some unfortunate procedural features. First, only 2 of 263 subjects 
were to be paid in a salient manner, and for the others the only motivation was a small fixed, non-
salient participation payment. Second, subjects were not told that probability at the outset (p. 535), 
                                                 
 
18 In their experiments 74% of choices were to purchase insurance. Three of 60 subjects never purchased insurance, and 
17 of 60 always purchased insurance. 
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and had no way of knowing how many subjects would be in the experiment. Third, they used the 
Becker-DeGroot- Marschak (BDM) procedure to elicit WTP for insurance.19 The BDM has been 
shown to have extremely poor behavioral properties (Harrison [1992] and Rutström [1998]). They 
replicated prior findings in a qualitative sense, finding highly skewed distributions of WTP. They do 
not report if they observe the bimodality of WTP noted in prior research when one uses real 
rewards compared to hypothetical survey questions. 
 Di Mauro and Maffioletti [1996] consider, among other things, a “self-insurance” experiment 
which is for our purposes the same as an insurance purchase.20 They frame it as self-insurance to 
contrast with self-protection experiments in which subjects could pay to have the probability of a 
loss reduced. In any event, each of 38 subjects has a stake of £10 and makes 8 choices, 4 of which 
are over risky outcomes of interest here. The loss probabilities for the 4 risky choices are 3%, 20%, 
50% and 80%. The subject reports a WTP in each case using a real-time English clock auction: as 
the price ticks along from £0 to £10, in increments that are not reported, the subject indicates when 
to “drop out” of the auction. There is considerable evidence from Rutström [1998] and Harstad 
[2000] that this English auction reliably elicits homegrown values from subjects, certainly by 
comparison with the theoretically isomorphic Vickrey sealed-bid auction or BDM procedure. 
Average and median bids are reported (p. 62), along with the standard deviation of bids. There is 
evidence of slight skewness in WTP, but not as severe as prior studies. There is no evidence 
presented in either direction about the existence of bimodality of WTP. Median WTP tracks EV 
closely for all but the highest loss probability, when it is 89% of EV. Average WTP exceeds EV for 
the 3% and 20% loss probabilities, and is 220% and 128% of EV, respectively; it is less than EV for 
the 50% and 80% probabilities, and is 87% and 81% of EV, respectively. 
                                                 
 
19 The BDM version employed in this study used a nice, credible method for generating the random purchase prices (p. 
536), but is the same as the BDM applied for many decades by experimental economists. 
20 Di Mauro and Maffioletti [2001] appear to report exactly the same experimental design and data. 
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1.12 Appendix E: Literature Review of Welfare Metrics  
In this section we elaborate on how the existing literature has defined welfare gain from insurance, 
and how it has been measured. Although our experiment only considers simple indemnity insurance 
with no deductibles, we consider here literature studying a wider range of products, particularly 
index insurance. We have broadly categorized the various methods of calculating welfare gain from 
insurance into 4 groups: take-up of insurance, WTP for insurance, risk reduction proxies, and “some 
other metric.” 
Tables 1.4 to 1.7 lists each study by category, and several salient characteristics of each. We 
only cover the more important studies here in greater detail. 
1.12.1 Take-up of Insurance 
Hill and Robles [2011] developed a market of weather securities in southern Ethiopia to replace 
the more traditional index insurance contract. Their motivation is to develop a risk management 
product that better meets the heterogeneous needs of rainfall protection for farmers, which can be 
dependent on crop choice, land quality or production practices. These factors can vary even among 
farmers within close proximity of each other. This study has proxied for this protection from 
uncertain rainfall as take-up of weather securities. They have indicated that a high take-up rate of 
20% reflects a welfare gain, but do not specify if a lower take-up reflects a smaller welfare gain or if 
it would reflect a negative welfare gain.  
Hill and Robles [2011] conducted an experiment offering six different weather securities, 
two securities: one against severe drought and one against moderate drought, in each of the three 
main month of the rainy season. Farmers are given an endowment and can choose which securities 
they would like to purchase if at all. Securities were priced at expected value. Payouts were given in 
real time, depending on actual rainfall levels, to closer model real life. The same securities were 
subsequently offered in a pilot program a year later. Weather securities designed in this way can 
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better meet the heterogeneous rainfall risks of the farmers, relative to a standard index insurance 
contract. The regression results from the experiment and the pilot program are similar. Farmers who 
grew barley were much more likely to purchase securities later in the season when barley grows and 
less for the beginning of the season. Use of fertilizer did not affect whether a farmer purchased 
securities, but it did affect which securities he was likely to buy. Those who use soil conservation 
were more inclined to purchase securities for the beginning of the season. Welfare gain in this study 
was measured as take-up of the weather securities, and Hill and Robles [2011] were interested in the 
determinants of securities choices. The do however clarify that though their results have some merit 
in understanding the benefits from weather securities, purchasing securities does not equate to 
purchasing securities that correctly hedge risk. 
Hill et al [2013] used survey questions on take-up to measure WTP for weather-index 
insurance among Ethiopian households. The survey asks questions to see how characteristics such 
as risk and time preferences, initial wealth, ability to borrow money, and price of insurance affect 
whether or not the household would purchase a hypothetical insurance product. The survey uses 
methodology from Binswanger [1980] to elicit risk preferences. However, rather than assuming a 
parametric form for utility to calculate the risk coefficient that corresponds with the subject’s lottery 
choice, they use the direct relationship between the subject’s preferred choice and take-up to draw 
their conclusions of how risk aversion affects take-up.  The impact from basis risk is measured by 
using distance from the closest weather station as a proxy for basis risk.  
They claim that using a probit model allows them to calculate the change in WTP brought 
about by each determinant of demand. Not only so, the probit model will allow them to generate an 
estimated WTP for each individual. All that means however is that the average coefficients estimated 
across the population can be applied to the individual’s specific characteristics to estimate the impact 
these characteristics have on WTP. For instance, their data shows increasing the distance from the 
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nearest weather station from 5 to 15 km reduces the demand for insurance by 8.6 percentage points 
which corresponds to a reduction in willingness to pay of 10.75 Birr. Using a probit model, the 
relationship between level of risk aversion and insurance demand is limited to a linear or quadratic 
relationship.  
Hill et al [2013] set out to examine how individual household characteristics impact weather 
index insurance demand, and their study shows that educated, rich and proactive individuals are 
more willing to purchase insurance. However, through their result, they are implying that an increase 
in insurance take-up reflects welfare gain for the household. In their introduction they explain that 
the welfare gain from insurance is from the reduction in adverse consequences from shocks, which 
include the loss of livelihood through loss of assets, slower income growth, reduced investment in 
human capital, and discouragement against risky actions which could potentially lead to higher 
yields. They cannot measure exactly how households benefit from insurance in these ways, if at all. 
Since they use a probit model, they can only tell if a certain characteristic, risk aversion for example, 
impacts insurance demand on average for the entire sample. They cannot determine if the insurance 
product would benefit a specific individual based on his specific risk preferences, and how much 
that benefit is. In other words, they cannot account for insurance benefitting some individuals and 
not others.  
Cole, Stein and Tobacman [2014] study the long-term impact of payouts of insurance 
claims on future take-up of index insurance. Their data is based on a rainfall insurance product sold 
by an NGO called SEWA in Gujarat India. They used randomized marketing packages as an 
exogenous variation in insurance coverage to households. These packages included discounts, 
targeted marketing messages, and special offers on multiple policy purchases. Using instrumental 
variable (IV) specifications, they instrument for the lag of number of insurance policies purchased 
and the amount of payouts received using variables characterizing the lagged marketing packages 
56 
 
with lagged insurance payouts. Their results show that an increase in payout by Rs 1,000 in the village 
as a whole results in a 29% average increase in the probability of purchasing insurance the following 
year, which is significantly positive. The coefficient of the individual payout received in the previous 
year, though positive, is not statistically significant. As the lag time increases, for two and three year 
lags, the estimated effect of the village payout decreases, while the effect of the individual payout 
increases. 
1.12.2 WTP for Insurance 
In their field experiment, Elabed and Carter [2015] use WTP for a weather index insurance 
product to measure welfare benefit of the insurance for cotton farmers in Mali. As in our 
experiment, they take into account risk preferences when measuring welfare. However, they assume 
that all the farmers evaluate risk using EUT. Their study looks into the impact of compound risk 
preferences from basis risk on WTP for weather index insurance. They make use of the Smooth 
Model of Ambiguity Aversion formalized by Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji [2005] (KMM) to 
separate preferences on simple risk and on compound risk. The premium for the compound lottery 
is approximated by the formula derived by Maccheroni et al. [2013], which breaks the premium 
down into a compound-risk premium and the classical Pratt risk premium, allowing the CE to be 
derived as the expected value of the lottery less the risk premium. WTP for the index insurance 
contract is then calculated as the difference between the CE of the index insurance contract and the 
CE of the simply lottery faced in the autarkic situation.  
Their experiment is divided into two tasks, where one of the tasks is randomly selected to 
actually be played out for real money. The first task presents insurance contracts with no basis risk 
using a methodology similar to Binswanger [1980], where the menu of insurance options are 
presented to the subject, and they select their preferred choice. The options are presented to the 
subjects as blocks of insurance: six discrete yield levels are specified with a probability assigned to 
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each level, and subjects were asked to select how much insurance coverage they wanted such that 
they would be guaranteed a minimum of that yield level. The probability, revenue and premium for 
each yield level were determined beforehand and shown to the subjects. Premia were set at 20% 
above the actuarially fair price. The actual yield outcome was then randomly selected based on the 
probabilities shown to the subjects. Assuming CRRA preferences, the subject’s CRRA risk 
parameter was then inferred from the range consistent with the selected insurance contract. This 
experiment frames the risk parameter elicitation question in the context of insurance, unlike our 
experiment which used simple lotteries. Although the parameters of this experiment were set up to 
reflect real-life scenarios, with a 50% chance of a highest yield, this does not allow one to reliably 
identify non-EUT models. Furthermore, the range of CRRA risk parameter that can be captured 
only spans 0.08 to 0.55. Lastly, with this methodology only one data point, the mid-point of the 
interval that corresponds to the subject’s preference, is used to estimate the risk preferences for each 
individual subject, hence there is no standard deviation. 
The second task presents the subjects with the index insurance contract, where there is a 
20% chance the insurance will not pay out even though the subject has a low yield. Only downward 
basis risk is considered here. Given the price of the index insurance contract, a Switching Multiple 
Price List, following Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2006], was used to elicit the minimum 
price of the “fail-safe” insurance where the index insurance would start being preferred over the 
“fail-safe” insurance contract. Such a set-up might frame the questions such that it leads subjects to 
select a switch-over price in the middle of the prices offered. Only compound risk aversion, and not 
risk loving, is considered. WTP to avoid basis risk is defined as the difference between the price the 
subject is willing to pay to avoid switching to index insurance and the market price of the “fail-safe” 
insurance, which was determined in the previous task as 120% of the actuarially fair premium.  
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Using the CRRA risk parameter elicited from the first task and assuming constant 
compound risk aversion, the compound risk parameter was also estimated, and 57% of subjects 
were found to be compound risk averse to varying degrees. They use the estimated risk parameter 
and compound risk parameter to calculate the WTP of index insurance and, and demand for the 
insurance product is defined as whether WTP lies above or below the market price which is defined 
as 120% of actuarially fair premium. Taking into consideration compound risk aversion when 
calculating WTP would reflect a demand that is only slightly over half of the demand estimated 
when only simple risk aversion parameters are used to calculate WTP.  
Elabed and Carter [2015] states that the welfare benefits from insurance are from the 
expected impact on the improved well-being of households exposed to risk. They implicitly estimate 
this expected improved well-being by measuring WTP of the individual subjects, and determine 
there is a positive welfare gain from purchasing insurance if WTP is greater than 120% of the 
actuarially fair premium, and a negative welfare gain from purchasing insurance if WTP is below that 
market price. 
1.12.3 Risk Reduction Proxies 
Mobarak and Rosenzweig [2013] used a Randomized Control Trial (RCT) to examine the 
relationships between informal risk sharing, index insurance and risk-taking behaviors in India. They 
made use of preexisting census data, offers of rainfall insurance contracts that provided a cash 
payment if rainfall was delayed beyond a predetermined date at randomized discounted prices, and 
knowledge of the extent of informal risk sharing within readily identifiable, exogenously formed 
networks: the subcaste, or jati. Jatis were their natural risk-sharing network: the data indicated that 
the majority of loans and transfers to the households were from family and fellow caste members, 
but also they were from fellow caste members originating from outside the village. This meant that 
this informal framework could also indemnify rainfall risk which was on a village-level, as well as 
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household-specific idiosyncratic risk. Another feature of their design is that they randomly placed 
weather stations in some of the project villages, and proxied basis risk of the household as their 
distance from these weather stations. This allows them to explore how basis risk affects take-up of 
index insurance, and how informal risk sharing affects the impact of basis risk on the index 
insurance take-up.  
Using their results Mobarak and Rosenzweig [2013] measure welfare gain in three ways. 
First, they examined whether and how caste-based risk sharing affects the demand for formal 
insurance. Second, they compared the effects of index insurance provision and informal risk sharing 
on farmers’ willingness to invest in risky production methods and technologies which could lead to 
higher yield and profits, which was measured by adaption of these methods and technologies. Third, 
they assessed the general equilibrium effects of offering insurance to both cultivators of the land as 
well as to agricultural laborers on wage levels and volatility of the wage levels. This was done by 
estimating labor supply and labor demand effects.   
To answer the first question regarding index insurance demand, Mobarak and Rosenzweig 
[2012] embeds a model of index insurance with basis risk in the cooperative risk-sharing model 
developed by Arnott and Stiglitz [1991]. This model predicts that (a) when there is no basis risk, 
index insurance demand is independent of whether or not there is informal risk sharing, and (b) as 
basis risk increases, it can decrease index insurance take-up, but having an informal risk sharing 
network can increase that demand as it can still cover the idiosyncratic loss when the index contract 
fails. The results from the RCT corroborate those predictions. For the second question regarding 
welfare gain from willingness to invest in riskier production techniques and new technologies, the 
modified Arnott-Stiglitz model predicts that higher informal coverage may be associated with less 
risk taking. The level of risk taken by farmers was proxied for by using sensitivity of their crop yield 
and profits to rainfall. This was measured by how much their crop yields and profits vary according 
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to rainfall levels, and is based on the assumption that the larger the risk the farmers take, the more 
their yields and profits are exposed and dependent on rainfall. Once again the results are consistent 
with the theory. Farmers who depended more on index insurance had profits and yields that were 
more sensitive to rainfall, relative to farmers to depended more in informal risk sharing. The impact 
of this welfare gain although clear, could not be quantified.  
Lastly, welfare gain was measured as a reduction in wage risk for landless agricultural 
laborers. Mobarak and Rosenzweig [2013] were able to measure this because they offered the index 
insurance to landless laborers as well as to cultivators, whereas most index insurance products are 
only marketed to landowners. The take-up rate of index insurance among the agricultural laborers 
was similar to that of the cultivators. A general equilibrium model was used to assess the impact of 
index insurance on the agricultural labor demand and supply. They assume workers work have to 
work more when rainfall levels are low in order to smooth income, and are able to take more leisure 
time when rain is plentiful, which would result in higher equilibrium wage rates in the good times 
and lower equilibrium wage rates when rainfall levels are lower . Regarding supply, number of days 
of agricultural work completed, for those with index insurance, was much less sensitive to rainfall 
than those without index insurance. Similarly probability of temporary migration as an ex post means 
to income smoothing was significantly less sensitive to rainfall for those who purchased insurance. 
On the demand side more male harvest labor was hired as rainfall levels increased, however the 
increase in demand for laborers was much steeper for farmers who were offered insurance. This 
indicates that when farmers purchase index insurance, their increased risk taking will increase wage 
levels, but labor demand volatility will also increase, which will increase wage risk. The welfare gain 
for laborers from purchasing index insurance should therefore increase if they know that the farmers 
are also purchasing index insurance, and this is reflected in laborer insurance take-up being higher 
when cultivators are also offered insurance. 
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DeBrauw and Eozenou [2014] conduct a hypothetical field experiment to measure risk 
preferences of Mozambican farmers regarding sweet potato production. Although their study does 
not consider insurance, they consider heterogeneity in risk preferences for farming inputs given 
uncertain weather conditions, and do not just assume that subjects are all EUT or CRRA. The 
results and methodology of this study could be applied to designing a weather insurance product 
that would match their objectives, which is to encourage people in rural Mozambique to grow and 
consume a more nutritional variety of sweet potato. The experiment was modelled after Holt and 
Laury [2002]. Respondents were given a series of 10 scenarios where they had to choose between 
two varieties of sweet potatoes which, depending on rainfall conditions, would produce different 
yields. The first variety would produce only average yields that vary less with rainfall, and the second 
variety would produce much higher yields under good weather conditions, but much lower yields 
under bad weather conditions. The probability of good rainfall increased across the scenarios from 
10% to 100%.  
Unlike our experiment, where we estimated risk preferences on an individual level, DeBrauw 
and Eozenou [2014] used the multiple price list (MPL) methodology. Using maximum likelihood, 
they could only estimate the average risk preferences of the sample. They were not clear on how 
exactly the risk preferences were estimated. They found that they can strongly reject CRRA 
preferences in favor of a more flexible utility function they call “Power Risk Aversion21” that nests 
the CRRA utility function. Regardless of utility function, they reject the hypothesis of EUT 
preferences for the pooled sample, in favor of RDU with S-shaped probability weighting functions 
where respondents on average underweight small probabilities and overweight larger probabilities. 
Their study focuses only on estimating the average risk preferences of the sample, and do not use 
                                                 
 
21 U(y) = 1/{ 1 - exp ( - [ ( y
1-
 -1)/(1-) ]) }, where y is wealth,   is the risk parameter. When , the utility 
function breaks down to a CRRA utility function. 
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the risk preferences to go one step further to estimate the WTP of insurance that would reduce the 
exposure of the subjects to risk.  
Karlan et al [2014] clearly state that the welfare gains from improving financial markets 
through weather index insurance are threefold. Firstly, uninsured risk and limited access to credit 
could discourage risky investments that could produce higher yields. Secondly, weather risk is worth 
managing, as agriculture in northern Ghana where the study is conducted is almost exclusively rain-
fed. Thirdly, index insurance can help smooth consumption. Karlan et al [2014] test the impact of 
insurance and credit on investment decisions by using a 2x2 treatment of either offering a cash grant 
or not, and offering insurance at varying prices or not. Using OLS they find that uninsured risk is a 
binding constraint on farmer ex ante investment (land investment costs and acres cultivated), but the 
liquidity constraints are not as binding as typically thought, meaning that credit markets alone are 
not sufficient to generate higher farm investments. They also find that there is sufficient demand for 
rainfall insurance. At actuarially fair prices, 40%-50% of farmers demanded insurance, purchasing 
coverage for more than 60% of their cultivated acreage. Factors such as basis risk, trust in the 
insurance company, and farmer’s recent experience affected their demand for insurance. Since OLS 
was used, the methodology can only give the sign and size of the welfare gain for the average of the 
sample population. They are unable to quantify, or tell if there is an expected welfare gain or loss for 
the individual, given the individual’s characteristics. 
Cai et al. [2015] considered welfare gain as an increase in the number of sows produced by 
pig farmers in Southwest China. Pig farmers have to decide if they raise their female piglets as sows 
for breeding purposes or if they spay them and raise them for their meat. A high mortality rate of 
sows (2%) deters farmers from choosing to not spay their female piglets, which leaves pork 
production numbers lower, and pork prices more sensitive to pork shortages. Cai et al. [2015] 
examine the effect sow insurance would have on the number of sows bred. The insurance is offered 
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by the government, and pays out a lump sum of 1000 yuan should the sow die through disease, 
natural disaster or accident. To further encourage take-up of the sow insurance, the government 
subsidized 80% of the annual premium of 60 yuan, so the farmers only pay 20% or 12 yuan.  
One cannot directly use ordinary least squares (OLS) to directly measure the causal impact 
of having sow insurance on number of sows in the village, as there is a problem of unobserved 
heterogeneity. There could be confounders that exist that would affect both insurance decisions and 
production decisions, and the regression study does not account for that. For instance, risk 
preferences, which are not considered in this study, might affect both the farmers’ preference for 
insurance as well as preference in other activities that might prolong the life of the sows. Cai et al. 
[2015] therefore use the incentives for Animal Husbandry Workers (AHWs), as an IV to counter 
this unobserved heterogeneity. AHWs serve as the bridge between the formal institutions and the 
rural villages for matters involving animal husbandry, and are responsible for checking and marking 
the sow for insurance, as well as initiating the claim process in the event of a sow death. The AHWs 
are randomly assigned one of three incentive packages: the control group is given a higher base pay 
of 50 yuan, but is not given any additional incentive dependent on number of sows insured by the 
villages they go to. The low-incentive group was given a lower base pay of 20 yuan, but an additional 
small financial incentive of 2 yuan for every sow insured. The high-incentive group was given the 
same lower base pay of 20 yuan, but was given an additional higher financial incentive of 4 yuan for 
every sow insured. AHW incentives should be significantly and positively correlated with the 
number of insured sows, while only affecting number of total sows produced through the number 
of insured sows. This would make it suitable as an IV for this regression.  
The results show that having insured sows significantly increases the number of sows. On 
average one additional insured sow increases the number of sows in the village by about 7.5 after 3 
months, and 9.4 after 6 months. As the study estimates the results using OLS, it is able to show if 
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the insurance actually provided a negative welfare gain on average. Welfare gain in this experiment 
can only be measured as an average on the village level, and not on a household level.  
1.12.4 Other Metrics 
Chou et al [2014] state that the welfare gain from health insurance is the resultant improvement in 
infant and child health. Having health insurance should lower the price of medical care services such 
as prenatal and neonatal care, delivery, vaccinations and immunizations, and this price reduction 
should increase demand for these services. Supply is also encouraged as insurance would guarantee 
payment for these services. They were interested in the effect of the National Health Insurance 
(NHI) coverage in Taiwan, which was introduced to all employees in 1995 when it was previously 
only offered to government employees. NHI was the only employee-based health coverage that 
provided benefits for infants of employees, and premium was subsidized by the government. The 
non-government employed households were assigned as the treatment group and the control group 
was the government-employed households that were already receiving NHI coverage. They tested 
the impact of introducing NHI on post neonatal deaths, and found that there was a significant 
reduction in post neonatal deaths among farm households, but not so among households who work 
in the private sector.  
Chou el al [2014] used difference-in-difference to remove effects from unobserved trends 
while measuring the impact of insurance on post neonatal deaths. Using this methodology they are 
only able to estimate the average impact, and whether or not it was a positive or negative welfare 
gain on the sample population level, and not for the individual.  
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1.12.5 Literature Review of Alternative Welfare Metrics 
Table 1.4 Welfare Measured By Take-Up 
 
Study Metric of Welfare Measure Data 
Elicitation 
method for 
experiments 
(Hypothetical or 
Real) Result 
Gumber (2001) 
Take-up of health insurance 
and financial protection Average 
Household 
survey   
Usage of private or public health facilities is price-
sensitive. 
Schneider and Diop 
(2001) Take-up of health insurance Average 
Household 
survey   
Low take-up, despite insurance improving financial access 
to care across all income levels. Social capital is an 
important determinant for participation. 
Giné et al. (2008) 
Take-up of rainfall index 
insurance Average 
Household 
survey   
Lack of understanding, but also credit constraints, limited 
familiarity, and risk aversion discourage insurance 
purchase. Being previously insured, connected to village 
networks and self-indentifying as 'progressive' encourage 
insurance purchase. 
Giesbert (2008) Take-up of health insurance Average 
Actual 
insurance sold 
and survey   
Understanding of concept of insurance beyond health 
insurance is mixed, though potential demand for 
insurance in survey area seems to be high. 
Thornton et al. 
(2010) 
Take-up of social security 
health insurance Average 
Actual 
insurance sold 
and survey   
Low take-up and retention rates for insurance. Health 
services utilization did not increase with insurance. MFIs 
were not a more effective delivery agent than the 
government. 
Hill and Robles 
(2011) 
Take-up of varying weather 
securities Average 
Field 
experiment, 
actual insurance 
sold and survey 
Choices on 
components of 
weather securities 
package  (Real) 
High take-up in Average and variance experimental game 
and pilot as weather securities are easily understood and 
fit heterogeneous farmers' needs. Crop and production 
choices, and soil characteristics have some explanatory 
power for security choices 
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Clarke and Kalani 
(2012) 
Take up of index insurance, 
reduction of risk aversion 
Average, 
variance, 
and 
MEU 
Field 
experiment Binswanger (Real) 
Take-up is hump-shaped against wealth, where subjects 
with immediate levels of wealth have the highest take-up. 
There is no strong evidence of schooling, understanding 
of the decision problems or financial literacy significantly 
increasing take-up. Background risk however significantly 
affects take-up. Parametric assumptions matter when 
estimating determinants of risk aversion.  
Hill et al (2013) 
Reduced adverse 
consequence of shocks on 
income and consumption Average Survey 
Double-bounded 
dichotomous 
choice elicitation 
(DBDC) (Real 
and Hypothetical) 
Those who faced higher rainfall risk, were less averse, 
more educated, more proactive, and richer were more 
likely to puchase insurance. Offering insurance through a 
risk sharing group increases demand for less educated 
females, but is constrained by lack of trust amongst 
neighbors 
Dercon et al. (2014) Take-up of rainfall insurance Average 
Actual 
insurance sold 
and survey   
Insurance demand increased when groups were exposed 
to training that encouraged sharing of insurance within 
groups. A suggested reason is that risk-sharing and index 
insurance can be shown to be complementary. 
Banerjee et al. (2014) 
Take-up of health insurance, 
through bundling with 
renewed loans Average 
Field survey 
and admin data   
Adverse selection was not detected in take-up of bundled 
product because there was no demand for the product. 
Low demand could have been due to consumers' 
pessimism on how insurance would be implemented. 
Vasilaky et al. (2014) Take-up of index insurance Average 
Field 
experiment    
Participation in educational game increases likelihood of 
purchasing insurance as well as amount purchased. The 
study focused on the context of scaling a large 
unsubsidized index insurance program. 
Cole et al. (2014) 
Take-up of rainfall index 
insurance Average 
Actual 
insurance sold 
and survey   
Households in villages that have experienced insurance 
payouts are more likely to purchase in the following 
season, but this effect decreases over time. Households 
that have experienced payouts themselves are more likely 
to purchase two and three seasons later, than the first. 
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Table 1.5 Welfare Measured by Willingness to Pay 
 
Chantarat et al. 
(2009) CE of herd growth rate CE Simulation   
Household initial herd size is the key determinant of the 
product’s performance, more so than household risk 
preferences or basis risk exposure. The product works 
least well for the poorest. The product is most valuable 
for the vulnerable non-poor, for whom insurance can 
stem collapses in herd size following predictable shocks. 
Demand appears to be highly price elastic, and willingness 
to pay is, on average, much lower than commercially 
viable rates. 
Donfouet et al. 
(2011) WTP for health insurance Average 
Surveys and 
field 
experiment 
DBDC 
(Hypothetical) 
Age, religion, usual means of seeking treatment when 
getting sick, profession, knowledge of insurance, income, 
and involvement in associations or health policies are key 
determinants of WTP. There is a demand for this 
insurance in the studied region. 
Carriquiry and 
Osgood (2012) 
Maximising expected utility 
(MEU) 
Average, 
Variance Theory   
If contracts are appropriately designed there are 
important synergies between forecasts and insurance and 
effective input use. 
Koufopoulos and 
Kozhan (2014) MEU Average Theory   
Full-insurance pooling equilibrium can exist when 
accounting for Average and variance asymmetric 
information and ambiguity. An increase in ambiguity may 
also lead to a strict pareto improvement. 
Gerking et al. (2014) 
WTP for reduction of 
mortality and morbidity risk Average Survey   
This paper develops and applies an integrated model of 
human mortality and morbidity in an expected utility 
framework, extended to incorporate a sick state of illness, 
allows parents to make choices about risk exposure 
Average and variance for herself and for a child, and a 
multi-period framework. 
De Janvry et al. 
(2014) 
WTP for insurance against 
common shocks Average Theory   
Insurance exacerbates free-riding when covering common 
shocks. Insurance against a common shock may be 
unprofitable to an individual if he anticipates others in the 
group not participating in it.  
Elabed and Carter 
(2015) 
WTP for agricultural index 
insurance CE 
Field 
experiment 
Binswanger, 
sMPL (Real) 
Accounting for compound risk aversion would 
significantly decrease the expected demand for insurance. 
Jaramillo et al. (2015) 
Risk reduction through 
informal insurance schemes 
CE, 
Variance Theory   
Heterogeneity within groups reduces risk sharing, 
redistribution schemes could counter social exclusion, 
norms of reciprocity and social capital are key 
determinants of insurance arrangements.  
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Clarke (2015) MEU MEU Theory   
A model for rational demand for index insurance 
products is presented which explains two puzzles 
regarding index insurance demand: why demand for index 
insurance is lower than expected and why demand is low 
for more risk averse individuals. 
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Table 1.6 Welfare Measured by Risk Reduction Proxies 
 
Townsend (1994) 
Smoothness of 
consumption as a result of 
risk sharing MEU 
Household 
survey   
By using a general equilibrum framework, the results on 
consumption and income are mixed for the complete 
market hypothesis. 
Skees et al. (2001) 
Reduced revenue volatility 
of rainfall insurance 
Coefficient 
of variation 
(CV) of 
expected 
revenue 
Simulation on 
past data   
A drought insurance program based on rainfall contracts 
would have reduced relative risk in Morocco. 
Hess (2003) 
Allowing risky farmers to 
maintain access to credit 
during drought and smooth 
income 
Value-at-
risk (VaR) 
Simulation on 
past data   
Integrated scheme can help banks reduce their lending 
volume while bringing down default rates and transaction 
costs. It can also help farmers stabilize their incomes and 
possible access to greater credit line from enhanced 
collateral 
Jowett (2003) 
Risk sharing (through 
informal networks or 
voluntary health insurance) Average 
Household 
survey   
Individuals in highly cohesive communities are far less 
likely to purchase public voluntary health insurance. 
Chou et al. (2003) 
Reduced precautionary 
savings or risk reduction 
against unexpected health 
expenditures Average 
Government 
survey   
Households significantly reduced their saving and 
increased their consumption when the comprehensive 
health insurance became available, with the largest effects 
on savings for households with the smallest savings. 
Vedenov and 
Barnett (2004) 
Efficiency: Reducing 
exposure to yield risk 
Mean root 
square 
(MSR) of 
loss, VaR 
and CER 
(certainty 
equivalent 
of revenue) 
Simulation on 
past data   
Weather derivatives may reduce risk, but complicated 
combinations of derivatives are needed to achieve 
reasonable fits (basis risk is not transparent). Results from 
in-sample do not translate to out-sample data. 
Giné et al. (2007) 
Reduced exposure to 
rainfall risk Variance 
Household 
survey   
There are large diversification benefits from holding a 
portfolio of insurance contracts, even though all 
insurance payouts are driven by rainfall in the same 
Indian state. 
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Breustedt et al. 
(2008) 
Risk reduction on farm level 
yields (vs regional level) 
MV (mean 
variance) 
and SSD 
(second-
degree 
stochastic 
dominance) 
Simulation on 
past data   
Out of weather index, area yield index and farm yield 
insurance, none provide statistically significant risk 
reduction for every farm.  
Giné and Yang 
(2009) 
Take-up of loan to adopt 
new technology Average 
Actual 
insurance sold   
Packaging rainfall insurance with loan to purchase high-
yielding seed decreases take-up of loan for Maize and 
groundnut farmers in Malawi. This could be due to 
implicit insurance from limited liability in loan contract. 
Clarke and Dercon 
(2009) Vulnerability to poverty Variance Review   
Insurance (Average and variance formal and informal), 
credit and safety nets can work together to reduce 
poverty 
Hill and Viceisza 
(2012) Take-up of fertilizer (input) Average 
Actual 
insurance sold   
Presence of (mandated) insurance increases take-up of 
fertilizer. Take-up also depends on initial wealth and 
previous weather realizations that affect subjective beliefs 
of weather outcomes. 
Cole et al. (2013) 
Improved risk sharing of 
weather shocks - which 
should affect income 
variability Average 
Actual 
insurance sold 
and survey Binswanger (Real) 
Insurance demand is significantly price sensitive, with an 
elasticity of around unity. There is evidence that limited 
trust and understanding of the product, product salience 
and liquidity constraints also limit insurance take-up and 
demand.  
Chantarat et al. 
(2013) 
Reduction of livestock 
mortality risk Average 
Survey and 
household data   
By addressing serious problems of covariate risk, 
asymmetric information, and high transactions costs that 
have precluded the emergence of commercial insurance 
in these areas to date, IBLI offers a novel opportunity to 
use financial risk transfer mechanisms to address a key 
driver of persistent poverty 
Mobarak and 
Rosenzweig (2013) 
Take-up of risky 
technologies and wage risk 
reduction for landless 
population Average 
Actual 
insurance sold 
and survey   
As basis risk increases, index insurance take-up increases 
if there is also informal risk sharing. Although informal 
risk sharing in caste groups reduces the sensitivity of 
profit and output to rainfall, relative to index insurance, it 
also reduces average returns. Landless households are 
more likely to purchase index insurance if cultivators are 
also offered weather insurance.  
Lin et al. (2014) 
Overall increase in risk 
coverage (crowding out 
effect) Average Lab experiment   
Formal partial insurance significantly crowds out public 
transfers, but without significant decline in risk coverage. 
Average altruistic preferences and fixed income 
inequalities  contribute to the crowding-out effect 
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De Brauw et al. 
(2014) 
EU from sweet potatoes 
yield Average 
Field 
experiment 
MPL  
(Hypothetical) 
Farmers' preferences better follow the more flexible 
power risk aversion preferences over CRRA, and RDU 
over EUT. Assuming CRRA would poorly predict risk 
preferences among those who are less risk averse for their 
sample. 
Karlan et al (2014) 
Increase in investments in 
risky input Average 
Actual 
insurance sold 
and survey   
Uninsured risk is a binding constraint on farmer ex ante 
investment, but the liquidity constraints are not as 
binding as typically thought, meaning that credit markets 
alone are not sufficient to generate higher farm 
investments. They also find that there is sufficient 
demand for rainfall insurance, but factors such as basis 
risk, trust in the insurance company, and farmer’s recent 
experience affected their demand for insurance.  
Cai et al. (2015) 
Number of sows raised 
(input) Average 
Actual 
insurance sold 
and 
government 
data   
Providing access to formal insurance significantly 
increases farmers' tendency to raise sows. These short-
run effects seem to have some persistence in the longer 
run. This increase is not in response to a substitution of 
other livestock. Lack of trust for government-sponsored 
insurance products acts a significant barrier for farmers' 
willingness to participate in the insurance program. 
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Table 1.7 Welfare Measured by Some Other Metric 
 
Bone et al. (2004) Ex ante efficient risk sharing Average Lab experiment Binswanger (Real) 
When sharing a risky financial prospect, the results 
indicate that fairness is not a significant consideration, but 
rather that having to choose between prospects diverts 
partners from allocating the chosen prospect efficiently. 
Wagstaff and 
Pradhan (2005) 
Improvement of health 
outcomes and expansion of 
household consumption Average Survey   
The program led to increased use of healthcare, reduction 
in out-of-pocket health expenditures and increase in 
nonmedical household consumption. 
Franco et al. (2008) 
Impact of community-based 
mutual health organizations 
(MHO) intervention on 
health utilization and 
financial protection. 
Average 
and 
variance Survey   
Members were more likely to seek treatment, make pre-
natal visits and use insecticide-treated nets. Distance 
significantly affects utilization, but enrollment not 
significantly associated with socioeconomic status, except 
for highest quintile. Members also have lower percentage 
of expenditures on health, lower out-of-pocket payments, 
and lower mean-to-median expenditures. 
Rao et al. (2009) 
Performance of Community 
Health Fund (CHF) Average 
Actual 
insurance sold 
and survey   
Members had significantly higher utilization of healthcare 
services, but no evidence of reduced out-of-pocket 
spending. The main reasons for not enrolling were being 
unaware of the program, high premiums, and perceived 
low quality of services. 
Charness and 
Genicot (2009) 
Optimal equilibrium from 
risk sharing Average Lab experiment Binswanger (Real) 
Risk sharing exists, even without commitment, and 
depends on continuation probability of experiment, level 
of risk aversion of subject, reciprocity, prior expectations 
of subject, and relative initial income. 
Aggarwal (2010) 
Increase in health utilization 
and financial protection 
through health insurance 
programme Average Survey   
Utilization of outpatient care and surgeries was greater in 
the insured group. Borrowings, and payments made from 
savings, incomes and other sources reduced. 
Hamid et al. (2011) 
Impact of addition of health 
insurance to microcredit on 
poverty indicators Average 
Actual 
insurance sold 
and survey   
Adding MHI to microcredit has a significant beneficial 
effect only on food sufficiency, which could possibly be 
due to the short time frame of the study. 
Chou et al. (2014) 
Improved infant health and 
postneonatal mortality rate Average 
Government 
data   
National Health Insurance (NHI) in Taiwan in 1995 led 
to reductions in the postneonatal mortality rate of infants 
born in farm households (previously uninsured, less 
education, low-weight births) but not to infants born in 
private sector households. 
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ABSTRACT.  
 
Index insurance was conceived to be a product that would simplify the claim settlement process and 
make it more objective, reducing transaction costs and moral hazard. However, index insurance also 
exposes the insured to basis risk, which arises because there can be a mismatch between the index 
measurement and the actual losses of the insured. It is not easy to predict the direction in which 
basis risk is going to affect insurance demand, in contrast to the clear and strong predictions for 
standard indemnity insurance products. Index insurance can be theoretically conceptualized as a 
situation in which the individual faces compound risk, where one layer of risk corresponds to the 
potential individual’s loss and the other layer of risk is created by the potential mismatch between 
the index measurement and the actual loss. Experimental evidence shows that people exhibit 
preferences for compound risks that are different from preferences exhibited for their actuarially-
equivalent counterparts. We study the potential link between index insurance demand and attitudes 
towards compound risks. We test the hypothesis that the compound risk nature of index insurance 
induced by basis risk negatively affects both the demand for the product and the welfare of 
individuals making take-up decisions. We study the impact of basis risk on insurance take-up and on 
expected welfare in a laboratory experiment with an insurance frame. We measure the expected 
welfare of index insurance to individuals while accounting for their risk preferences, and structurally 
decompose the sources of the welfare effects of index insurance. Our results show that the 
compound risk in index insurance decreases the welfare of index insurance choices made by 
individuals. The behavioral inability to process compound risks decreases welfare when there is a 
compound risk of loss, whereas loss probability, basis risk and premium only impact the welfare of 
insurance choices when the risk of loss is expressed in its reduced, non-compound form. We also 
see, again, that take-up is not a reliable indicator of welfare. Furthermore, we show that take-up is 
not a useful proxy for guiding policy to improve welfare, as the drivers that significantly affect take-
up are different from the drivers that significantly affect welfare measures. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Index insurance is widely viewed as having great potential for addressing some of the risk 
management needs of billions of residents in developing countries, particularly in rural areas. The 
idea of an index contract is that the insured gets coverage for an idiosyncratic risk of loss that they 
face that is positively correlated with some easily observed and verifiable index.22 Payment of a claim 
depends solely on outcomes with respect to the index, not with respect to outcomes that are specific 
to the insured. The advantages of index contracts are that claims can be instantly adjudicated 
without costly assessment procedures, there is no opportunity for moral hazard or adverse selection, 
and transparency concerns that are particularly severe in developing countries can be mitigated.23 
 The disadvantage of index insurance is equally simple to state: compared to a conventional 
indemnity product, it makes the worst possible outcome even worse, and makes the best possible 
outcome even better. The worst possible outcome is if the insured experiences a loss but the index is 
not triggered, and the best possible outcome is if the insured suffers no loss and the index is 
triggered so that a payment to the insured is made. One classical motive for purchasing indemnity 
insurance is to reduce variability of risky outcomes, so it is apparent that this feature of index 
contracts could rationally reduce demand for insurance by comparison, and even make the index 
                                                 
 
22 The use of an index differentiates index insurance from “area-yield” insurance, which defines the loss to the insured 
by the average yield in some geographic area. Area-yield insurance was first written in Sweden in 1961, in Quebec in 
1977, in the United States on a small scale in 1993 and then significantly in 1994 (Skees, Black and Barnett [1997; p. 
431]). Halcrow [1949] originally proposed the idea, which was resurrected and developed by Miranda [1991] and Mahul 
[1999].  
23 Moral hazard is eliminated because there is nothing that the insured can do to affect the index outcome. Indeed, 
incentives to undertake self-protection and self-insurance remain intact. Adverse selection is eliminated because the 
contract does not differentiate between the correlation of the idiosyncratic risk and the index outcome. Adverse 
selection is an issue with area-yield insurance if contracts are individual, and specific to the correlation of the idiosyncratic 
risk and the area-yield risk, as proposed by Mahul [1999]: the insured can choose production activities to affect the 
correlation (Chambers and Quiggin [2002]), and the need to cover fixed costs requires an individual-specific indemnity 
schedule that is feasible only if the correlation is known to both the insured and the insurance company (Bourgeon and 
Chambers [2003]). 
 75 
 
contract unattractive for a sufficiently risk-averse individual.24 
 Thus index insurance poses an important behavioral tradeoff. Usually when we talk about 
traditional indemnity insurance and actuarially-fair pricing, we are on firm ground recommending 
the purchase of the product for anyone that is risk averse, which is arguably everyone. But 
traditional products are hard to offer on a profitable basis in developing countries, hence making it 
attractive to modify the product in some way so as to make it less costly to offer (and settle claims 
on). But the simplest contractual modification, making the payout a function of some common 
index, could turn the firm ground of recommendation into a quicksand for those that would find the 
traditional product the most attractive (the most risk averse). What is the balance here, to allow us to 
say when a particular index insurance product is attractive or not? We spell out the answer to that 
challenging question in the simplest possible setting, guided by structural theory and empirical 
evidence of the risk attitudes of potential index insurance customers. 
 Demand for index insurance is also claimed to be notoriously low, particularly by academic 
researchers: see Giné et al. [2008], Giné and Yang [2009], Cole [2014] and Clarke [2016]. Many 
factors have been cited as possible explanations of such low take-up, such as lack of understanding, 
risk aversion, prior experience with insurance, basis risk, and premium. But worrying about “low 
take-up” surely presumes what we need to determine, whether there is an expected consumer 
surplus from purchasing the product in the first place. Our analysis tries to provide answers as to 
what “low” and “high” might mean for index insurance products, particularly when we study actual 
behavior.   
 We evaluate the expected welfare of index insurance contracts in a simple setting in which 
we can control all potential confounds and yet still observe behavioral responses, a laboratory 
                                                 
 
24 Clarke [2016] provides a rich characterization of these possibilities, noting that they are an extension of familiar results 
from Doherty and Schlesinger [1990] on contractual non-performance by insurance companies. 
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experiment. Given the importance of the issue for policies towards risk management in developing 
countries, the deep pessimism in recent academic literature about the real-world attractiveness of 
index insurance, the evidence that nonetheless “millions are being served” with index contracts 
(Microinsurance Network [2017])25, and the unblinking enthusiasm of many policy-makers and non-
governmental agencies for index insurance, we make no apology for starting this evaluation in a 
laboratory. The confounds of field evaluations of the effects of index insurance and the demand for 
the product make it impossible to make clean, simple evaluations of the welfare effects of the policy. 
Most evaluations, in fact, only talk about whether take-up is “too low” or “about right,” with no 
coherent sense of what take-up is appropriate for the insured. Many evaluations actually dodge the 
issue of the welfare effect of the index contract as insurance by focusing on whether it is correlated 
with increased utilization of services or activities that are insured: that is not what insurance is 
designed to influence, and is at most a secondary benefit or cost of insurance as a risk management 
instrument. As usual, we view our laboratory experiment as a necessary predecessor to an 
informative and powerful field experiment. 
 A decided advantage of undertaking a controlled experimental evaluation, whether in the 
laboratory or the field, is that we can investigate the structural reasons for welfare losses from 
decisions about index insurance. We say “decisions” rather than take-up, since it is possible that 
losses arise from not taking up the product when the individual should do so. Conversely, admitting 
that behavior is not always consistent, take up of the product is not even a reliable indicator of a 
welfare gain. In the case of index insurance, the focus of theoretical attention has to be the 
compound risk that the contract generates: this is the basis risk that there is less than perfect, positive 
                                                 
 
25 According to the triannual landscape studies conducted by the Microinsurance Network as of 2017, 3.4 million lives 
worldwide are covered by agricultural insurance. 
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correlation between the aggregate index and idiosyncratic losses26. In theoretical terms this draws 
attention to violations of the Reduction of Compound Lotteries (ROCL) axiom, which has been 
implicated in many experimental studies of Expected Utility Theory (EUT). 
 We lay out the basic theory of index insurance in Section 2.2, identifying the role of ROCL, 
basis risk and risk preferences in welfare evaluation. By “risk preferences” we mean both the level of 
risk aversion that an individual exhibits in choice behavior as well as the type of psychological 
processes underlying that level of risk aversion. To keep matters simple, we focus on EUT and 
Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU) Theory, and further consider two variants of RDU in which the 
Compound Independence Axiom (CIA) or ROCL is relaxed. In Section 2.3 we lay out the 
experimental design motivated by this theory, to allow us to identify welfare gains and losses at the 
individual level. A central subtlety of this design to undertake normative inferences is that we must 
have a measure of risk preferences of the individual that is separate from the index insurance 
choices, even if that might be viewed by some as descriptively restrictive. Section 2.4 presents our 
results, and Section 2.5 draws conclusions. 
 Our results show that the compound risk in index insurance decreases the welfare of 
insurance choices made by individuals. Violation of the ROCL axiom by individuals decreases 
welfare when there is a compound risk of loss, whereas loss probability, basis risk and premium only 
impact the welfare of insurance choices when risk of loss is expressed in its reduced, non-compound 
form. Building on Harrison and Ng [2016], we again find that take-up is not a reliable indicator of 
welfare. Furthermore, we show that take-up is not a useful proxy for guiding policy to improve 
welfare, as the drivers that significantly affect take-up are different from the drivers that significantly 
                                                 
 
26 An alternate definition of basis risk used in the commodities market is the variability between the spot price and the 
futures price. Based off this definition, the price of basis risk of index insurance is defined as the difference between the 
payout as measured by the index and the actual loss incurred by the farmer (World Bank [2011]). We recognize that this 
alternate definition exists, but retain that our definition for the study of the impact of the compound nature of basis risk 
on the welfare of index insurance choices. 
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affect welfare measures. 
2.2 Theory 
An index insurance product will only fully compensate for a loss based on a predetermined and 
objective index, and not whether the individual experiences a loss. For instance, assume that an 
individual has an initial endowment of $20, and will lose $15 if she experiences a loss event. The 
individual is given an opportunity to purchase index insurance, which would only pay out the $15 
indemnity if the index reflects that a loss event has occurred. This insurance would cost $1.20, but 
the probability of the individual's outcome matching the index may vary. The possible monetary 
outcomes and their corresponding probabilities are summarized in Figure 2.1. Basis risk is 
represented by the probability of the individual’s outcome matching the index, and we define this 
parameter as correlation. 
 
Figure 2.1 Decision Tree for Index Insurance Product 
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  Notation necessarily becomes more complex with index insurance. There are 8 possible 
states, depending on the permutations of binary outcomes of if the individual chooses to purchase 
insurance {I1, I0}, if the index reflects a loss {L1, L0}, and if the individual’s outcome matches the 
outcome of the index {P1, P0}.
27 For instance, if the individual chooses not to purchase insurance 
(I0), the index reflects a loss outcome (L1), and the individual’s outcome matches the index (P1), the 
individual would also experience a loss (I0L1P1) and be left with $5. If the individual’s outcome does 
not match the index (P0), she does not experience a loss (I0L1P0) and would keep her $20. By the 
same logic, I0L0P1 = $20 and I0L0P0 = $5. 
 If the individual chooses to purchase insurance (I1) the outcomes are slightly more complex. 
If the index reflects a loss (L1), and if the individual’s outcome matches that of the index (P1), the 
individual experiences a loss and receives a payout (I1L1P1), hence she will keep her initial 
endowment less the premium ($20 - $1.20 = $18.80). However if the individual’s outcome does not 
match the index which shows a loss (I1L1P0), the individual does not experience a loss but still 
receives a payout of $15 on top of her initial endowment less premium ($20 - $1.20 +$15 = $33.80). 
This is the upside basis risk. Conversely if the individual’s outcome does not match the index when 
the index does not show a loss (I1L0P0), then the individual experiences a loss but receives no payout 
from insurance ($20 - $1.20 - $15 = $3.80). This is the downside basis risk.  
                                                 
 
27 Some states may have same final monetary outcome, but we consider them as separate states here to avoid making 
assumptions to combine probabilities. 
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2.2.1 Evaluating Welfare 
Let W denote wealth, L denote the loss amount, π denote the insurance premium, p denote the 
probability of the index indicating a loss, ρ denote the correlation28 between the index and the 
outcome to the individual, and U(⋅) denote the utility function of the individual. Assuming the 
individual behaves consistently with EUT, the expected utility (EU) of the choice to not purchase 
insurance is 
 EU0 = (p × ρ) U(W-L) + [p×(1-ρ)] U(W) + ((1-p)×ρ) U(W) + [(1-p)×(1-ρ)] U(W-L) 
or, to link to the previous presentation, 
 EU0 = (p × ρ) U(I0L1P1) + [p×(1-ρ)] U(I0L1P0) + ((1-p)×ρ) U(I0L0P1) + [(1-p)×(1-ρ)] U(I0L0P0). 
The EU of the choice to purchase insurance is: 
 EU1 = (p × ρ) U(W-π) + [p×(1-ρ)] U(W-π+L) + ((1-p)×ρ) U(W-π) + [(1-p)×(1-ρ)] U(W-π-L) 
or 
 EU1 = (p × ρ) U(I1L1P1) + [p×(1-ρ)] U(I1L1P0) + ((1-p)×ρ) U(I1L0P1) + [(1-p)×(1-ρ)] U(I1L0P0). 
We can define the Certainty Equivalent (CE) as the wealth level that is equivalent to a lottery, so the 
CE of not purchasing insurance CE0 is defined by U(CE0) = EU0, and the CE of purchasing 
insurance CE1 is defined by U(CE1) = EU1. Expected welfare gain is measured by the consumer 
surplus (CS) from the option of purchasing insurance. This is the difference between the CE of 
purchasing insurance and the CE of not purchasing insurance: CS = CE1 - CE0. 
 If we assume RDU as the decision-making model, the calculation of CS is similar once we 
calculate the corresponding CE values. The only complication is keeping track of how probabilities 
                                                 
 
28 We assume that this correlation is non-negative, and lies in the closed unit interval. This is a reasonable assumption for 
the practical settings in which index insurance is being proposed. In fact, our formal exposition treats ρ as if it were a 
probability, which is only valid under this assumption. 
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are transformed into decision weights: Appendix B explains this transformation in detail.29 The RDU 
of not purchasing insurance then defined as RDU0,, and the RDU of purchasing insurance is RDU1. 
The CE are then defined similarly, but using RDU instead of EU, so CE0 is defined by U(CE0) = 
RDU0, and CE1 is defined by U(CE1) = RDU1. The expected welfare gain is then calculated again as 
CS = CE1 - CE0.  Since RDU0 need not equal EU1, and RDU1 need not equal EU1, and both will 
typically be quite different for a subject best characterized by RDU, the expected welfare gain of the 
option of purchasing insurance will depend on the characterization of risk preferences for the 
individual. 
 The same logic for evaluating the welfare gain extends to other variants on EUT, such as 
Dual Theory (DT) due to Yaari [1987] and Disappointment Aversion (DA) due to Gul [1991]. We 
do not consider Prospect Theory here, since all outcomes were in the gain domain in our 
experiments, but the logic extends immediately. 
2.2.2 Welfare and Basis Risk Correlation 
How does the CS from purchasing index insurance vary as the correlation varies? To provide 
concrete illustrations, assume utility follows the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) model so that  
 U(x) = x(1−r)/(1−r)  
where x is the monetary outcome and r≠1 is a parameter to be estimated. For r=1 assume 
U(x)=ln(x) if needed. Thus r is the coefficient of CRRA under EUT: r=0 corresponds to risk 
neutrality, r<0 to risk loving, and r>0 to risk aversion. Values between 0.3 and 0.7 are typical for our 
subjects. 
                                                 
 
29 The highest-ranked monetary outcome has a decision weight equal to the weighted probability, where the weighting 
function is to be defined. In our insurance choices there are only two monetary outcomes in each implied lottery, despite 
there being four outcomes in terms of states of nature. In this special case the decision weight on the smallest-ranked 
monetary outcome is 1 minus the decision weight on the highest-ranked monetary outcome. The probabilities of the top 
two monetary prizes are added prior to probability weighting, as are the probabilities of the bottom two monetary prizes. 
Thereafter the RDU is evaluated as if it only had two outcomes. 
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 Figure 2.2 shows how the CS varies for this index insurance product across the risk 
parameter r, assuming the individual has EUT preferences. When there is 100% correlation and 
ρ=1, so the outcome of the individual always matches the outcome of the index, the CS is larger if 
the individual is more risk averse. This follows from the fact that more risk averse individuals are 
willing to pay more for insurance. This is a special case of the index insurance contract where the 
compound lottery collapses into a simple indemnity contract.  
 
Figure 2.2 Consumer Surplus Across EUT CRRA Coefficients 
 
 
 
 As correlation decreases, so the probability of the outcome of the individual matching the 
index outcome decreases, the downside basis risk causes the CS to decrease at a greater rate for the 
more risk averse than the less risk averse individual. This causes the “twist” in Figure 2.2, which 
leads to the CS for the less risk averse individual being higher than the CS of the more risk averse 
individual. Regardless of level of risk aversion, the decrease in CS decreases as correlation decreases, 
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because the positive impact of the upside basis risk is greater as correlation decreases to 0.4 < ½. 
Since we are only dealing with losses L from initial wealth W, a correlation less than ½ means there 
is a greater probability of the personal outcome not matching the index loss outcome, which would 
result in a payout being received even though the individual has not experienced a loss. As 
correlation decreases for this index insurance product, CS decreases to the point of becoming 
negative. This shows that the risk preferences of the individual and the correlation can affect 
whether the individual’s decision to purchase insurance would result in an expected welfare gain or 
loss. 
 Figure 2.3 shows how CS varies as correlation decreases assuming an RDU decision-making 
model with a Power probability weighting function ω(p) = pγ. In this case γ≠1 is consistent with a 
deviation from the conventional EUT representation. The probability weighting parameter γ spans 
our expected range of 0.7 to 1.3, and the CRRA coefficient r is held constant at 0.6. Convexity of 
the probability weighting function, with γ>1, is said to reflect “pessimism” and generates, if one 
assumes for simplicity a linear utility function, a risk premium since ω(p) < p  ∀p and hence the 
“RDU EV” weighted by ω(p) instead of p has to be less than the EV weighted by p. The converse is 
true for γ<1, and is said to reflect “optimism.” When there is 100% correlation the presence of 
optimism causes the CS of purchasing insurance to be lower if γ is smaller, since the probability of 
no loss occurring is over-weighted. As the correlation decreases, this optimism increases the impact 
of underweighting of the downside basis risk and overweighting of the upside basis risk when 
purchasing insurance, which causes the expected welfare gain of purchasing insurance to increase as 
correlation decreases for optimistic individuals. 
 The converse is true for pessimistic individuals with a larger γ. Underweighting the 
probability that the individual will experience a loss though the index does not reflect a loss and 
overweighting the probability that the individual does not experience a loss and still receives a 
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payout as the index is triggered causes the CS of purchasing index insurance to decrease more as 
correlation decreases. Once again, not only do the probability weighting parameters impact whether 
the expected welfare gain is positive or negative, and hence whether or not the “correct” decision 
estimated for the individual is to purchase or not to purchase index insurance, it also affects how 
much the insurance product will or will not benefit the individual. 
 
Figure 2.3 Consumer Surplus Across Power Probability Weighting Parameter 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2.4 shows how the CS is affected if we vary the parameter of an inverse-S probability 
weighting function ω(p) = pγ / ( pγ + (1-p)γ )1/γ for an RDU decision making model while decreasing 
the correlation ρ. This function exhibits inverse-S probability weighting (optimism for small p, and 
pessimism for large p) for γ<1, and S-shaped probability weighting (pessimism for small p, and 
optimism for large p) for γ>1. Once again the probability weighting parameter γ spans our expected 
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typical range of 0.7 to 1.3, and the CRRA coefficient r is held constant at 0.6. A smaller γ<1 reflects 
an overweighting of the probabilities of extreme outcomes, while a larger γ>1 reflects an 
underweighting of the probabilities of extreme outcomes. When correlation is at 100%, the 
probability of the loss outcome is overweighted when γ<1 and underweighted when γ>1, which 
causes the CS of index insurance to be higher for smaller γ. As correlation decreases, there is a 
tradeoff between the impact of the probability of downside basis risk versus the impact of the 
probability of the upside basis risk. Increasing the probability of downside basis risk will cause the 
CS of insurance to decrease; however, increasing the probability of upside basis risk will cause the 
CS to increase. For γ<1, where the probabilities of extreme outcomes are overweighted, the impact 
of overweighting the downside basis risk initially dominates and causes the CS to decrease; however, 
for smaller correlations the impact of overweighting the upside basis risk increases. When γ>1, the 
extreme probabilities are underweighted, hence the impact of underweighting downside basis risk 
would initially cause the CS to decrease less; but the impact from underweighting the upside basis 
risk will increase for smaller correlations, causing a larger decrease in CS. 
 Using this methodology to calculate expected welfare gains implicitly assumes the Reduction 
Of Compound Lotteries (ROCL) axiom holds when we multiply the compound probabilities from 
the multiple steps to calculate EU or RDU. It would hence be inappropriate to use expected welfare 
calculated in this way to compare the effects of violating the ROCL axiom. We also make use of the 
two-step methodology explained in Segal [1990][1992] that does not assume ROCL, while still 
maintaining the independence axiom. We explain this methodology in detail later. 
2.3 Experimental Design 
Our experimental design has two essential tasks: one to elicit the risk preferences of the individual, 
and the other to elicit index insurance choices. 
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Figure 2.4 Consumer Surplus Across Inverse-S Probability Weighting Parameter 
 
 
  
 
2.3.1 Risky Lottery Choices 
Each subject was asked to make choices for each of 76 pairs of lotteries in the gain domain, 
designed to provide evidence of risk aversion as well as the tendency to make decisions consistently 
with EUT or RDU models. The battery is based on designs from Loomes and Sugden [1998] to test 
the Independence Axiom (IA), designs from Harrison, Martínez-Correa and Swarthout [2015] to test 
the ROCL axiom, and a series of lotteries that are actuarially-equivalent versions of some of our 
index insurance choices. Each subject faced a randomized sequence of choices from this 76. The 
analysis of risk attitudes given these choices follows Harrison and Rutström [2008]. The typical 
interface used is shown in Figure 2.5. 
 The key insight of the Loomes and Sugden [1998] design is to vary the “gradient” of the 
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EUT-consistent indifference curves within a Marschak-Machina (MM) triangle.30 The reason for this 
is to generate some choice patterns that are more powerful tests of EUT for any given risk attitude. 
Under EUT the slope of the indifference curve within a MM triangle is a measure of risk aversion. 
So there always exists some risk attitude such that the subject is indifferent, as stressed by Harrison 
[1984], and evidence of Common Ratio (CR) violations in that case has virtually zero power.31  
 The beauty of this design is that even if the risk attitude of the subject makes the tests of a 
CR violation from some sets of lottery pairs have low power, then the tests based on other sets of 
lottery pairs have to have higher power for this subject. By presenting subjects with several such 
sets, varying the slope of the EUT-consistent indifference curve, one can be sure of having some 
tests for CR violations that have decent power for each subject, without having to know a priori what 
their risk attitude is. Harrison, Johnson, McInnes and Rutström [2007] refer to this as a 
“complementary slack experimental design,” since low-power tests of EUT in one set mean that 
there must be higher-power tests of EUT in another set. 
 A simple variant on these tests for a CR violation allow one to detect an empirically 
important pattern known as “boundary effects.” These effects arise when one nudges the lottery 
pairs in CR and Common Consequence tests of EUT into the interior of the MM triangle, or moves 
them significantly into the interior. The striking finding is that EUT often performs better when one 
does this. Actually, the evidence is mixed in interesting ways. Camerer [1992] generated a remarkable 
series of experiments in which EUT did very well for interior lottery choices, but his data was 
unfortunately from hypothetical choices. These lotteries were well off the border. These lotteries can 
                                                 
 
30 In the MM triangle there are always one, two or three prizes in each lottery that have positive probability of occurring. 
The vertical axis in each panel shows the probability attached to the high prize of that triple, and the horizontal axis 
shows the probability attached to the low prize of that triple. So when the probability of the highest and lowest prize is 
zero, 100% weight falls on the middle prize. Any lotteries strictly in the interior of the MM triangle have positive weight 
on all three prizes, and any lottery on the boundary of the MM triangle has zero weight on one or two prizes. 
31 EUT does not, then, predict 50:50 choices, as some casually claim. It does say that the expected utility differences will 
not explain behavior, and that then allows all sorts of psychological factors to explain behavior. In effect, EUT has no 
prediction in this instance, and that is not the same as predicting an even split. 
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be contrasted with those in Camerer [1989] that were on the border, and where there were 
significant EUT violations. But Harless [1992] found that just nudging the lotteries off the boundary 
did not improve behavior under EUT for real stakes. So one natural question is whether the CR 
tests lead to EUT not being rejected when we are in the interior triangle, and to EUT being rejected 
when we are have choices on the boundary. Our battery replicates several of the sets of boundary 
CR tests originally proposed by Loomes and Sugden [1998], but with all lotteries moved into the 
interior of the MM triangle. 
 
Figure 2.5 Interface for Risk Aversion Lottery Choice 
 
 
 
 Our battery includes 15 lottery pairs based on Loomes and Sugden [1998] and a 
corresponding 15 lottery pairs that are interior variants of those 15 that are “on the border.” Table 
2.9 of Appendix C documents these 30 lottery pairs.  
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 Harrison, Martínez-Correa and Swarthout [2015] designed a battery to test ROCL by posing 
lottery pairs that include an explicit compound lottery and a simple (non-compound) lottery. These 
lottery pairs have a corresponding set of pairs that replace the explicit compound lottery with its 
actuarially equivalent simple lottery. Thus a ROCL-consistent subject would make the same choices 
in the first and second set. The compound lotteries are constructed by visually presenting two simple 
lotteries, but having some “double or nothing” option for one of them: Tables 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 of 
Appendix C document these 30 lottery pairs. 
 Finally, we pose 16 lottery pairs that are actuarially-equivalent simple lotteries corresponding 
to 16 of the index insurance choices explained below. The objective is to present the “same” choices 
as the index insurance choices, but using the interface and abstract framing of a risky lottery choice, 
and assuming away the need to employ ROCL. The parameters for these lottery pairs are displayed 
in Table 2.10 in Appendix C, and Figure 2.5 shows the type of interface used. 
2.3.2 Index Insurance Choices 
We are primarily interested in observing how subjects’ choices vary as the correlation factor varies 
across insurance choices, since a perfect correlation correspond to the traditional indemnity 
insurance product studied by Harrison and Ng [2016]. Subjects start with a $20 endowment and a 
10% chance of losing $15. Each individual in Harrison and Ng [2016] is then offered 24 choices, 
where the premium of indemnity insurance with full coverage is varied from $0.20 to $4.80 in 20-
cent increments, and for each premium decide if they want to purchase insurance or not. Each 
subject was classified as an EUT or RDU decision-maker, depending on which estimated model best 
explained the observed choices. Given the specific risk preferences estimated for each subject, the 
expected welfare gain from their battery of insurance choices was calculated. 
 We have extended the insurance choices of Harrison and Ng [2016] to include variation in 
correlation and loss probability, in addition to variation in premium amounts. We use a 4×4×2 
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framework for a total of 32 choices, displayed in Table 2.1. Correlation here is defined as the 
probability that the loss outcome of the individual matches the loss outcome of an independent 
index, and varies from +100% to +80%, +60% and +40%. Premium amounts vary around the 
actuarially fair premium of the initial insurance battery of $1.50, when the correlation is 100% and 
the loss probability set at 10%. Premia vary from much lower, slightly lower, slightly higher, and 
much higher than the actuarially fair premium: $0.50, $1.20, $1.80 and $3.50. The probability that 
the index reflects a loss is varied from 10% to 20%. The experiment was programmed and 
conducted with the z-Tree software developed by Fischbacher [2007]. 
 This insurance battery is applied across three treatments, designed to identify the structural 
source of welfare gains and losses: 
 In the Index Insurance (II) treatment, the probability of the index experiencing a loss, and 
the probability of the personal outcome matching that of the index, are presented separately 
to the subjects. The monetary outcomes are also presented based on the outcomes of the 
index loss and personal event matching as separate events. Figure 2.6 displays a typical 
screenshot from this treatment. 
 In the Actuarially-Equivalent (AE) treatment the probability of the index experiencing a 
loss, and the probability of the personal outcome matching that of the index, are still 
presented separately. However, the probabilities of the monetary outcomes are presented as 
final combined lotteries as if ROCL applies. The screenshot in Figure 2.7 shows that the 
information presentation in this treatment matches the II treatment, apart from collapsing 
the compound lottery of the index insurance contract. The logic of the contract and 
underlying risk is still explained in the same manner in the instructions, so the natural 
context remains the same as the II treatment. 
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 In the Naked Actuarially-Equivalent (Naked AE) treatment the index loss probability 
and matching probability are not mentioned at all, and the AE lotteries corresponding to the 
index insurance contract are displayed using the abstract interface used for the risk lotteries 
task. As noted earlier, Figure 2.5 shows the interface used. 
 
Table 2.1 Index Insurance Contracts and Parameters in the Experiment 
 
Choice Correlation 
Premium 
Amount ($) 
Index Loss 
Probability 
Initial 
Endowment ($) 
Loss Amount 
($) 
1 1 0.5 0.1 20 15 
2 0.8 0.5 0.1 20 15 
4 0.4 0.5 0.1 20 15 
5 1 1.2 0.1 20 15 
6 0.8 1.2 0.1 20 15 
7 0.6 1.2 0.1 20 15 
8 0.4 1.2 0.1 20 15 
9 1 1.8 0.1 20 15 
10 0.8 1.8 0.1 20 15 
11 0.6 1.8 0.1 20 15 
12 0.4 1.8 0.1 20 15 
13 1 3.5 0.1 20 15 
14 0.8 3.5 0.1 20 15 
15 0.6 3.5 0.1 20 15 
16 0.4 3.5 0.1 20 15 
17 1 0.5 0.2 20 15 
18 0.8 0.5 0.2 20 15 
19 0.6 0.5 0.2 20 15 
20 0.4 0.5 0.2 20 15 
21 1 1.2 0.2 20 15 
22 0.8 1.2 0.2 20 15 
23 0.6 1.2 0.2 20 15 
24 0.4 1.2 0.2 20 15 
25 1 1.8 0.2 20 15 
26 0.8 1.8 0.2 20 15 
27 0.6 1.8 0.2 20 15 
28 0.4 1.8 0.2 20 15 
29 1 3.5 0.2 20 15 
30 0.8 3.5 0.2 20 15 
31 0.6 3.5 0.2 20 15 
32 0.4 3.5 0.2 20 15 
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Figure 2.6 Interface for Insurance Choice in II Treatment 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Interface for Insurance Choice in AE Treatment 
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 In the Index Insurance Contextual Cue (II-CC) treatment we provided subjects with 
some text explaining the real-world context of the insurance choice problem defined by the 
Index Insurance (II) treatment. Apart from the text, shown in Box 1, the instructions were 
the same as the II treatment. In effect this treatment moves in the opposite direction than 
the AE and with the exception of the Naked AE treatment, which was part of the risk 
aversion task, all of the insurance choices came after the risk aversion task, and were 
presented in the order shown in Table 2.1.  
 
Box 1: Additional Text Provided in Index Insurance Contextual Clue Treatment 
 
 
 
2.3.3 Welfare and Compound Risk Preferences 
When we assume a CRRA utility function and EUT risk preferences to calculate the CS of 
purchasing insurance, a positive (negative) risk aversion parameter reflects risk aversion (loving) 
preferences, with a larger magnitude reflecting stronger preferences. We use the same insurance 
Information on Real-World Counterpart 
 
This task is based on a real-world insurance product known as index insurance, widely used for 
farmers who grow crops in poor countries. 
 
Index insurance is insurance that is linked to an index such as rainfall, temperature, humidity or 
crop yields, rather than an actual loss. An example of index insurance is the use of an index of 
rainfall totals to insure against drought-related crop loss. Payouts occur when rainfall totals over 
some time period fall below some pre-agreed threshold that can be expected to result in crop 
loss in a geographic area. 
 
One advantage of using the index is that, unlike traditional crop insurance, the insurance 
company does not need to visit farmers’ fields to assess losses and determine payouts. That is 
expensive to do, and means that traditional premiums would have to be too high for most 
farmers to afford. Instead, index insurance uses data from rain gauges near the farmer’s field. If 
these data show the rainfall amount is below the threshold, the insurance pays out; if the data 
show the rainfall amount exceeds the threshold, the insurance does not pay out. All the 
insurance company has to do, to figure out if it should pay out, is check the rain gauge. This 
reduces the cost of providing insurance to these farmers.  
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product that provides full indemnity against a 10% chance of losing $15 while starting with an initial 
endowment of $20 to demonstrate the impact of varying risk aversion on insurance demand in the 
presence and absence of basis risk. The cost of insurance is set at $1.80, which is slightly above 
actuarially fair insurance. We initially assume the ROCL axiom, which is the same as assuming 
compound risk neutrality when considering the impact of “simple” risk aversion on expected 
welfare gain. 
 When correlation is 1, or when there is no basis risk so that the individual’s outcome 
matches the index outcome with certainty, an increase in (simple) risk aversion increases the CS of 
purchasing insurance. This corresponds to the conventional insurance theory stated in Clarke [2016], 
that an increase in risk aversion increases insurance demand in the absence of basis risk. This 
increase in risk aversion is shown in the red line in Figure 2.8, showing the effect on CS. The blue 
line in Figure 2.8 shows the impact of risk aversion on CS when basis risk is introduced: in this case 
we define basis risk as a 60% chance that the individual’s outcome matches the index outcome. The 
blue line shows that this additional risk actually decreases the expected welfare gain of purchasing 
insurance as risk aversion increases. 
 When we compare the CS of purchasing insurance when there is no basis risk (red line) to 
the CS of purchasing insurance when there is basis risk (blue line), Figure 2.8 allows us to see that 
the expected welfare gain for the risk averse is reduced when basis risk is introduced. As risk 
aversion increases, this reduction in CS caused by the presence of basis risk increases. When the 
CRRA risk parameter is 0.7, or when there is moderate risk aversion, the CS is actually positive in 
the absence of basis risk: purchasing insurance for a moderately risk averse individual will lead to 
expected welfare gain. When basis risk is introduced, however, the CS of this insurance choice for 
the same moderately risk averse individual is negative: purchasing insurance in the presence of basis 
risk for this moderately risk averse individual will lead to expected welfare loss. In other words the 
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presence of basis risk changes the “correct” insurance choice from “should purchase” to “should 
not purchase.” This result of basis risk decreasing insurance demand for higher levels of risk 
aversion was first shown in Clarke [2016].When we allow for violations of ROCL, while assuming a 
CRRA utility function, we use the CRRA risk parameter r for simple lotteries and the parameter r + 
rc for compound lotteries, where rc captures the additive effect of evaluating a compound lottery. 
This additional layer of risk compounds the impact of risk aversion on the expected welfare gain 
from insurance, and this impact of ROCL violations is shown by the dotted lines in Figure 2.9. 
When rc is positive (negative), as shown by the longer (shorter) dotted lines, there is compound risk 
aversion (loving) as rc increases (decreases) the CRRA risk parameter.   
 
Figure 2.8 Effects of Simple Risk on CS 
 
 
 
 One oddity in using this methodology is that compound-neutral individuals and non-
compound-neutral individuals will still have a different CS evaluated for the same insurance product 
even in the absence of basis risk. This is shown by the red lines in Figure 2.9, which show the CS when 
correlation is 1, so that the individual’s outcome matches the index outcome with certainty, and 
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there is no basis risk. The solid line in Figure 2.9 reflects the compound risk neutral CS, the short-
dotted red line shows the compound risk loving CS, and the long-dotted red line shows the 
compound risk averse CS. We see that an increase in simple risk aversion increases CS in the 
absence of basis risk regardless of compound risk preferences. Using this methodology, however, 
shows that compound risk averse preferences increase CS and compound risk loving preferences 
decrease CS even though correlation is 1, which means there is no basis risk.  
 Compound risk aversion has a similar effect on the expected welfare gain of insurance as 
simple risk aversion. The blue lines show the CS of purchasing insurance when correlation is 0.6, so 
that is there is a 40% chance the individual’s outcome does not match the index outcome. This 
introduces basis risk since there is a chance that the individual experiences a loss but the index does 
not reflect a loss and hence there is no insurance payout even though the individual experiences a 
loss. This is an example of downside basis risk. Upside basis risk refers to the case in which the 
individual does not experience a loss but the index reflects a loss so the individual receives a payout 
even though he has not experienced a loss.  
 The solid blue line in Figure 2.9 shows the expected welfare gain from purchasing insurance 
for compound risk neutral preferences, which is the same blue line in Figure 2.8 when we only 
considered simple risk preferences. The long-dotted blue line in Figure 2.9 shows the expected 
welfare gain for compound risk averse preferences and the short dotted blue line shows the 
expected welfare gain for compound risk loving preferences. The long-dotted blue lines in Figure 2.9 
show that the effect on CS from an increase in compound risk aversion is similar to the effect on CS 
from an increase in simple risk aversion: compound risk aversion lowers the expected welfare gain 
from purchasing insurance. Conversely the short-dotted blue line shows that compound risk loving 
preferences increase CS relative to the solid blue line. Again the effect of compound risk loving 
preferences is similar to the effect of simple risk loving preferences.  
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 As we have seen from Figure 2.8 when we only consider “simple” risk preferences, basis risk 
causes the expected welfare gain from purchasing insurance to decrease, and this decrease is larger as 
the level of risk aversion increases. This impact of basis risk on CS is more pronounced in Figure 2.9 
when we also take compound risk preferences into account. When we assume moderate risk averse 
preferences (r = 0.7), Figure 2.9 shows that compound risk averse preferences increase CS when 
there is no basis risk (red), but compound risk averse preferences decrease CS when there is basis 
risk (blue). Without taking into account compound risk preferences, basis risk decreases CS of 
insurance for the moderately risk averse by $1.26. When compound risk aversion is taken into 
account the size of this reduction in CS caused by basis risk increases to $1.96. Compound risk 
aversion can further decrease insurance demand in the presence of basis risk, which could help 
explain why actual demand for index insurance has been lower than anticipated: we have yet to take 
into account the impact of compound risk preferences on index insurance welfare. 
 
Figure 2.9 Effect of Compound Risk on CS 
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2.4 Experimental Evidence 
2.4.1 Risk Preferences 
Overall, the proportion of model classifications as EUT or RDU are similar to previously conducted 
experiments with this population, although there are slightly more subjects classified as EUT 
compared to previous samples. Figure 2.10 displays the classifications, based on tests of the null 
hypothesis that ω(p) = p and a 5% significance level. These estimates and hypothesis tests are 
undertaken for each subject. Exactly 60% of the subjects are classified as EUT, with the next most 
common model being the RDU specification with a Prelec [1998] probability-weighting function. 
This function is ω(p) = exp{-η(-ln p)φ}, and is defined for 0<p≤1, η>0 and φ>0.32 The distribution 
of model classifications of subjects conditional on insurance choice treatment is also similar, with 
slight differences. Just over 50% of subjects under the AE treatment were classified as EUT, and 
almost 40% were classified as RDU with the Prelec probability weighting function. This difference 
in distribution was offset by subjects under the II-CC treatment, where about ⅔ of subjects were 
classified as EUT, but only 9% were classified as RDU with the Prelec probability weighting 
function. 
 It is important that we assign the appropriate model of risk preferences to each subject, since 
the model classification influences the expected welfare calculated for each insurance choice. To 
illustrate this point, consider individual subject #2. The risk parameters were estimated based on his 
choices on lotteries in the risk task, and are displayed in Figure 2.11. If subject #2 was classified as 
                                                 
 
32 When φ=1 this function collapses to the Power function ω(p) = pη, and to EUT when η = φ = 1. Many apply the 
Prelec [1998; Proposition 1, part (B)] function with constraint 0 < φ < 1, which requires that the probability weighting 
function exhibit subproportionality (so-called “inverse-S” weighting). Contrary to received wisdom, many individuals 
exhibit estimated probability weighting functions that violate subproportionality, so we use the more general 
specification from Prelec [1998; Proposition 1, part (C)], only requiring φ > 0, and let the evidence determine if the 
estimated φ lies in the unit interval. This seemingly minor point often makes a major difference empirically. In addition, 
one often finds applications of the one-parameter Prelec [1998] function, on the grounds that it is “flexible” and only 
uses one parameter. The additional flexibility over the Inverse-S probability weighting function is real, but minimal 
compared to the full two-parameter function. 
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EUT, he would be moderately risk averse with a modestly concave utility function (r = 0.61). 
However, the preferred model is based on the log-likelihood and the hypothesis test that ω(p) = p, 
and for subject #2 that is the RDU model with the Inverse-S probability weighting function.33  
 Classifying subject #2 as RDU (Inverse-S) means the utility function is less concave, and the 
probability weighting function implies that the subject will overweigh extreme outcomes (γ = 0.7). 
Hence the subject would overestimate the probability of experiencing a loss, and would be willing to 
pay a higher premium to purchase the insurance. This overweighting of loss probability offsets the 
reduction in risk aversion under RDU, compared to when the risk premium is characterized entirely 
by curvature of the utility function. 
 
Figure 2.10 Classifying Subjects as EUT or RDU 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
33 Even though the Prelec probability weighting function is more flexible, it can generate slightly smaller log-likelihood 
values on occasions for numerical reasons. As it happens, it would not affect our conclusions, since the estimated 
functions are virtually the same (see the bottom two panels of Figure 2.11).  
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Figure 2.11 Estimated Risk Parameters for Subject #2 
 
 
 
Figure 2.12 Consumers Surplus of Choices of Subject #2, 
EUT Risk Preference 
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Figure 2.13 Consumer Surplus of Choices of Subject #2, 
RDU (Inverse-S) Risk Preferences 
 
 
 Figures 2.12 and 2.13 illustrate the importance of this classification on the welfare 
calculations for subject #2. Each chart shows the CS calculated for each insurance choice made by 
subject #2. Blue bars indicate that subject had chosen to purchase insurance and red bars indicate 
that subject had chosen not to purchase insurance. The former chart shows the CS distribution if we 
had assumed subject #2 had EUT risk preferences, and the latter chart shows the CS distribution 
assuming subject #2 had RDU risk preferences with Inverse-S probability weighting function, the 
best-fit model based on the log-likelihood criteria. Different models of risk preference type can lead 
to different insurance decisions being recommended. For choices 7 and 13 under EUT, subject #2 
choice to not purchase insurance resulted in a positive CS. Under RDU, however, these same 
choices resulted in a negative welfare gain. Using a different model of risk preference type can also 
impact the size of the expected welfare gain from an insurance choice, and not just the sign. Choice 
17 becomes more beneficial when subject #2 is classified as RDU (Inverse-S) compared to EUT. 
Again, subject #2 made one set of choices over the risky lotteries, so it is the classification of latent 
preferences given those choices that is driving these differences. Structural theory is essential to 
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making the correct calculations about the sign and size of welfare. 
 We need to make a theoretical assumption that we can indeed identify risk preferences 
independently of the insurance choice under evaluation to calculate the CS of insurance choices. An 
independent measure of risk preferences is required in order to identify an expected welfare loss.  
We can test this source independence assumption by comparing the risk parameters in the risk task 
estimated for the pooled sample against the pooled risk parameters estimated only from the Naked 
AE lotteries. If the pooled risk parameters estimated from the two sources are statistically 
significantly different from each other, it would weaken the empirical basis for this assumption.34 We 
find that the pooled risk aversion parameter estimated from just the Naked AE lotteries is not 
significantly different from the pooled risk aversion parameter estimated from the risk task when we 
assume EUT. When we assume an RDU (Prelec) decision-making model, the point estimates of the 
risk aversion parameter r and the probability weighting parameter  are not significantly different, 
but the pooled point estimate for the probability weighting parameter  is significantly different. 
Figure 2.30 in Appendix E shows how the probability weighting functions differ for the two 
sources. Even though the estimated risk parameters assuming RDU are significantly different, we 
still assume source independence for reasons explained in Harrison and Ng [2016; p.101ff.]. 
2.4.2 Insurance Take-Up 
The overall distribution of insurance choices is displayed in Figure 2.14. We define a “correct” 
choice is one in which the subject makes the choice to purchase or not purchase the insurance 
product on offer that is predicted by correctly applying the risk preferences we estimate for that subject. In 
other words, if the certainty-equivalent of the consumer surplus is positive when purchasing the 
insurance product, the “correct” decision is to purchase it; otherwise, the “correct” decision is not to 
                                                 
 
34 Even if the assumption is descriptively false, it must still be made for normative evaluations, for reasons discussed in 
Harrison and Ng [2016; p.101ff.]. 
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purchase it. We use quotation marks for the word correct here, because our definition rests on 
theory and econometric inference about the risk preferences of individuals, and both of those might 
be wrong. But we firmly reject the view that one can determine what a correct insurance purchase 
decision is in the absence of some assumed theoretical and econometric structure.35 
 Subjects make the “correct” choice more often when they are predicted to take up insurance 
based on their estimated risk preferences and the specific features of that insurance choice (the left 
panel, compared to the right panel). There appears to be no significant pattern when the estimated 
risk preferences predict that the subject should not purchase insurance (the right panel). A Fisher 
Exact test indicates that one can claim that these patterns of correct and incorrect decisions are 
significantly different across the two predictions. 
 These calculations employ the point estimates of the preferred specification of risk 
preferences for each subject. Harrison and Ng [2016; p.110ff.] demonstrate how to allow for the 
sampling distribution of these estimates. Assuming a multivariate normal distribution on the 
estimated risk parameters, 500 draws on the risk parameters for each individual can be used to 
calculate the expected CS for each decision. Each decision can be tested to determine if it was 
statistically significantly “incorrect.” In other words, for decisions where insurance was actually 
                                                 
 
35 Clarke [2016] derives a ratio to determine an upper bound on the optimal level of insurance for individuals with 
decreasing absolute risk aversion. This upper bound does not depend on the level of risk aversion of the individual 
under EUT, and can be used as a quick measure of rational insurance choices. This ratio depends only on the correlation 
of the insurance choice. Since the correlation values in our experiment are {40%, 60%, 80% and 100%}, the possible 
upper bounds of optimal level of insurance assuming actuarially-fair premiums in our experiment are respectively {-50%, 
33%, 75%, 100%}. These ratios refer to the maximum optimal coverage a risk averse EUT individual should purchase 
regardless of the level of their risk aversion. Since our experimental design only allows for the binary choice of full 
coverage or no coverage, we cannot directly compare this upper bound of optimal coverage to our results on take-up. 
One way to determine rationality of an insurance purchase for a risk averse EUT individual in our experiment is to base 
CS calculations on a utility function that would maximize CS for any risk averse EUT individual. This would be a utility 
function that reflects the most optimism for insurance for an individual with a given risk parameter and premium 
loading. This CS calculated based on this utility function represents the upper bound of rational expected welfare gains 
from purchasing insurance. If this CS is never positive across all risk aversion parameters, we can deduce that it is never 
rational for an EUT risk averse individual to purchase insurance. This test is beyond the scope of our experiment, 
however, and this upper bound could be better compared against an experiment that allows for partial insurance 
coverage. 
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purchased, was the expected CS significantly negative? And if insurance was not actually purchased, 
was the expected CS significantly positive? Even after allowing for bootstrapping of the calculated 
welfare, the conclusion remained the same. The largest shift in count was for the bucket where 
insurance was predicted not to be taken up, but insurance was purchased. The number of choices in 
this bucket decreased from 739 to 706, a 4% decrease, but this “incorrect” choice still represented 
47% of the choices where insurance should not be taken up. This shows that even after we allow for 
risk preferences to lie on a distribution, a considerable portion of the purchase choices were still 
found to be “incorrect.” 
 
Figure 2.14 Proportion of Actual Take-Up to Predicted Choices 
 
 
 
 The result of subjects preferring to take up insurance over not taking up insurance is driven 
by insurance choices in the AE treatment. Subjects in the AE treatment also choose to take up 
insurance more even when taking up insurance is predicted to result in negative welfare gain. This 
result is not observed in the II or II-CC treatments. In those two treatments, when we predict that 
the subject should not take up insurance, the choice count of those who agree and do not take up 
insurance is higher than the choice count of those who do take up insurance.  This is the first piece 
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of evidence to suggest that compound risk might “scare away” potential buyers. 
 The distribution of choices for the II choices with a real world context (the II-CC treatment) 
is similar to the choices without the real world context (the II treatment). Detailed figures showing 
the breakdown of predicted count to actual choices by treatment can be found in Appendix E. 
2.4.3 Comparing the II and AE Treatments 
The breakdown by treatment of actual choices compared to predicted action to purchase insurance 
provides an initial insight into potential welfare losses. As noted, in Figure 2.14 the proportion of 
“correct” choices of take-up for choices that are predicted to lead to take-up are higher with the AE 
treatment than with the II treatment. However, the proportion of “correct” choices to not take-up 
for choices that are predicted to lead to no take-up are higher with the II treatment than with the AE 
treatment. Thus there is an interesting structural trade-off underlying the net welfare differences 
between the II and AE treatments. As it happens, the first effect is clearly much larger than the 
second effect, as a fraction of choices and as a number of choice. We would expect the same relative 
importance when these choice errors are translated into welfare loss. 
 In Figure 2.15 we compare the distribution of expected CS calculated from each insurance 
choice made in the II treatment to the expected CS calculated from each insurance choice made in 
the AE treatment. This comparison allows us to see if the decisions made in the AE treatment lead 
to greater welfare gains than the decisions made in the II treatment, and specifically provide a 
welfare metric to rigorously evaluate the trade-off in “correct” choices identified in Figure 2.14. The 
average CS in the AE treatment is indeed statistically significantly greater than the average CS in the 
II treatment, with a t-test showing a p-value < 0.01. This is yet another piece of evidence pointing 
towards ROCL and the presence of compound risk in the II product as the cause of potential buyers 
being discouraged from purchasing when they should. 
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Figure 2.15 Comparison of Consumer Surplus Distribution for II and AE Treatments 
 
 
Figure 2.16 Comparison of Efficiency Distribution for II and AE Treatments 
 
 
 
Efficiency is defined as the sum of the actual CS each subject earns from all their insurance choices 
as a ratio of the total CS they could have earned if they had made every choice consistently with 
their risk preferences. The efficiency metric was developed by Plott and Smith [1978], and is defined 
at the level of the individual subject, whereas the expected welfare gain is defined at the level of each 
choice by each subject. In addition, efficiency provides a natural normalization of expected welfare 
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gain on loss by comparing to the maximal expected welfare gain for that choice and subject. Both 
metrics are of interest, and are complementary. Figure 2.16 displays the efficiency comparisons, with 
the same conclusion as with the CS comparisons: the AE treatment leads to significantly greater 
efficiency. 
2.4.4 Comparing the II and II-C Treatments 
Comparing the distributions of expected CS calculated between the II treatments with and without 
real-life context in Figure 2.17 shows that there is no statistical difference between the expected 
welfare benefits from insurance choices in each case. The efficiency of subjects between the II 
treatment and the II-CC treatment, shown in Figure 2.18, provides a slightly different result, with 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicating that they do not have the same distribution (p < 0.001), 
despite the similarity of average efficiency. From our results we see that while take-up and welfare 
increase when compound lotteries are expressed in their reduced form, adding text to provide real-
life context beyond the lab does not significantly change behavior, and does not discourage the 
validity of lab results for index insurance in the real world. 
 
Figure 2.17 Comparison of Consumer Surplus Distribution for II and II-C Treatments 
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Figure 2.18 Comparison of Efficiency Distribution for II and II-C Treatments 
 
 
2.4.5 Allowing for ROCL Violations 
One conceptual limitation of the current methodology for calculating the expected welfare benefits 
from insurance is that we assume the subject calculates CS by using ROCL. This is true whether the 
subject is classified as having EUT or RDU preferences, since both assume ROCL. We therefore 
consider variants of the EUT and RDU models that do not assume ROCL. 
 For EUT we follow Harrison, Martínez-Correa and Swarthout [2015] and consider a 
“source-dependent” model in which the individual has one risk attitude for simple lotteries and 
potentially another risk attitude for compound lotteries. In historical context, Smith [1969] proposed 
this specification as one that was consistent with the evidence from several of the thought 
experiments underlying (two-color) Ellsberg paradox. If we view these types of lotteries as defining 
different sources of risk, this specification deviates from ROCL to the extent that these risk attitudes 
differ.36  
                                                 
 
36 In a handful of cases the source-dependent EUT model does not solve for an individual, but the traditional EUT 
model does solve. In that case we assume the latter specification for this individual, at least as the best EUT 
characterization. 
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 For RDU we apply the methodology from Segal [1990][1992] to relax the ROCL 
assumption, leading to what is often referred to as the Recursive RDU model. The basic idea is to 
assume the second-stage lotteries of any compound lottery are replaced by their certainty-equivalent, 
“throwing away” information about the second-stage probabilities before one examines the first-
stage probabilities at all. Hence one cannot then define the actuarially-equivalent simple lottery, by 
construction, since the informational bridge to that calculation has been burnt. If this CE is 
generated by RDU, then one can apply RDU to evaluate the first-stage lottery using those CE as 
final outcomes. The Recursive RDU model assumes one set of RDU preference parameters, just 
applied recursively in this manner.37 
 
Classification of Risk Preferences 
Figure 2.19 shows that the overall distribution of risk preferences of subjects is similar whether or 
not we assume ROCL, and should be compared to Figure 2.10 where we assume ROCL. We find an 
even greater fraction of subjects classified as EUT, although here we stress that “EUT” is in fact the 
source-dependent EUT model and not EUT, which assumes ROCL.38 The distribution conditional 
on treatment is also similar, with the exception of the II-CC treatment, where the distribution 
between RDU models is more balanced. Given the importance of the source-dependent EUT 
model, it is useful to identify how significant the deviations from ROCL are. Figure 2.20 shows the 
distribution of p-values, one per subject, testing the null hypothesis that the risk attitude for simple 
                                                 
 
37 It would be a simple matter to also consider a source-dependent Recursive RDU, or just a source-dependent RDU 
model. There is only one way for ROCL to be valid, but an infinite number of ways for it to be invalid.  
38 Nested hypothesis tests are not appropriate to use to determine if the source-dependent EUT (sdEUT) and recursive 
RDU (rRDU) models would be a better fit for each subject’s choices, since the sdEUT model is not nested in the rRDU 
model. For the non-nested model comparisons we use the Vuong test and the Clarke test, described in Harrison and 
Rutström [2009]. The Vuong test compares the observation-specific likelihoods of each model, rather than using the sum of 
the likelihoods of each model as in nested hypothesis tests. The ratio of the sdEUT likelihood to the rRDU likelihood at 
the observation level is calculated, then the average log of that test statistic for each subject is tested for the null 
hypothesis that it is zero. If the test statistic is not asymptotically distributed standard normal, the non-parametric Clarke 
test is more suitable. Not only does each test tell us which model is a better fit, but it also provides some statistical 
confidence in the rejection of the null in the direction of the favored model. 
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lotteries (rsimple) is the same as the risk attitude for compound lotteries (rcompound). We find that only 
16% of the subjects are estimated to violate ROCL in this manner at the 5% significance level (i.e, 
where the null hypothesis is EUT and the alternative hypothesis is source-dependent EUT). Of 
course, from Figure 2.19 we see that over 20% of subjects are classified as Recursively RDU. 
 
Figure 2.19 Classifying Subjects as Source-Dependent EUT or Recursive RDU, 
Without Assuming ROCL 
 
 
 
Figure 2.20 Tests of Source-Independence of EUT 
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Comparison of Predicted Choices and Actual Choices 
Relaxing ROCL in the calculation of welfare does not change our conclusions on the distribution of 
insurance choices (Figure 2.21). The movement of insurance choice count between buckets is small, 
and the largest shift is from choices to take-up insurance: the number of insurance choices that 
matched the prediction to take-up insurance decreased by 74, from 2114 to 2040. Relaxing ROCL 
changes the “sign” of the expected welfare benefits. If the sign assuming ROCL is positive 
(negative) but changes to negative (positive) when relaxing ROCL, then the choice will switch from 
predicted to take-up (not take-up) to predicted to not take-up (take-up). Bootstrapping the 
calculated CS also does not change our conclusions. Assuming the recursive methodology, the shift 
in the choice count from the “incorrect” choice to the “correct” choice in each bucket is less than 
20. The largest impact is in choice count where take-up is not predicted, the proportion of 
“incorrect” choices decreases from 50% to 47%.  
 
Figure 2.21 Proportion of Actual Take-Up to Predicted Choices Without Assuming ROCL 
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Comparison of Consumer Surplus and Efficiency 
Relaxing ROCL still leads us to the same conclusion, that on average expected welfare gain is higher 
in the AE treatment than in the II treatment (Figures 2.22 and 2.23). Just as we found when we 
assume ROCL, a comparison of CS distributions shows expected welfare gain from insurance 
choices is not statistically significantly different between the II and II-CC treatments (Figure 2.24). 
When we relax the ROCL assumption however, efficiency in the II-CC treatment is statistically 
different and larger than efficiency in the II treatment (Figure 2.25). Thus, when we relax the ROCL 
assumption our results show that subjects are slightly more efficient when they are able to relate the 
experiment to its actual application in the field as index insurance. 
 
Figure 2.22 Comparison of Consumer Surplus Distribution for II and AE Treatments, 
Without Assuming ROCL 
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Figure 2.23 Comparison of Efficiency Distribution for II and AE Treatments, 
Without Assuming ROCL 
 
 
 
Figure 2.24 Comparison of Consumer Surplus Distribution for II and II-C Treatments, 
Without Assuming ROCL 
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Figure 2.25 Comparison of Efficiency Distribution for II and II-C Treatments, Without 
Assuming ROCL 
 
 
 
 Once again we look to an individual’s welfare benefits from choices on insurance to illustrate 
the impact of relaxing the ROCL assumption. Figures 2.26 and 2.27 show the calculated CS for each 
insurance choice based on the risk model estimated for subject #116 with and without the ROCL 
assumption, respectively. The method for determining the preferred model is the same as described 
earlier. When ROCL is assumed, subject #116 is classified as RDU with a Prelec probability 
weighting function with a modestly concave utility function and a probability function that 
overweighs extreme outcomes. When we relax the ROCL assumption, however, subject #116 is 
classified as with the Source-Dependent EUT model with moderate risk aversion (r=0.56 for simple 
lotteries, and r=0.6 for compound lotteries). The CS distributions between the two models are 
similar, but there are still differences that impact how we evaluate subject #116’s insurance take-up 
decisions. The decision to not take up insurance for choices 7 and 8 are incorrect when subject #116 
is RDU (Prelec), since they result in negative CS. These same decisions to not take up insurance, 
however, become the correct choice under Source-Dependent EUT. 
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Figure 2.26 Consumer Surplus of Choices of Subject #116,  
RDU (Prelec) Risk Preferences 
 
 
 
Figure 2.27 Consumer Surplus of Choices of Subject #116,  
Source-Dependent EUT Risk Preferences 
 
 
For choices 14, 15 and 16 and 30, 31 and 32, when we relax the ROCL assumption we still 
infer that the decision to not purchase insurance resulted in positive expected welfare benefits. 
However, those benefits are greater for these decisions when the ROCL assumption is relaxed. This 
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is also seen in the efficiency calculated for subject #116, which is 0.56 if ROCL is assumed but 0.67 
if it is not. Again, the persistent theme here is that latent, structural theory is needed to get the 
correct welfare evaluations. 
2.4.6 The Reduction of Compound Lotteries Axiom 
Motivation 
It is apparent that the II contract differs formally from the standard indemnity contract by 
contractually transforming a simple risk into a compound risk, and in a way that necessarily increases 
the potential variability of final wealth levels for anyone purchasing the II contract. We say 
“necessarily” because we are studying naked II contracts that exist in a risk management vacuum: 
they are the only risk management tool available to our agents. In the field there exist a myriad of 
self-protection and self-insurance options, typically in the form of “informal insurance 
arrangements.” After all, one function of households, villages and even ethnicity is to pool risks – 
whether they do it, or even do it well, is a separate issue. But if we consider the formal II contract in 
this broader setting, as one component of a potential individual or group risk management portfolio, 
it may be less exposed as a risk management instrument to the fact that it exacerbates the variability 
of risk. But that is not our setting, by design. 
 Our design deliberately isolates the II contract, and focuses a bright light on the role of 
ROCL in explaining why the compound risks of an II contract might generate welfare losses when 
real individuals make real choices, and why some of those losses might be significant in size. This is 
the point of our comparison of II and AE insurance contracts, and our use of individual-specific 
tests of the validity of ROCL in the abstract. 
 As a result, we must be very careful in making claims about welfare effects to not assume in 
the left hand what we are rejecting and evaluating in the right hand: the validity of the ROCL axiom. 
The EUT and RDU models considered to this stage as a way of characterizing risk preferences both 
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assume the validity of ROCL. We now consider “variants” of EUT and RDU that do not assume 
ROCL, so that our welfare evaluation of II contracts can be undertaken on a theoretically consistent 
basis. We say “variants” in quotation marks since these are not EUT or RDU: we consider a Source-
Dependent EUT (sdEUT) and Recursive RDU (rRDU) specification, respectively. The sdEUT 
model nests EUT, and the rRDU model nests RDU, but the rRDU model does not nest sdEUT in 
the same way that RDU nests EUT. Hence we cannot simply apply the same methodology as before 
to decide on the best characterization of risk preferences for an individual. To do that we would 
need to rely on non-nested hypothesis tests or mixture specifications of sdEUT and rRDU – the 
historical linkage between non-nested hypothesis tests and mixture models is documented in 
Harrison and Rutström [2009], and has been largely forgotten in modern econometric doctrine. 
 We intend to undertake non-nested hypothesis tests in order to determine the best 
characterization of the model of non-ROCL risk preferences for the individual.39 But for now we 
adopt a simpler approach by assuming that the individual is either sdEUT or rRDU and evaluating the 
welfare costs of their decisions conditional on the implied risk preferences for that individual.  
 
Statistical Analysis 
A regression analysis is useful in understanding what is driving the typical differences in the welfare 
distribution between the II treatments and AE treatments. We are interested in the impact of 
parameters that vary across insurance choices, which are the correlation, the probability the index 
suffers a loss, and the premium. We are also interested in how characteristics of our subjects might 
influence their welfare choices.  
 One natural characteristic to also look at is how a subject’s behavior with respect to the 
                                                 
 
39 Harrison and Swarthout [2016] illustrate the approach we will use, in the context of evaluating the empirical strength 
of support for Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) compared to RDU and EUT, since RDU and EUT are not nested in 
CPT. 
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ROCL axiom influence the welfare from choices over compound lotteries. We measure violations of 
the ROCL axiom non-parametrically by making use of the 15 ROCL lottery pairs in our risk battery. 
Each subject was given 15 lottery choices between a simple lottery and a compound lottery (S-C 
lottery), as well as 15 corresponding lottery choices between the same simple lottery and a simple 
lottery that was actuarially-equivalent to that compound lottery (S-AE lottery). If the subject was 
making ROCL-consistent choices, the choices in each lottery pair would match: either choose the 
simple lottery in both choices or choose the compound and actuarially-equivalent lottery. We count 
the number of pairs out of the 15 that each subject does not make these ROCL-consistent choices 
as a measure of the degree to which each subject deviates from the ROCL axiom. This method of 
measuring compound risk preferences does not differentiate between compound-loving or 
compound-risk averse, and only measures if the lottery choice deviates from ROCL or not.  
 Another natural characteristic of interest is a subject’s attitude towards risk.  We include a 
variable for the level of risk aversion for each subject, which is the risk parameter r, estimated 
assuming all subjects have CRRA utility functions and behave according to EUT. In this respect we 
only use EUT descriptively, to provide a measure of the overall risk aversion of the subject, and not 
to claim that the subject is best characterized by EUT. We also include the square of the risk 
parameter, to test the result in Clarke [2016], that subjects might display a “hump-shaped” demand 
for index insurance which increases, then decreases, as risk aversion increases. We stress that these 
risk aversion characteristics are being considered heuristically here, since they are point estimates 
from a distribution and not data. For that reason we present the results of considering them 
separately. 
 We use CS calculated for each insurance choice, as well as the efficiency of each subject, to 
estimate expected welfare gain from insurance. We also look at efficiency at the choice level 
(Choice), which is simply a binary variable indicating whether or not the “correct” choice was made 
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to purchase insurance if it is expected to have positive welfare compared to the status quo, or not to 
purchase insurance if it is expected to have negative welfare compared to the status quo. Finally we 
also compare the results for the three welfare metrics to the results on take-up. Since take-up and 
Choice are binary variables, a random effects probit model is used to measure the average marginal 
probability of insurance factors. Since CS is continuous, a random effects linear regression is used to 
measure the average marginal effect. A beta regression is applied to efficiency to measure the 
average marginal probability, since efficiency is a continuous variable between 0 and 1.40 
 We first look at the average marginal effects across treatments assuming all subjects are 
source-dependent EUT and that model is used to evaluate the CS for each subject. As we are 
considering the impact of ROCL violations, it is more appropriate to use a model that does not 
assume ROCL to calculate welfare. Welfare in the AE treatment is significantly impacted by the 
correlation, loss probability and premium (Table 2.2). CS is on average $1.46 higher (p-value < 
0.001) for a unit increase in correlation. Lower premiums and higher loss probabilities significantly 
increase both welfare and take-up. Interestingly, correlation and premium do not significantly impact 
welfare when subjects are dealing with the compound lotteries in the II treatments (Table 2.3). 
 On the other hand, the ROCL violation count, our proxy for each subject’s consistency with 
the ROCL axiom, significantly impacts welfare in the II treatments. For each decrease in the 
violation count, a subject is on average 1.5% more likely to make a “correct” choice (p-value = 
0.002) that increases CS of that choice by $0.05 (p-value = 0.001) and increases the subject’s 
efficiency by 1.8% (p-value = 0.007). The ROCL violation count does not significantly impact 
welfare in the simple lotteries in the AE treatment. Insurers promoting index insurance encourage 
take-up or increase the welfare benefits of II by tweaking the characteristics of the insurance 
                                                 
 
40 Because all but one of these regression models are non-linear in the estimated parameters, it is possible for the margin, 
which is the derivative of the prediction function, to be greater than 1. 
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product, such as reducing the basis risk between index and personal outcome, and lowering 
premiums to encourage take-up (e.g., Skees et al. [2001], Cole et al. [2013], Jensen et al. [2014]). Our 
results show that on average these strategies are effective in increasing the welfare of insurance 
products dealing with simple risk, but resources might be better focused on encouraging ROCL 
consistency in insurance with compound risks, possibly through education. Our results also show 
that this improvement in welfare through an increase in ROCL-consistency may not be reflected in a 
significant increase in take-up. These same results hold when we consider the marginal effects at the 
mean of the covariates, instead of the average marginal effects.   
 Our results show that there is a gender effect on welfare of insurance choices in the AE 
treatment. The expected welfare gain from insurance choices from females are on average $0.22 
lower per choice (p-value = 0.007) and females are on average 8.0% less efficient (p-value = 0.002). 
This corresponds to the findings in Harrison and Ng [2016] with a simple indemnity product, where 
females were more likely to make the wrong decision to take up insurance when it was predicted that 
they should not. Our study finds that females might have benefitted more from the compound 
nature of index insurance, at least then the negative welfare impact of their insurance decisions were 
not significant. There were similar results for subjects who were college seniors and those who 
identified as Christian. On average in the AE treatment college seniors were making insurance 
choices that increased their welfare, while Christian students were making choices that decreased 
their welfare. This was consistent across welfare metrics CS and efficiency. 
 However, these demographics no longer have any significant impact in the II treatments. 
Once again these impacts can only be seen in calculated welfare, and not in take-up. Additionally, 
our results show that different demographics have different impacts between evaluating simple and 
compound insurance products. The sub-groups one might want to focus on when promoting simple 
insurance products may not be the same when considering compound insurance products. Black 
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subjects were significantly making decisions that benefitted them less in the II treatments, but their 
decisions did not significantly impact welfare in the AE treatment.  
 To best approximate the assumptions of the theoretical model of “rational behavior” in 
Clarke [2016], we can restrict all evaluations to EUT and further to all observed decisions that 
generated a positive CS (i.e., that were the correct decision, given the implied EUT preferences for 
that subject). In this instance we do find a significant “hump-shaped” impact on take-up for the II 
treatment, looking at the joint impact for r and r2. The same, predicted pattern arises even more 
strongly for impacts on CS under these assumptions: of course, under these assumptions the CS can 
be viewed as a richer measure of the strength of the “rational preference” implied by the theoretical 
model, whereas take-up is simply a binary indicator of the sign of the preference. There is also 
evidence for this predicted pattern on take-up when one considers relaxing the assumptions of the 
formal model of “rational behavior” underlying the predictions in Clarke [2016] by allowing some 
subjects to be characterized by RDU preferences. However, once we relax the assumption of 
ROCL, and use sdEUT or rRDU risk preferences to characterize individuals, the predicted pattern 
fails. This is not a surprise logically, but does show that these predictions from the perspective of 
“rational behavior” are not robust to the behavioral vagaries of real subjects making choices for real 
rewards. Similarly, when we relax the representation of the insurance task in terms of explicit 
compound lotteries and basis risk, in our AE treatment, there is no evidence for the predicted 
pattern with respect to take-up. These findings strengthen our argument that violations of the 
ROCL axiom should be considered as a first-order determinant when one studies the impacts of risk 
aversion on the welfare from index insurance products. Again, we stress that these estimated 
impacts from risk aversion are heuristic at best, since our risk aversion parameter is stochastic. 
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Table 2.2 Average Marginal Effects of Factors Affecting Welfare Assuming Source-
Dependent EUT in AE Treatment 
 
Take-up Choice CS Efficiency
Correlation -0.0184 0.308 1.457***
(0.744) (0.990) (<0.001)
Premium -0.0786*** -0.117 -0.479***
(<0.001) (0.990) (<0.001)
Loss Probability 1.118*** 1.626 7.833***
(<0.001) (0.990) (<0.001)
ROCL Violation Count 0.00180 0.00205 0.00767 0.00806
(0.900) (0.992) (0.636) (0.309)
Young -0.254* -0.0211 0.107 0.0330
(0.021) (0.989) (0.674) (0.507)
Female -0.0292 -0.0454 -0.215** -0.0799**
(0.636) (0.990) (0.007) (0.002)
Black -0.104 0.0288 0.0702 0.0179
(0.266) (0.989) (0.497) (0.644)
Asian -0.112 0.0423 0.0691 0.0420
(0.330) (0.990) (0.420) (0.525)
Business Major 0.00219 -0.0217 -0.0629 -0.0282
(0.971) (0.990) (0.212) (0.303)
Freshman -0.0350 0.0479 0.174 0.0551
(0.630) (0.989) (0.096) (0.106)
Senior 0.0443 0.0828 0.272** 0.103**
(0.570) (0.990) (0.001) (0.002)
High GPA -0.0227 -0.00687 0.0217 -0.00584
(0.681) (0.990) (0.684) (0.838)
Christian -0.00677 -0.0641 -0.291** -0.113**
(0.944) (0.990) (0.007) (0.008)
Insured -0.0363 -0.0319 -0.152* -0.0637*
(0.532) (0.991) (0.043) (0.042)
p -values in parentheses
* p <0.05    ** p <0.01    *** p <0.001  
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Table 2.3 Average Marginal Effects of Factors Affecting Welfare Assuming Source-
Dependent EUT in II Treatment 
 
Take-up Choice CS Efficiency
Correlation 0.0579 -0.00107 0.0629
(0.429) (0.984) (0.836)
Premium -0.0739*** -0.000429 -0.0119
(<0.001) (0.976) (0.883)
Loss Probability 1.534*** 0.891*** 3.475*
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.015)
ROCL Violation Count 0.00180 -0.0149** -0.0542*** -0.0183**
(0.845) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007)
Young -0.243** 0.115* 0.480 0.179**
(0.001) (0.010) (0.144) (0.001)
Female -0.0138 -0.00288 -0.0133 -0.00191
(0.752) (0.909) (0.753) (0.955)
Black -0.101 -0.0678* -0.243** -0.0837*
(0.147) (0.027) (0.008) (0.037)
Asian -0.152 -0.0359 -0.192 -0.0504
(0.054) (0.377) (0.079) (0.336)
Business Major -0.0159 -0.000492 0.0355 0.0108
(0.720) (0.985) (0.604) (0.760)
Freshman -0.0278 -0.0450 -0.0903 -0.0382
(0.600) (0.166) (0.199) (0.391)
Senior -0.0797 -0.0301 -0.0392 -0.0176
(0.162) (0.330) (0.673) (0.672)
High GPA -0.0383 -0.00693 0.0278 0.00963
(0.319) (0.770) (0.643) (0.774)
Christian -0.0800 -0.0438 -0.158* -0.0551
(0.124) (0.085) (0.027) (0.077)
Insured 0.119** 0.0201 0.109 0.0351
(0.009) (0.473) (0.139) (0.375)
p -values in parentheses
* p <0.05    ** p <0.01    *** p <0.001  
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 The average marginal effects by treatment for the standard methodology and for the 
methodology assuming all subjects are recursive RDU can be found in appendix F.41 We also 
consider estimates in Appendix F that drop the stochastic variables, and show that we get essentially 
the same results as in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. 
2.5 Conclusions 
Index insurance poses an important policy puzzle. It promises to allow large-scale risk management 
instruments to be made available to poor, underserved populations. On the other hand, making the 
product attractive42 is a behavioral challenge. Index insurance, by itself, exacerbates the risk faced by 
the insured if the sole measure of riskiness is the variability of potential outcomes: this is in sharp 
contrast to the effects of traditional indemnity products. Of course, the relevant issue is whether the 
expected benefit to the consumer of the change in the weighted distribution of outcomes exceeds 
the known premium. And that expected benefit depends on how the insured weights the probability 
of different outcomes, both the extreme outcomes and the typical outcomes. 
 Our results show that the compound risk in index insurance decreases the welfare of 
insurance choices made by individuals. Behavioral violation of the ROCL axiom decreases welfare 
when there is a compound risk of loss, whereas loss probability, basis risk and premium only impact 
the welfare of insurance choices when risk of loss is expressed in its reduced, non-compound form. 
We also see, again, that take-up is not a reliable indicator of welfare. Furthermore, we show that 
                                                 
 
41 Our conclusions from assuming that all subjects are recursive RDU are quite different from either the standard 
methodology or source-dependent EUT results, and seem more difficult to explain. ROCL consistency only significantly 
impacts the welfare in the AE treatment. The young make significantly less efficient choices for simple insurance but 
significantly more efficient decisions for compound insurance which are more complicated. 
42 By “making the product attractive” we do not just mean seeing the product purchased. One can (almost) always 
directly subsidize a product so that many people purchase it, but the critical step in designing a financially sustainable 
instrument is to make it attractive when there are some reasonable loadings. There are also many important policy 
settings in which microinsurance thrives because it is required by government policy, in order for insurance companies 
to be allowed to sell other, more profitable products in their country (IRDA [2015]). This is a cross-subsidy, for a public 
purpose. 
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take-up is not a useful proxy for guiding policy to improve welfare, as the drivers that significantly 
affect take-up are different from the drivers that significantly affect welfare measures.   
 The upshot is that we need to know the specific risk preferences of the individual to 
determine if the expected benefit of the index insurance product exceeds the known premium. Risk 
preferences, in turn, mean more than just some “level of risk aversion,” but includes the manner in 
which variability of outcomes are evaluated as well as the manner in which various probabilities are 
weighed. In the case of index insurance, we also have to be sensitive to the manner in which 
compound risks are assessed compared to simple risks, since index insurance explicitly relies on 
compound risks. Each of these dimensions of what we mean by risk preferences can be assessed, if 
we are careful to spell out specific structural theories of risk preferences and experimental designs 
that identify them. 
 Our results consistently point to the importance of evaluating how individuals process 
compound risks when evaluating the welfare effects of decisions to purchase index insurance 
products. Although this may come as no great surprise, the point to behavioral subtleties in the 
welfare evaluation of index insurance that demand greater attention. Although reducing basis risk 
and lowering the cost of insurance are strategies to increase the desirability of index insurance 
through increasing the expected welfare gain from insurance ceterus paribus, these strategies were 
found in our experiment to not help individuals know when it is beneficial for them to purchase 
index insurance and when it is not. On the contrary, we find that it is more important to teach 
individuals how to process compound risks to improve the expected welfare gain from their 
purchase choices on index insurance. One obvious extension to our approach is to undertake a field 
evaluation. Another extension is to assess the role of formal index insurance products as one part of 
the wider portfolio of informal individual, household, village and state risk management instruments. 
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2.6 Appendix A: Experimental Instructions  
2.6.1 Lottery Choices 
Choices Over Risky Prospects 
 
 This is a task where you will choose between prospects with varying prizes and chances of 
winning. You will be presented with a series of pairs of prospects where you will choose one of 
them. For each pair of prospects, you should choose the prospect you prefer to play. You will 
actually get the chance to play one of the prospects you choose, and you will be paid according to 
the outcome of that prospect, so you should think carefully about which prospect you prefer. 
 
 Here is an example of what the computer display of such a pair of prospects might look like. 
 
 
 
  
The outcome of the prospects will be determined by the draw of a random number between 
1 and 100. Each number between, and including, 1 and 100 is equally likely to occur. In fact, you will 
be able to draw the number yourself using two 10-sided dice. 
 
Although not shown in this example, in the top left corner of your computer screen you can 
see how many choices you will be asked to make today. 
 In this example the left prospect pays five dollars ($5) if the number drawn is between 1 and 
40, and pays fifteen dollars ($15) if the number is between 41 and 100. The blue color in the pie 
chart corresponds to 40% of the area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be 
between 1 and 40 and your prize will be $5. The orange area in the pie chart corresponds to 60% of 
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the area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be between 41 and 100 and your 
prize will be $15. 
  
 Now look at the pie in the chart on the right. It pays five dollars ($5) if the number drawn is 
between 1 and 50, ten dollars ($10) if the number is between 51 and 90, and fifteen dollars ($15) if 
the number is between 91 and 100. As with the prospect on the left, the pie slices represent the 
fraction of the possible numbers which yield each payoff. For example, the size of the $15 pie slice 
is 10% of the total pie. 
 
 Each pair of prospects is shown on a separate screen on the computer. On each screen, you 
should indicate which prospect you prefer to play by clicking on one of the buttons beneath the 
prospects.  
 
 You could also get a pair of prospects in which one of the prospects will give you the chance 
to play “Double or Nothing.” For instance, the right prospect in the next screen image pays 
“Double or Nothing” if the Green area is selected, which happens if the number drawn is between 
51 and 100. The right pie chart indicates that if the number is between 1 and 50 you get $10. 
However, if the number is between 51 and 100 a coin will be tossed to determine if you get double 
the amount. If it comes up Heads you get $40, otherwise you get nothing. The prizes listed 
underneath each pie refer to the amounts before any “Double or Nothing” coin toss. 
 
 
 After you have worked through all of the pairs of prospects, raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come over. You will then roll two 10-sided dice until a number comes up to 
determine which pair of prospects will be played out. If there are 40 pairs we will roll the dice until a 
number between 1 and 40 comes up, if there are 80 pairs we will roll until a number between 1 and 
80 comes up, and so on. Since there is a chance that any of your choices could be played out for 
real, you should approach each pair of prospects as if it is the one that you will play out. Finally, you 
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will roll the two ten-sided dice to determine the outcome of the prospect you chose, and if necessary 
you will then toss a coin to determine if you get “Double or Nothing.” 
 
 For instance, suppose you picked the prospect on the left in the last example. If the random 
number was 37, you would win $0; if it was 93, you would get $20. 
 
 If you picked the prospect on the right and drew the number 37, you would get $10; if it was 
93, you would have to toss a coin to determine if you get “Double or Nothing.” If the coin comes 
up Heads then you get $40. However, if it comes up Tails you get nothing from your chosen 
prospect. 
 
 It is also possible that you will be given a prospect in which there is a “Double or Nothing” 
option no matter what the outcome of the random number. This screen image illustrates this 
possibility. 
 
 
 
  
 
Therefore, your payoff is determined by four things: 
 
 by which prospect you selected, the left or the right, for each of these pairs; 
 by which prospect pair is chosen to be played out in the series of pairs using the two 10-
sided dice;  
 by the outcome of that prospect when you roll the two 10-sided dice; and  
 by the outcome of a coin toss if the chosen prospect outcome is of the “Double or 
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Nothing” type. 
 
 Which prospects you prefer is a matter of personal taste. The people next to you may be 
presented with different prospects, and may have different preferences, so their responses should 
not matter to you. Please work silently, and make your choices by thinking carefully about each 
prospect. 
 
All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the show-up fee that you receive just for being 
here, as well as any other earnings in other tasks. Are there any questions? 
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2.6.2 Index Insurance (II) Treatment 
Choices Over Insurance Prospects 
 
In this task you will make choices about whether to insure against possible monetary loss.  In each 
choice you will start out with an initial amount of money and, in the event of a loss, the loss amount 
will be taken from this initial stake.  In each choice you will have the option to buy insurance to 
protect you against the possible loss, although you are not required to buy the insurance. 
 
You will make 32 choices in this task.  You will actually get the chance to play one of the choices 
you make, and you will be paid according to the outcome of that choice. So you should think 
carefully about how much each insurance choice is worth to you.  
 
Each choice has two random events: the Index Event, and the Personal Event. Each event has two 
possible outcomes: Good and Bad. If the Personal Event outcome is Bad, then you will suffer a loss.  
You will decide whether to purchase insurance against this possible loss.  However, insurance only 
covers the loss if the Index Event outcome is Bad.   
 
If you do not purchase insurance, then only the outcome of the Personal Event will decide your 
earnings: 
 
Personal Event Your Earnings 
Bad Initial stake - Loss 
Good Initial stake 
 
If you do purchase insurance, it is important for you to understand that insurance is not paid 
according to whether you actually suffer a loss. Instead, insurance is paid only according to the 
Index Event.  Both events will decide your earnings: 
 
Index Event 
Personal 
Event 
Your Earnings 
Bad Bad Initial stake - Insurance cost - Loss + Insurance coverage 
Bad Good Initial stake - Insurance cost + Insurance coverage 
Good Bad Initial stake - Insurance cost - Loss 
Good Good Initial stake - Insurance cost 
 
So there are four possible outcomes if you purchase insurance. You might suffer a loss and receive 
insurance coverage.  Or you might receive insurance coverage even when you do not suffer a loss.   
You might suffer a loss but not receive insurance coverage. Finally, you might not suffer a loss and 
also receive no insurance coverage. 
 
Each event is determined by randomly drawing a colored chip from a bag.  In general, each draw 
will involve two colors, and each decision you make will involve different amounts and mixtures of 
two colors.  When making each decision, you will know the exact amounts and mixtures of colored 
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chips associated with the decision.  After you have decided whether or not to purchase insurance, 
the two events will be determined as follows. 
 
First, the Index Event will be determined with red and blue chips.   
 If you draw a red chip, then the Index Event outcome is Bad.   
 If you draw a blue chip, then the Index event outcome is Good.   
 
Next, the Personal Event will be determined with black and green chips.   
 If you draw a green chip, then the Personal Event outcome is the same as the Index Event 
outcome.   
 If you draw a black chip, then the Personal Event outcome differs from the Index Event 
outcome. 
 
Here is an example of what your decision would look like on the computer screen. The display on 
your screen will be bigger and easier to read. 
 
 
 
In this example you start out with an initial stake of $20.  If the outcome of the Personal Event is 
Bad you will lose $15, and if the outcome of the Personal Event is Good you will not lose any money.  
If you faced the choice in this example and chose to purchase insurance, you would pay $1.80 from 
your initial stake. You would pay this $1.80 before you drew any chips, so you would pay it 
regardless of the outcomes of your draws. 
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You will be drawing colored chips from bags to determine the outcomes of both events.  First, you 
will draw a chip to determine the Index Event outcome.  The pie chart shows that there is a 10% 
chance that the Index Event outcome is Bad, and a 90% chance that the Index Event outcome is 
Good. This means there will be 9 blue chips and 1 red chip in a bag, and the color of the chip you 
randomly draw from the bag represents the outcome of the Index Event. If a blue chip is drawn, the 
Index Event outcome is Good, and if a red chip is drawn the Index Event outcome is Bad.  
 
Next, you will draw a chip to determine the Personal Event outcome.  There is an 80% chance that 
the Personal Event outcome is the Same as the Index Event outcome and a 20% chance that the 
Personal Event outcome will Differ from the Index Event outcome. This means there will be 8 green 
chips and 2 black chips in a bag.  If a green chip is drawn your Personal Event outcome is the Same 
as the Index Event outcome, and if a black chip is drawn your Personal Event outcome Differs from 
the Index Event outcome.  
 
The possible outcomes if you choose not to purchase insurance are therefore as follows: 
 
Index Draw Personal Draw Your Earnings 
Red (Bad) Green (Same →Bad) $20 - $15 = $5 
Red (Bad) Black (Different →Good) $20 
Blue (Good) Green (Same →Good) $20 
Blue (Good) Black (Different →Bad) $20 - $15 = $5 
 
 If a red chip is drawn from the Index bag and a green chip is drawn from the Personal 
bag, your Personal Event outcome is Bad. You will lose $15 and be left with $5. 
 If a red chip is drawn from the Index bag and a black chip is drawn from the Personal 
bag, your Personal Event outcome is Good. You will not lose any money and you keep 
your $20. 
 If a blue chip is drawn from the Index bag and a green chip is drawn from the Personal 
bag, your Personal Event outcome is Good.  You do not lose any money and you keep 
your $20. 
 If a blue chip is drawn from the Index bag and a black chip is drawn from the Personal 
bag, your Personal Event outcome is Bad.  You will lose $15 and be left with $5. 
 
You can choose to purchase insurance, which will fully compensate the $15 loss only if the Index 
Event outcome is Bad. In this example the insurance will cost you $1.80, and if you chose to 
purchase insurance you would pay this $1.80 regardless of the outcomes of your draws.   
 
 
The possible outcomes if you choose to purchase insurance are therefore as follows: 
 
Index Draw Personal Draw Your Earnings 
Red (Bad, insurance will pay out $15) Green (Same →Bad) $20 - $1.80 - $15 + $15 = 18.20 
Red (Bad, insurance will pay out $15) Black (Different →Good) $20 - $1.80 + $15= $33.20 
Blue (Good) Green (Same →Good) $20 - $1.80 = 18.20 
Blue (Good) Black (Different →Bad) $20 - $1.80 - $15 = $3.20 
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 If a red chip is drawn from the Index bag and a green chip from the Personal bag, you 
will lose $15 but insurance will cover the loss. You will keep $18.20, net of the cost of 
insurance. 
 If a red chip is drawn from the Index bag and a black chip from the Personal bag, you 
will not lose any money but you will still receive a payout from insurance.  You will keep 
$33.20, net of the cost of insurance. 
 If a blue chip is drawn from the Index bag and a green chip from the Personal bag, you 
will not lose any money.  You will keep $18.20, net of the cost of insurance. 
 If a blue chip is drawn from the Index bag and a black chip from the Personal bag, you 
will lose $15 and receive no payout from insurance. You will keep $3.20, net of the cost 
of insurance. 
 
You should indicate your choice to purchase, or not purchase, the insurance by clicking on your 
preferred option on the computer screen. 
 
There are 32 decisions like this one to be made, each shown on a separate screen on the computer.  
Each decision might have different chances for the Index Event outcomes, the Personal Event 
outcomes, or the cost of insurance, so pay attention to each screen.  After everyone has worked 
through all of the insurance decisions, please wait in your seat and an experimenter will come to you. 
You will then roll two 10-sided die to determine which insurance decision will be played out. Since 
there are only 32 decisions, you will keep rolling the die until a number between 1 and 32 comes up. 
There is an equal chance that any of your 32 choices could be selected, so you should approach each 
decision as if it is the one that you will actually play out to determine your payoff. Once the decision 
to play out is selected, you will draw chips from the Index bag and the Personal bag to determine the 
outcome.  
 
In summary: 
 You will decide whether or not to purchase insurance in each of the 32 insurance decisions 
in this task. 
 One of your decisions will be randomly selected to actually be played out using two 10-sided 
dice. 
 You will suffer the specified monetary loss only if the Personal Event outcome is Bad. 
 If you purchase insurance, it will pay out only if the Index Event outcome is Bad. 
 
Whether or not you prefer to buy the insurance is a matter of personal taste. You may choose to buy 
insurance on some or all of your 32 choices, or none of the choices. The people next to you may be 
presented with different choices, insurance prices, and may have different preferences, so their 
responses should not matter to you. Please work silently, and make your choices by thinking 
carefully about each prospect. 
 
All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the show-up fee that you receive just for being here, as 
well as any other earnings in other tasks. Are there any questions? 
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2.6.3 Actuarially-Equivalent (AE) Treatment 
Choices Over Insurance Prospects 
 
In this task you will make choices about whether to insure against possible monetary loss.  In each 
choice you will start out with an initial amount of money and, in the event of a loss, the loss amount 
will be taken from this initial stake.  In each choice you will have the option to buy insurance to 
protect you against the possible loss, although you are not required to buy the insurance. 
 
You will make 32 choices in this task.  You will actually get the chance to play one of the choices 
you make, and you will be paid according to the outcome of that choice. So you should think 
carefully about how much each insurance choice is worth to you.  
 
Each choice has two random events: the Index Event, and the Personal Event. Each event has two 
possible outcomes: Good and Bad. If the Personal Event outcome is Bad, then you will suffer a loss.  
You will decide whether to purchase insurance against this possible loss.  However, insurance only 
covers the loss if the Index Event outcome is Bad.   
 
If you do not purchase insurance, then only the outcome of the Personal Event will decide your 
earnings: 
 
Personal Event Your Earnings 
Bad Initial stake - Loss 
Good Initial stake 
 
If you do purchase insurance, it is important for you to understand that insurance is not paid 
according to whether you actually suffer a loss. Instead, insurance is paid only according to the 
Index Event.  Both events will decide your earnings: 
 
Index Event 
Personal 
Event 
Your Earnings 
Bad Bad Initial stake - Insurance cost - Loss + Insurance coverage 
Bad Good Initial stake - Insurance cost + Insurance coverage 
Good Bad Initial stake - Insurance cost - Loss 
Good Good Initial stake - Insurance cost 
 
So there are four possible outcomes if you purchase insurance. You might suffer a loss and receive 
insurance coverage.  Or you might receive insurance coverage even when you do not suffer a loss.   
You might suffer a loss but not receive insurance coverage. Finally, you might not suffer a loss and 
also receive no insurance coverage. 
 
Each event is determined by randomly drawing a colored chip from a bag.  In general, each draw 
will involve two colors, and each decision you make will involve different amounts and mixtures of 
two colors.  When making each decision, you will know the exact amounts and mixtures of colored 
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chips associated with the decision.  After you have decided whether or not to purchase insurance, 
the two events will be determined as follows. 
 
First, the Index Event will be determined with red and blue chips.   
 If you draw a red chip, then the Index Event outcome is Bad.   
 If you draw a blue chip, then the Index event outcome is Good.   
 
Next, the Personal Event will be determined with black and green chips.   
 If you draw a green chip, then the Personal Event outcome is the same as the Index Event 
outcome.   
 If you draw a black chip, then the Personal Event outcome differs from the Index Event 
outcome. 
 
 
Here is an example of what your decision would look like on the computer screen. The display on 
your screen will be bigger and easier to read. 
 
 
 
In this example you start out with an initial stake of $20.  If the outcome of the Personal Event is 
Bad you will lose $15, and if the outcome of the Personal Event is Good you will not lose any money.  
If you faced the choice in this example and chose to purchase insurance, you would pay $1.80 from 
your initial stake. You would pay this $1.80 before you drew any chips, so you would pay it 
regardless of the outcomes of your draws. 
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In this example there is a 10% chance that the outcome of the Index Event is Bad, and a 90% 
chance that the Index Event outcome is Good.  However there is only an 80% chance that the 
Personal Event is the Same as the Index Event outcome and a 20% chance that the Personal Event 
outcome will Differ from the Index Event outcome.  Based on these probabilities, the pie charts 
show the overall probabilities of the possible earnings and their respective amounts.  
 
The pie chart on the left shows the possible earnings if you choose not to purchase insurance.  
Without insurance, the payouts depend only on the outcome of the Personal Event.  Given that 
there is a 10% chance that the Index Event outcome is Bad and that there is an 80% chance that the 
Personal Event outcome is the Same as the Index Event outcome, the chance that the Personal 
Event outcome is Bad is 26% (= [10% × 80%] + [90% × 20%]), and the chance that the outcome of 
the Personal Event is Good is 74% (= 100% - 26%).  
 
You will be drawing colored chips from bags to determine the outcomes of both events.  First, you 
will draw a chip to determine the Index Event outcome.  Since in this example there is a 10% chance 
of a Bad outcome for the Index event, the experimenter will place 1 red chip and 9 blue chips in the 
bag. The color of the chip you randomly draw from the bag represents the outcome of the Index 
Event. If a blue chip is drawn the Index Event outcome is Good, and if a red chip is drawn the Index 
Event outcome is Bad.  
 
Next, you will draw a chip to determine the Personal Event outcome.  Since there is an 80% chance 
that the Personal Event outcome is the Same as the Index Event outcome and a 20% chance that the 
Personal Event outcome will Differ from the Index Event outcome, there will be 8 green chips and 2 
black chips in a bag. The color of the chip you randomly draw from the bag determines the outcome 
of the Personal Event.  If a green chip is drawn your Personal Event outcome is the Same as that of 
the Index Event, and if a black chip is drawn your Personal Event outcome Differs from that of the 
Index Event. 
 
The possible outcomes if you choose not to purchase insurance are therefore as follows: 
 
Index Draw Personal Draw Your Earnings 
Red (Bad) Green (Same →Bad) $20 - $15 = $5 
Red (Bad) Black (Different →Good) $20 
Blue (Good) Green (Same →Good) $20 
Blue (Good) Black (Different →Bad) $20 - $15 = $5 
 
 If a red chip is drawn from the Index bag and a green chip is drawn from the Personal 
bag, you will lose $15 and be left with $5. 
 If a red chip is drawn from the Index bag and a black chip is drawn from the Personal 
bag, you will not lose any money and you keep your $20. 
 If a blue chip is drawn from the Index bag and a green chip is drawn from the Personal 
bag, you do not lose any money and you keep your $20. 
 If a blue chip is drawn from the Index bag and a black chip is drawn from the Personal 
bag, you will lose $15 and be left with $5. 
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You can choose to purchase insurance, which will fully compensate the $15 loss only if the Index 
Event outcome is Bad. In this example the insurance will cost you $1.80, and if you chose to 
purchase insurance you would pay this $1.80 regardless of the outcomes of your draws.   
 
The pie chart on the right shows the possible earnings if you choose to purchase insurance.  Since 
the insurance is only paid out according to the outcome of the Index Event, outcomes from both 
the Index Event and the Personal Event will decide your earnings.  There is an 80% chance that the 
Personal Event outcome is the Same as the Index Event outcome, hence there is an 80% chance you 
will either receive a payout when you suffer a loss or not receive a payout when you do not suffer a 
loss.  If this happens your payout will be $18.20: your initial stake of $20 less the $1.80 cost of 
insurance.  
 
According to the pie chart the chance that the Index Event outcome is Good, but your Personal 
Event outcome Differs, is 18% (= 90% × 20%). This means that there is an 18% chance that your 
Personal Event outcome is Bad without insurance compensation. You will receive $3.20: your initial 
stake of $20 less the $1.80 cost of insurance less the $15 loss. The chance that the Index Event 
outcome is Bad, and your Personal Event outcome Differs, is 2% (= 10% × 20%). This means that 
there is a 2% chance that your Personal Event outcome is Good and you still receive insurance 
compensation.  You receive $33.20: your initial stake of $20 less the $1.80 cost of insurance plus the 
$15 payout from the insurance.  
 
If you choose to purchase insurance, the Index Event outcome and Personal Event outcome will be 
determined by drawing chips from bags, in the same way as if insurance was not purchased.  
 
The possible outcomes if you choose to purchase insurance are therefore as follows: 
 
Index Draw Personal Draw Your Earnings 
Red (Bad, insurance will pay out $15) Green (Same →Bad) $20 - $1.80 - $15 + $15 = 18.20 
Red (Bad, insurance will pay out $15) Black (Different →Good) $20 - $1.80 + $15= $33.20 
Blue (Good) Green (Same →Good) $20 - $1.80 = 18.20 
Blue (Good) Black (Different →Bad) $20 - $1.80 - $15 = $3.20 
You should indicate your choice to purchase, or not purchase, the insurance by clicking on your 
preferred option on the computer screen. 
 
There are 32 decisions like this one to be made, each shown on a separate screen on the computer.  
Each decision might have different chances for the Index Event outcomes, the Personal Event 
outcomes, or the cost of insurance, so pay attention to each screen.  After everyone has worked 
through all of the insurance decisions, please wait in your seat and an experimenter will come to you. 
You will then roll two 10-sided die to determine which insurance decision will be played out. Since 
there are only 32 decisions, you will keep rolling the die until a number between 1 and 32 comes up. 
There is an equal chance that any of your 32 choices could be selected, so you should approach each 
decision as if it is the one that you will actually play out to determine your payoff. Once the decision 
to play out is selected, you will draw chips from the Index bag and the Personal bag to determine the 
outcome.  
 
 
 
 138 
 
In summary: 
 
 You will decide whether or not to purchase insurance in each of the 32 insurance decisions 
in this task. 
 One of your decisions will be randomly selected to actually be played out using two 10-sided 
dice. 
 You will suffer the specified monetary loss only if the Personal Event outcome is Bad. 
 If you purchase insurance, it will pay out only if the Index Event outcome is Bad. 
 
Whether or not you prefer to buy the insurance is a matter of personal taste. You may choose to buy 
insurance on some or all of your 32 choices, or none of the choices. The people next to you may be 
presented with different choices, insurance prices, and may have different preferences, so their 
responses should not matter to you. Please work silently, and make your choices by thinking 
carefully about each prospect. 
 
All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the show-up fee that you receive just for being here, as 
well as any other earnings in other tasks. Are there any questions? 
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2.7 Appendix B: Numerical Examples of Decision Weights  
To understand the mechanics of evaluating lotteries using RDU it is useful to see worked numerical 
examples. Although this is purely a pedagogic exercise, in our experience many users of RDU are 
not familiar with these mechanics, and they are critical to the correct application of these models. 
Even the best pedagogic source available, Wakker [2010], leaves many worked examples as exercises, 
and many of the examples are correctly contrived to make a special pedagogic point. 
 We first review the general case, and then explain the application to index insurance. 
2.7.1 General Rank-Dependent Decision Weights 
Assume a simple power probability weighting function ω(p) = pγ and let γ = 1.25. To see the pure 
effect of probability weighting, assume U(x) = x for x≥0. Start with a two-prize lottery, then 
consider three-prizes and four-prizes to see the general logic. The lotteries in our risk aversion task 
contain up to 4 prizes and probabilities. 
 In the two-prize case, let y be the smaller prize and Y be the larger prize, so Y>y≥0. Again, 
to see the pure effect of probability weighting, assume objective probabilities p(y) = p(Y) = ½. The 
first step is to get the decision weight of the largest prize. This uses the answer to the question, 
“what is the probability of getting at least  Y?”43 This is obviously ½, so we then calculate the 
decision weight using the probability weighting function as ω(½) = (½)γ = 0.42. To keep notation 
for probability weights and decision weights similar but distinct, denote the decision weight for Y as 
w(Y). Then we have w(Y) = 0.42. 
 The second step for the two-prize case is to give the other, smaller prize y the residual 
weight. This uses the answer to the question, “what is the probability of getting at least  y?” Since one 
                                                 
 
43 This expression leads to what Wakker [2010; §7.6] usefully calls the “gain-rank.” The “loss-rank” would be based on 
the answer to the question, “what is the probability of getting Y or less?” Loss-ranks were popular with some of the 
earlier studies in rank-dependent utility. 
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always gets at least y, the answer is obviously 1. Since ω(1) = 1 for any of the popular probability 
weighting functions,44 we can attribute the decision weight ω(1) - ω(½) = 1 - 0.42 = 0.58 to the prize 
y. Another way to see the same thing is to directly calculate the decision weight for the smallest prize 
to ensure that the decision weights sum to 1, so that the decision weight w(y) is calculated as 1-w(Y) 
= 1 - 0.42 = 0.58. The two-prize case actually makes it harder to see the rank-dependent logic than 
when we examine the three-prize or four-prize case, but can be seen in retrospect as a special case. 
 With these two decision weights in place, the RDU evaluation of the lottery is 0.42 ×U(Y) + 
0.58×U(y), or 0.42Y + 0.58y given our simplifying assumption of a linear utility function. Inspection 
of this RDU evaluation, and viewing the decision weights as if they were probabilities, shows why 
the RDU evaluation has to be less than the Expected Value (EV) of the lottery using the true 
probabilities, since that is 0.5Y + 0.5y. The RDU evaluation puts more weight on the worst prize, 
and greater weight on the better prize, so it has to have a CE that is less than the EV (this last step is 
helped by the fact that U(x) = x, of course). Hence probability weighting in this case generates a CE 
that is less than the EV, and hence a risk premium. 
 However, the two-prize case collapses the essential logic of the RDU model. Consider a 
three-prize case in which we use the same probability weighting functions and utility functions, but 
have three prizes, y, Y and Y, where Y>Y>y, and p(y) = p(Y) = p(Y) = ⅓. 
 The decision weight for Y is evaluated first, and uses the answer to the question, “what is the 
probability of getting at least Y?” The answer is ⅓, so the decision weight for Y is then directly 
evaluated as w(Y) = ω(⅓) = (⅓)γ = 0.25. 
 The decision weight for Y is evaluated next, and uses the answer to the more interesting 
question, “what is the probability of getting at least Y?” This is p(Y) + p(Y) = ⅓ + ⅓ = ⅔, so the 
                                                 
 
44 The prominent exception is the probability weighting function suggested by Kahneman and Tversky [1979], which 
had interior discontinuities at p=0 and p=1. 
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probability weight is ω(⅔) = (⅔)γ = 0.60. But the only part of this probability weight that is to be 
attributed solely to Y is the part that is not already attributed to Y, hence the decision weight for Y is 
ω(⅔) - ω(⅓) = ω(Y) - ω(Y) = 0.60 - 0.25 = 0.35. This intermediate step shows the rank-dependent 
logic in the clearest fashion. One could equally talk about cumulative probability weights, rather than 
just probability weights, but the logic is simple enough when one thinks of the question being asked 
“psychologically” and the partial attribution to Y that flows from it. In the two-prize case this partial 
attribution is skipped over. 
 The decision weight for y is again evaluated residually, as in the two-prize case. We can either 
see this by evaluating ω(1) - ω(⅔) = 1 - 0.60 = 0.40, or by evaluating 1 - w(Y) - w(Y) = 1 - 0.35 - 0.25 
= 0.40. 
 The general logic may now be stated in words as follows: 
 Rank the prizes from best to worst. 
 Use the probability weighting function to calculate the probability of getting at least the prize 
in question. 
 Then assign the decision weight for the best prize directly as the weighted probability of that 
prize. 
 For each of the intermediate prizes in declining order, assign the decision weight using the 
weighted cumulative probability for that prize less the decision weights for better prizes (or, 
equivalently, the weighted cumulative probability for the immediately better prize). 
 For the worst prize the decision weight is the residual decision weight to ensure that the 
decision weights sum to 1. 
 
The key is to view the decision weights as the incremental decision weight attributable to that prize. 
 Table 2.4 collects these steps for each of the examples, and adds a four prize example. From 
a programming perspective, these calculations are tedious but not difficult as long as one can assume 
that prizes are rank-ordered as they are evaluated. Our computer code in Stata allows for up to four 
prizes, which spans most applications in laboratory or field settings, and is of course applicable for 
lotteries with any number of prizes up to four. The logic can be easily extended to more prizes. 
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 Figure 2.28 illustrates these calculations using the power probability weighting function. The 
dashed line in the left panel displays the probability weighting function ω(p) = pγ = p1.25, with the 
vertical axis showing underweighting of the objective probabilities displayed on the bottom axis. The 
implications for decision weights are then shown in the right panel, for the two-prize, three-prize 
and four-prize cases. In the right panel the bottom axis shows prizes ranked from worst to best, so 
one immediately identifies the “probability pessimism” at work with this probability weighting 
function. Values of γ < 1 generate overweighting of the objective probabilities and “probability 
optimism,” as one might expect. 
 Figure 2.29 shows the effects of using the “inverse-S” probability weighting function ω(p) = 
pγ / ( pγ + (1-p)γ )1/γ for γ = 0.65. This function exhibits inverse-S probability weighting (optimism 
for small p, and pessimism for large p) for γ<1, and S-shaped probability weighting (pessimism for 
small p, and optimism for large p) for γ>1. 
2.7.2 Rank-Dependent Decision Weights for Index Insurance Choices 
Recall the notation for index insurance from the main text. There are 8 possible states, depending on 
the permutations of binary outcomes of if the individual chooses to purchase insurance {I1, I0}, if 
the index reflects a loss {L1, L0}, and if the individual’s outcome matches the outcome of the index 
{P1, P0}.  
 For instance, if the individual chooses not to purchase insurance (I0), the index reflects a loss 
outcome (L1), and the individual’s outcome matches the index (P1), the individual would also 
experience a loss (I0L1P1) and be left with $5. If the individual’s outcome does not match the index 
(P0), she does not experience a loss (I0L1P0) and would keep her $20. By the same logic, I0L0P0 = $20 
and I0L0P0 = $5. 
 The logic for the case in which the individual does purchase insurance (I1) is the same, other 
than the fact that a premium is deducted for each outcome.  
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 The essential point to take into account with this index insurance contract is that the top two 
prizes should be associated with the sum of the probabilities of each outcome, and then the bottom 
two prizes should be associated with the sum of the probabilities of each outcome. Then the 
analyses proceeds as if there were only two prizes. Table 2.5 illustrates. Panel A repeats the 4-prize 
example from Table 2.4, where all 4 prizes are distinct in value. Panel B changes the calculations in 
panel B assuming instead that the top 2 prizes are the same value, and the bottom 2 prizes are the 
same value. Panel C then shows an example from the text and Figure 2.1, assuming that ρ = 0.7. 
 
Table 2.4 Tabulations of RDU Examples 
 
Prize Probability 
Cumulative 
Probability 
Weighted 
Cumulative 
Probability 
Decision 
Weight 
A. Two Prizes 
Y 0.5 0.5 0.42 = 0.51.25 0.42 
y < Y 0.5 1 1 = 11.25 0.58 = 1 - 0.42 
     
B. Three Prizes 
Y 0.33 0.33 0.25 = 0.331.25 0.25 
Y < Y 0.33 0.67 0.60 = 0.671.25 0.35 = 0.60 - 0.25 
y < Y < Y 0.33 1 1 = 11.25 
0.40 = 1 - 0.60 
= 1 - 0.35 - 0.25 
     
C. Four Prizes 
Best 0.25 0.25 0.18 = 0.251.25 0.18 
2nd Best 0.25 0.5 0.42 = 0.501.25 0.24 = 0.42 - 0.18 
3rd Best 0.25 0.75 0.70 = 0.751.25 
0.28 = 0.70 - 0.42 
= 1 - 0.24 - 0.18 
Worst 0.25 1 11.25 
0.30 = 1 - 0.70 
= 1 - 0.28 - 0.24 - 0.18 
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Figure 2.28 Power Probability Weighting and Implied Decision Weights for Gains 
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and Implied Decision Weights for Gains
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.29 Inverse-S Probability Weighting and Implied Decision Weights for Gains 
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Table 2.5 Tabulations of RDU Examples Applied to Index Insurance 
 
Prize Probability 
Cumulative 
Probability 
Weighted 
Cumulative 
Probability 
Decision 
Weight 
A. Four Distinct Prizes 
Best 0.25 0.25 0.18 = 0.251.25 0.18 
2nd Best 0.25 0.5 0.42 = 0.501.25 0.24 = 0.42 - 0.18 
3rd Best 0.25 0.75 0.70 = 0.751.25 
0.28 = 0.70 - 0.42 
= 1 - 0.24 - 0.18 
Worst 0.25 1 11.25 
0.30 = 1 - 0.70 
= 1 - 0.28 - 0.24 - 0.18 
B. Four Prizes But Only Two Distinct Prize Levels 
Best 
0.25 + 0.25 0.5 0.42 = 0.501.25 0.42 
2nd Best 
3rd Best 
0.25 + 0.25 1 11.25 0.58 = 1 - 0.42 
Worst 
C. Index Insurance Not Purchased and ρ = 0.7 
I0L1P0 = $20 0.1 (1-ρ) + 0.9 ρ 
= 0.025 + 0.675 
0.7 0.640 = 0.71.25 0.64 
I0L0P1 = $20 
I0L1P1 = $5 0.1 ρ + 0.9 (1-ρ) 
= 0.075 + 0.225 
1 11.25 0.36 = 1 - 0.64 
I0L0P0 = $5 
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2.8 Appendix C: Risky Lottery Choices 
Table 2.6 Parameters for Double or Nothing Lotteries 
Also see text for the Right Lottery in Table 2.7 
 Left Lottery Right Lottery 
Lottery ID Prize 1 Probability 1 Prize 2 Probability 2 Prize 3 Probability 3 Prize 1 Probability 1 Prize 2 Probability 2 Prize 3 Probability 3 
             
rdon1 $0  0.5 $10  0.5 $20  0 $0  0.5 $10  0.5 $20  0 
rdon2 $0  0 $10  1 $20  0 $0  0.5 $10  0.5 $20  0 
rdon3 $0  0 $10  1 $35  0 $0  0 $5  0.5 $18  0.5 
rdon4 $0  0.25 $10  0.75 $70  0 $0  0 $35  1 $70  0 
rdon5 $0  0 $10  1 $70  0 $0  0 $35  1 $70  0 
rdon6 $0  0 $20  1 $35  0 $0  0 $10  0.5 $35  0.5 
rdon7 $0  0 $20  0.5 $70  0.5 $0  0 $35  0.5 $70  0.5 
rdon8 $0  0 $35  1 $70  0 $0  0 $35  0.5 $70  0.5 
rdon9 $0  0 $20  0.5 $35  0.5 $0  0.5 $20  0 $70  0.5 
rdon10 $0  0 $35  0.75 $70  0.25 $0  0 $35  1 $70  0 
rdon11 $0  0 $20  1 $70  0 $0  0 $20  0.5 $35  0.5 
rdon12 $0  0 $35  0.75 $70  0.25 $0  0 $35  0.5 $70  0.5 
rdon13 $0  0.25 $10  0.75 $35  0 $0  0.5 $18  0.5 $35  0 
rdon14 $0  0 $20  0.75 $35  0.25 $0  0 $18  0.5 $35  0.5 
rdon15 $0  0 $20  0.75 $70  0.25 $0  0 $35  0.5 $70  0.5 
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Table 2.7 Text for Double or Nothing Lotteries 
Also see parameters for the Right Lottery in Table 2.6 
 
 
Lottery ID Double or Nothing Text 
  
rdon1 Double or Nothing if outcome 2 in right lottery 
rdon2 Double or Nothing if outcome 2 in right lottery 
rdon3 Double or Nothing for any outcome in right lottery 
rdon4 Double or Nothing for any outcome in right lottery 
rdon5 Double or Nothing for any outcome in right lottery 
rdon6 Double or Nothing if outcome 2 in right lottery 
rdon7 Double or Nothing if outcome 2 in right lottery 
rdon8 Double or Nothing if outcome 2 in right lottery 
rdon9 Double or Nothing if outcome 3 in left lottery 
rdon10 Double or Nothing for any outcome in right lottery 
rdon11 Double or Nothing if outcome 3 in right lottery 
rdon12 Double or Nothing if outcome 2 in right lottery 
rdon13 Double or Nothing if outcome 2 in right lottery 
rdon14 Double or Nothing if outcome 2 in right lottery 
rdon15 Double or Nothing if outcome 2 in right lottery 
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Table 2.8 Parameters for the Actuarially-Equivalent Lotteries 
 
 Left Lottery Right Lottery 
Lottery ID Prize 1 Probability 1 Prize 2 Probability 2 Prize 3 Probability 3 Prize 1 Probability 1 Prize 2 Probability 2 Prize 3 Probability 3 
             
rae1 $0  0.5 $10  0.5 $20  0 $0  0.75 $10  0 $20  0.25 
rae2 $0  0 $10  1 $20  0 $0  0.75 $10  0 $20  0.25 
rae3 $0  0 $10  1 $35  0 $0  0.5 $10  0.25 $35  0.25 
rae4 $0  0.25 $10  0.75 $70  0 $0  0.5 $10  0 $70  0.5 
rae5 $0  0 $10  1 $70  0 $0  0.5 $10  0 $70  0.5 
rae6 $0  0 $20  1 $35  0 $0  0.25 $20  0.25 $35  0.5 
rae7 $0  0 $20  0.5 $70  0.5 $0  0.25 $20  0 $70  0.75 
rae8 $0  0 $35  1 $70  0 $0  0.25 $35  0 $70  0.75 
rae9 $0  0.25 $20  0.5 $70  0.25 $0  0.5 $20  0 $70  0.5 
rae10 $0  0 $35  0.75 $70  0.25 $0  0.5 $35  0 $70  0.5 
rae11 $0  0 $20  1 $70  0 $0  0.25 $20  0.5 $70  0.25 
rae12 $0  0 $35  0.75 $70  0.25 $0  0.25 $35  0 $70  0.75 
rae13 $0  0.25 $10  0.75 $35  0 $0  0.75 $10  0 $35  0.25 
rae14 $0  0 $20  0.75 $35  0.25 $0  0.25 $20  0 $35  0.75 
rae15 $0  0 $20  0.75 $70  0.25 $0  0.25 $20  0 $70  0.75 
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Table 2.9 Parameters for the Lotteries Based on Loomes and Sugden [1998] 
 
 Left Lottery Right Lottery 
Lottery 
ID 
Prize 1 Probability 1 Prize 2 Probability 2 Prize 3 Probability 3 Prize 1 Probability 1 Prize 2 Probability 2 Prize 3 Probability 3 
             
ls2_lr $10  0.3 $30  0 $50  0.7 $10  0.15 $30  0.25 $50  0.6 
ls6_lr $10  0.6 $30  0 $50  0.4 $10  0 $30  1 $50  0 
ls7_lr $10  0.6 $30  0 $50  0.4 $10  0.15 $30  0.75 $50  0.1 
ls10_lr $10  0.5 $30  0 $50  0.5 $10  0.1 $30  0.8 $50  0.1 
ls13_rl $10  0.5 $30  0.4 $50  0.1 $10  0.7 $30  0 $50  0.3 
ls15_rl $10  0.4 $30  0.6 $50  0 $10  0.5 $30  0.4 $50  0.1 
ls17_lr $10  0.1 $30  0 $50  0.9 $10  0 $30  0.25 $50  0.75 
ls18_rl $10  0.1 $30  0.75 $50  0.15 $10  0.4 $30  0 $50  0.6 
ls21_lr $10  0.7 $30  0 $50  0.3 $10  0.6 $30  0.25 $50  0.15 
ls26_rl $10  0.2 $30  0.6 $50  0.2 $10  0.4 $30  0 $50  0.6 
ls29_rl $10  0.5 $30  0.3 $50  0.2 $10  0.6 $30  0 $50  0.4 
ls32_rl $10  0.7 $30  0.3 $50  0 $10  0.8 $30  0 $50  0.2 
ls34_rl $10  0.1 $30  0.6 $50  0.3 $10  0.25 $30  0 $50  0.75 
ls35_rl $10  0 $30  1 $50  0 $10  0.25 $30  0 $50  0.75 
ls39_rl $10  0.5 $30  0.2 $50  0.3 $10  0.55 $30  0 $50  0.45 
ls1i_lr $10  0.12 $30  0.05 $50  0.83 $10  0.03 $30  0.2 $50  0.77 
ls3i_lr $10  0.27 $30  0.05 $50  0.68 $10  0.03 $30  0.45 $50  0.52 
ls7i_lr $10  0.54 $30  0.1 $50  0.36 $10  0.18 $30  0.7 $50  0.12 
ls9i_lr $10  0.08 $30  0.04 $50  0.88 $10  0.05 $30  0.1 $50  0.85 
ls13i_lr $10  0.65 $30  0.1 $50  0.25 $10  0.55 $30  0.3 $50  0.15 
ls16i_lr $10  0.88 $30  0.04 $50  0.08 $10  0.83 $30  0.14 $50  0.03 
ls17i_rl $10  0.04 $30  0.15 $50  0.81 $10  0.08 $30  0.05 $50  0.87 
ls18i_rl $10  0.14 $30  0.65 $50  0.21 $10  0.38 $30  0.05 $50  0.57 
ls22i_lr $10  0.66 $30  0.1 $50  0.24 $10  0.54 $30  0.4 $50  0.06 
ls28i_rl $10  0.12 $30  0.84 $50  0.04 $10  0.18 $30  0.66 $50  0.16 
ls30i_rl $10  0.45 $30  0.45 $50  0.1 $10  0.55 $30  0.15 $50  0.3 
ls31i_lr $10  0.48 $30  0.36 $50  0.16 $10  0.42 $30  0.54 $50  0.04 
ls35i_lr $10  0.2 $30  0.2 $50  0.6 $10  0.1 $30  0.6 $50  0.3 
ls36i_rl $10  0.02 $30  0.92 $50  0.06 $10  0.08 $30  0.68 $50  0.24 
ls37i_lr $10  0.48 $30  0.28 $50  0.24 $10  0.44 $30  0.44 $50  0.12 
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Table 2.10 Parameters for the Actuarially-Equivalent Index Insurance Lotteries 
 
 Left Lottery Right Lottery 
Lottery ID Prize 1 Probability 1 Prize 2 Probability 2 Prize 3 Probability 3 Prize 1 Probability 1 Prize 2 Probability 2 Prize 3 Probability 3 
             
iiae1 $4.5  0 $19.5  1 $34.5  0 $0  0 $5  0.1 $20  0.9 
iiae2 $4.5  0.18 $19.5  0.8 $34.5  0.02 $0  0 $5  0.26 $20  0.74 
iiae3 $4.5  0.36 $19.5  0.6 $34.5  0.04 $0  0 $5  0.42 $20  0.58 
iiae4 $4.5  0.54 $19.5  0.4 $34.5  0.06 $0  0 $5  0.58 $20  0.42 
iiae5 $3.8  0 $18.8  1 $33.8  0 $0  0 $5  0.1 $20  0.9 
iiae6 $0  0 $5  0.26 $20  0.74 $3.8  0.18 $18.8  0.8 $33.8  0.02 
iiae7 $3.8  0.36 $18.8  0.6 $33.8  0.04 $0  0 $5  0.42 $20  0.58 
iiae8 $0  0 $5  0.58 $20  0.42 $3.8  0.54 $18.8  0.4 $33.8  0.06 
iiae9 $3.2  0 $18.2  1 $33.2  0 $0  0 $5  0.1 $20  0.9 
iiae10 $0  0 $5  0.26 $20  0.74 $3.2  0.18 $18.2  0.8 $33.2  0.02 
iiae11 $0  0 $5  0.42 $20  0.58 $3.2  0.36 $18.2  0.6 $33.2  0.04 
iiae12 $0  0 $5  0.58 $20  0.42 $3.2  0.54 $18.2  0.4 $33.2  0.06 
iiae13 $1.5  0 $16.5  1 $31.5  0 $0  0 $5  0.1 $20  0.9 
iiae14 $1.5  0.18 $16.5  0.8 $31.5  0.02 $0  0 $5  0.26 $20  0.74 
iiae15 $0  0 $5  0.42 $20  0.58 $1.5  0.36 $16.5  0.6 $31.5  0.04 
iiae16 $0  0 $5  0.58 $20  0.42 $1.5  0.54 $16.5  0.4 $31.5  0.06 
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2.9 Appendix D: Detailed Literature Review  
 We look to the literature to see how previous studies have measured the impact of basis risk 
in index insurance. Table 2.12 collates the various welfare metrics used to evaluate insurance in the 
studies we are aware of. 
 
 Five studies are closer to our approach, so we provide more detail below on their approach. 
Clarke [2016] develops a theory for the rational demand of index insurance, explaining the impact of 
risk aversion, price and wealth on the demand for index insurance which has basis risk. Clarke and 
Kalani [2012] test the validity of the developed theory in an empirical study. Elabed and Carter 
[2015] take a different approach, instead applying a model of ambiguity aversion to explain the 
willingness to pay (WTP) for index insurance resulting from violations of the ROCL axiom. 
McIntosh, Povel and Sadoulet [2015] also estimate the WTP for insurance, but they use it to assess 
the demand for partial and probabilistic insurance. Finally, Swarthout [2012] is a progenitor of our 
study. 
 
2.9.1 A Theory of the Rational Demand for Index Insurance 
 Clarke [2016] raises two empirical puzzles with regards to index insurance demand. The first 
is that the demand for weather index insurance, which is expected to offer protection against 
extreme adverse weather events, is lower than expected. The second is that demand seems to be 
particularly low from the most risk averse, when they are the ones who should benefit most from 
insurance. He makes use of a rational demand model to derive a theory to solve these puzzles, that is 
he assumes the consumer is a price-taking risk averse expected utility maximizer. 
 
 The critical feature of this model with basis risk is the nature of the joint probability 
structure of the index insurance product and the consumer’s loss. Since the payout from insurance is 
imperfectly correlated with the individual’s loss, purchasing index insurance both worsens the worse 
possible outcome and improves the best possible outcome. Although purchasing more index 
insurance could reduce the loss exposure of the individual when the individual outcome matches the 
outcome of the index, it will also increase exposure to a worse possible outcome when the individual 
experiences a loss but the index does not. Depending on which factor has a stronger impact, it is no 
longer obvious what the optimal amount of insurance a risk inverse individual should purchase.  
 
 The model is set up as follows. A decision maker holds strictly risk averse preferences over 
wealth, with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U(W) satisfying Uʹ (W) > 0 and Uʺ (W) 
< 0.The decision maker is endowed with constant wealth w, is exposed to uninsurable zero mean 
background risk, and is exposed to the possibility of suffering a loss of L. There is also an index 
which is exposed to the binary possibility of experiencing a loss event or not. The index is not 
necessarily perfectly correlated with the loss and so there are four possible joint realizations of the 
index and individual loss. The table below shows the joint probabilities of all four possible 
outcomes, where p is the probability that the individual experiences a loss, and q is the probability 
that the index experiences a loss. 
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Table 2.11 Joint Probabilities and Outcomes of Index Insurance 
 
 
 Clarke [2016] defines basis risk using the parameter r, which is defined as the joint 
probability that the individual experiences a loss but does not receive a payout, as the index does not 
experience the loss event. With this joint probability set-up, basis risk can vary while p and q remain 
constant. This definition of basis risk differs from the definition in our model, which is the 
probability the outcome for the individual’s loss event is different from the outcome of the index 
loss event. 
 
 Solving for the optimal amount of coverage the individual should purchase to maximize 
expected utility, Clarke [2016] finds that for the classes of constant absolute and constant relative 
risk aversion, demand for actuarially unfair indexed cover is hump-shaped in the degree of risk 
aversion. First it increases is risk aversion increases, then it decreases at higher levels of risk aversion. 
Demand for actuarially-favourable indexed cover is either decreasing or decreasing-increasing-
decreasing in risk aversion. Using similar methods, Clarke also finds that there is no monotonic 
relationship between demand and initial wealth, loss amount or premium loading. 
 
2.9.2 Empirical Tests of a Theory of the Rational Demand for Index Insurance 
 Clarke and Kalani [2012] empirically test the results from Clarke [2016] by conducting a field 
experiment in villages in Ethiopia. They set up lottery choices in the gain frame which they call the 
benchmark, as well as insurance choices which they try to frame as losses, to test determinants for 
demand of index insurance, determinants of risk aversion, and effect of group insurance over 
individual insurance.  
 
 They use the Ordered Lottery Selection design of Binswanger [1980], and applied it in their 
benchmark treatment, as well as in four insurance treatments. Subjects were given 65 Birr, and were 
told they could lose up to 50 Birr, then they were asked how much insurance they would prefer to 
purchase. We describe the two insurance treatments that our relevant to our study. The first is an 
individual indemnity treatment. Subjects are shown that there are 4 tokens in a bag, 3 blue and 1 
yellow. If a yellow token is drawn, subjects will lose 50 Birr. Subjects can choose to purchase 
between 0 to 5 units of indemnity insurance to reduce the loss amount. One unit of indemnity 
insurance costs a premium of 8 Birr and with each unit of insurance purchased the loss when a 
yellow token is drawn is reduced by 10 Birr. 
 
 The second treatment is the individual index treatment. This insurance decision is based on a 
two-stage probability structure.  In the first stage, a fair wheel is spun to select between a blue bag, 
and a yellow bag. The blue bag contains 3 blue tokens and 1 yellow token, and a yellow bag contains 
1 blue token and 3 yellow tokens. A token is drawn from the bag selected in the first stage, and if a 
yellow token is drawn, the subject will lose 50 Birr. Once again subjects can choose to purchase 
between 0 to 5 units of insurance, but for this treatment the insurance will only pay out if the yellow 
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bag is selected in the first stage. One unit of index insurance cost a premium of 3 Birr and led to a 
claim payment of 5 Birr in the event of the yellow bag being selected, and zero otherwise. There is 
basis risk, hence there is a chance that a subject who purchased insurance might incur a loss but not 
receive a payout. 
 
 Clarke and Kalani [2012] use structural maximum likelihood, like we do, to elicit risk 
preferences based on the choices made in the individual indemnity treatment. Like us, they assume a 
CRRA utility function, and that the population on average can have EUT or RDU risk preferences. 
They also use the mean-variance (MV) utility decision theory developed by Giné et al [2008] to see 
how well the risk choices fit that model. They also tested for how well the risk choices fit a mixture 
model between MV and RDU risk preferences. They find their data best fits the mixture model of 
MV and EUT. 
 
 As Clarke and Kalani [2012] used the Ordered Lottery Selection design, each subject only 
makes one insurance choice per treatment, hence they are only able to elicit average risk preferences 
for the sample population, and unlike our study they are unable to elicit risk preferences on the 
individual level. They also notice framing effects in their study. Although the benchmark and 
individual indemnity treatment are made up of numerically identical choices, they do not produce 
numerically consistent choices.  
 
 They run an ordered probit model on the choices from the individual index treatment to 
determine the how characteristics impact demand for index insurance. They find that subjects with 
intermediate levels of wealth have the highest take-up, with the poorest and richest subjects 
revealing a low demand for index insurance. This is consistent with the hump-shaped theoretical 
relationship between index insurance take-up and wealth derived by Clarke [2016] in an expected 
utility framework. However, unlike us, they do not use the risk preferences estimated from the 
benchmark or indemnity insurance to calculate willingness to pay (WTP) for insurance. In other 
words they do not compare how risk aversion should or could affect take-up. However, they do 
allude to this comparison in Clarke and Kalani [2012; p. 30]: 
 
This finding [of an “S-shaped” probability weighting function] is not surprising given 
the data; a large number of participants purchased more index insurance than is 
consistent with EUT or RDU with an inverse S-shape. 
 
2.9.3 Compound Risk and the Welfare Evaluation of Index Insurance 
 In their field experiment, Elabed and Carter [2015] use WTP for a weather index insurance 
product to measure welfare benefit of the insurance for cotton farmers in Mali. As in our 
experiment, they take into account risk preferences when measuring welfare. However they assume 
that all the farmers evaluate risk aversion over insurance framed as a simple lottery (“simple risk 
aversion”) using EUT. Their study looks into the impact of compound risk preferences from basis 
risk on WTP for weather index insurance. They make use of the Smooth Model of Ambiguity 
Aversion formalized by Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji [2005] (KMM) to separate preferences on 
simple risk and on compound risk. The premium for the compound lottery is approximated by the 
formula derived by Maccheroni et al. [2013], which breaks the premium down into a compound-risk 
premium and the classical Pratt risk premium, allowing the CE to be derived as the expected value 
of the lottery less the risk premium. WTP for the index insurance contract is then calculated as the 
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difference between the CE of the index insurance contract and the CE of the simply lottery faced in 
the autarkic situation.  
 
 Their experiment is divided into two tasks, where one of the tasks is randomly selected to 
actually be played out for real money. The first task presents insurance contracts with no basis risk 
using a methodology similar to Binswanger [1980], where the menu of insurance options is 
presented to the subject, and they select their preferred choice. The options are presented to the 
subjects as blocks of insurance: six discrete yield levels are specified with a probability assigned to 
each level, and subjects were asked to select how much insurance coverage they wanted such that 
they would be guaranteed a minimum of that yield level. The probability, revenue and premium for 
each yield level were determined beforehand and shown to the subjects. Premia were set at 20% 
above the actuarially fair price. The actual yield outcome was then randomly selected based on the 
probabilities shown to the subjects. Assuming CRRA preferences, the subject’s CRRA risk 
parameter was then inferred from the range consistent with the selected insurance contract. This 
experiment frames the risk parameter elicitation question in the context of insurance, unlike our 
experiment which used simple lotteries. Although the parameters of this experiment were set up to 
reflect real-life scenarios, with a 50% chance of a highest yield, this does not allow one to reliably 
identify non-EUT models. Furthermore, the range of CRRA risk parameter that can be captured 
only spans the intervals < 0.08 to > 0.55, with 56% of their subjects falling in these clopen intervals. 
The first interval corresponds to extremely slight risk aversion, risk neutrality, or even risk loving; 
the last interval corresponds to a significant fraction of risk aversion found worldwide using lottery 
tasks like these (see Harrison and Rutström [2008] for a review). Lastly, with this methodology only 
one data point is used to calibrate the risk preferences for each individual subject, hence there is no 
standard deviation on the value of simple risk aversion or compound risk aversion. 
 
 The second task presents the subjects with the index insurance contract, where there is a 
20% chance the insurance will not pay out even though the subject has a low yield. Only downward 
basis risk is considered here. Given the price of the index insurance contract, a Switching Multiple 
Price List, following Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2006], was used to elicit the minimum 
price of the “fail-safe” insurance where the index insurance would start being preferred over the 
“fail-safe” insurance contract. Such a set-up might frame the questions such that it leads subjects to 
select a certain price. Only compound risk aversion, and not risk loving, is considered. WTP to 
avoid basis risk is defined as the difference between the price the subject is willing to pay to avoid 
switching to index insurance and the market price of the “fail-safe” insurance, which was determined 
in the previous task as 120% of the actuarially fair premium. Using the CRRA risk parameter elicited 
from the first task and assuming constant compound risk aversion, the compound risk parameter 
was also estimated, and 57% of subjects were found to be compound risk averse to varying degrees. 
Using the estimated risk parameter and compound risk parameter to calculate the WTP of index 
insurance and assuming subjects will only choose to purchase insurance if their WTP lies above the 
market price of 120% of actuarially fair premium, considering compound risk aversion on top of the 
simple risk aversion could cut demand for index insurance by as much as half, relative to demand 
calculated from just considering simple risk aversion. 
 
2.9.4 Welfare Evaluation of Partial and Probabilistic Insurance 
 McIntosh, Povel and Sadoulet [2015] define basis risk as risk that is not covered by the 
insurance product, and they test the impact of basis risk on insurance demand when it is expressed 
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in two different ways. The first is when insurance is partial, in the sense that the insurance will pay 
out when there is a shock but it might not completely cover the loss. The second is when insurance 
is probabilistic, in the sense that the insurance may fail to pay out when there is a shock. They used a 
field experiment with coffee farmers in Guatemala to understand the demand for index-based 
rainfall insurance. Insurance demand is calculated using a flexible utility function at the individual 
level to evaluate WTP for insurance. The risk parameters of the utility function were estimated from 
actual insurance choices using a non-linear least squares estimator. They find that the average WTP 
for insurance increases as loss severity increases. This result holds even if the insurance payout 
remains constant, regardless of loss severity, which causes the insurance coverage to be even more 
partial as loss severity increases. Average WTP decreases, however, when payouts are more 
probabilistic: as the probability the insurance fails to pay for a shock increases, insurance demand 
decreases. 
 
 One way their methodology differs from ours is that they use the same insurance choices 
that they estimate risk parameters from to calculate the WTP of insurance. Applying the estimated 
risk parameters to the same data set that they were estimated from would result in the WTP for 
insurance to be biased, in the sense that these risk parameters are selected in order to maximize the 
likelihood that the observed insurance choice is the correct thing to do (by revealed preference). 
There is no allowance for mistaken choices, in the behavioral sense, and for the estimated WTP 
estimated to be negative (in statistical expectation). They also have less than 10 data points per 
subject to use to estimate risk parameters, which makes their results very noisy statistically. Also, 
their results only apply to villages that self-report in a survey that they are vulnerable to excess 
rainfall risk. Since the survey is hypothetical, this adds another layer of uncertainty to the validity of 
their results. 
 
2.9.5 Prior Lab Experiments on Index Insurance at GSU 
 We based the design of our insurance battery on Swarthout [2012], who makes use of an 
exploratory laboratory experiment to investigate the behavioral foundations of index insurance 
purchase behavior. One attractive feature of his experiment is that in the laboratory he is able to 
define and control what the basis risk is and exactly how it appears to the subjects, which is more 
difficult to do in the field. On average, he finds that the subjects in his experiment increased 
insurance take-up as basis risk increased. This differs from our result, which shows that take-up is 
not significantly impacted by basis risk. The insurance battery he uses varies loss amount also, while 
we have kept our loss amount fixed, and that might have influenced the difference in results. He also 
estimates risk preferences using EUT and Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), and finds that both 
the probabilistic loss aversion and non-linear probability weighting in CPT, rather than the curvature 
of the utility function, are factors influencing insurance take-up. We have accounted for that aspect 
of risk preferences in our experiment by allowing for subjects to have non-EUT risk preferences 
consistent with RDU. We have also taken these estimates on risk preferences one step further to use 
them to evaluate welfare of the insurance choices, rather than just take-up. 
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2.9.6 Literature Review of Welfare Metrics for Index Insurance 
 
Table 2.12 Literature Review of Welfare Metrics for Index Insurance 
 
 
Study 
Metric of 
Welfare 
Measure Data Hypothetical or Real Result 
 
A. Welfare Measured by Take-up 
 
Giné et al. [2008] 
Take-up of rainfall 
index insurance 
Average Household survey  
Lack of understanding, but also credit constraints, limited 
familiarity, and risk aversion discourage insurance 
purchase. Being previously insured, connected to village 
networks and self-identifying as 'progressive' encourage 
insurance purchase. 
Hill and Robles [2011] 
Take-up of 
varying weather 
securities 
Average 
Field experiment, 
actual insurance sold 
and survey 
Choices on 
components of weather 
securities package  
(Real) 
High take-up in Average and variance experimental game 
and pilot as weather securities are easily understood and 
fit heterogeneous farmers' needs. Crop and production 
choices, and soil characteristics have some explanatory 
power for security choices 
Clarke and Kalani 
[2012] 
Take up of index 
insurance, 
reduction of risk 
aversion 
Average, variance, 
and Maximizing 
Expected Utilty 
(MEU) 
Field experiment Binswanger (Real) 
Take-up is hump-shaped against wealth, where subjects 
with immediate levels of wealth have the highest take-up. 
There is no strong evidence of schooling, understanding 
of the decision problems or financial literacy significantly 
increasing take-up. Background risk however significantly 
affects take-up. Parametric assumptions matter when 
estimating determinants of risk aversion.  
Hill, Hoddinott and 
Kumar [2013] 
Reduced adverse 
consequence of 
shocks on income 
and consumption 
Average Survey 
Double-bounded 
dichotomous choice 
contingent valuation 
method (Hypothetical); 
Binswanger (one 
Hypothetical, and one 
Real) 
Those who faced higher rainfall risk, were less risk averse, 
more educated, more proactive, and richer, were more 
likely to purchase insurance. Offering insurance through 
a risk-sharing group increases demand for less educated 
females, but is constrained by lack of trust amongst 
neighbors. 
Dercon et al. [2014] 
Take-up of rainfall 
insurance 
Average 
Actual insurance sold 
and survey 
 
Insurance demand increased when groups were exposed 
to training that encouraged sharing of insurance within 
groups. A suggested reason is that risk-sharing and index 
insurance can be shown to be complementary. 
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Vasilaky et al. [2014] 
Take-up of index 
insurance 
Average Field experiment   
Participation in educational game increases likelihood of 
purchasing insurance as well as amount purchased. The 
study focused on the context of scaling a large 
unsubsidized index insurance program. 
Cole et al. [2014] 
Take-up of rainfall 
index insurance 
Average 
Actual insurance sold 
and survey 
 
Households in villages that have experienced insurance 
payouts are more likely to purchase in the following 
season, but this effect decreases over time. Households 
that have experienced payouts themselves are more likely 
to purchase two and three seasons later, than the first. 
Jensen et al. [2014] 
Demand for 
Index-based 
livestock 
insurance (IBLI) 
Average 
Actual insurance sold 
and survey 
 
Basis risk and spatial adverse selection associated with 
division average basis risk dampen demand for IBLI. 
Households in divisions with greater average idiosyncratic 
risk are much less likely to purchase insurance. There is 
also strong evidence of intertemporal adverse selection as 
households purchase less coverage, conditional on 
purchasing, before seasons for which they expect good 
conditions. 
Norton et al. [2014] 
Optimal allocation 
of endowment 
between risk 
management 
options 
Average 
Field experiment and 
actual insurance sold 
Allocation of 
endowment between 
risk management 
options (Real) 
Participants exhibited clear preferences for insurance 
contracts with higher frequency payouts and for 
insurance over other risk management options, including 
high interest savings. The preference for higher frequency 
payouts is mirrored in commercial sales of the product, 
with commercial purchasers paying substantially higher 
premiums than the minimal, low frequency option 
available. Commercial insurance also has option for 
premiums to be paid through labor. 
Hill et al. [2016] 
Take-up of 
weather-based 
index insurance 
Average Field experiment 
Binswanger 
(Hypothetical) 
Weather insurance demand in India falls with price and 
basis risk, and is hump-shaped in risk aversion, with price 
sensitivity decreasing at higher levels of basis risk. 
Increased incentive to learn or learning by using are more 
effective than insurance training at increasing both 
understanding and demand. Over time, the impact of 
premium, new weather stations and increased training 
diminish, and receiving a payout encourages future 
uptake while previous purchase of insurance does not. 
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Jin et al. [2016] 
Take-up of 
weather-based 
index insurance 
Average 
Household survey 
and field experiment 
Multiple Price List 
(Real) 
More than half of the farmers surveyed purchased the 
weather index insurance. Their main stated reasons were 
the support and subsidy from the government, and the 
belief that the probability of future crop losses due to 
weather events is high. The main reasons for not 
participating are farmer’s low income, low trust in local 
insurers, and lack of understanding of the policy. The 
average farmer is moderately risk averse, and risk 
aversion has a positive effect on farmer’s weather index 
insurance participation decisions. 
      
 
 
 
B. Welfare Measured by Willingness to Pay 
 
Chantarat et al. [2009] 
Certainty 
equivalent (CE) of 
herd growth rate 
CE Simulation  
Household initial herd size is the key determinant of the 
product’s performance, more so than household risk 
preferences or basis risk exposure. The product works 
least well for the poorest. The product is most valuable 
for the vulnerable non-poor, for whom insurance can 
stem collapses in herd size following predictable shocks. 
Demand appears to be highly price elastic, and 
willingness to pay is, on average, much lower than 
commercially viable rates. 
Elabed et al. [2013] 
Willingness to Pay 
(WTP) for 
agricultural index 
insurance 
CE Field experiment 
Binswanger and 
Multiple Price List 
(Real) 
Index insurance demand decreases under both risk 
aversion and compound risk aversion as basis risk 
increases. Multi-scale contracts that depend on triggers at 
the district and village level may allow for lower triggers 
to reduce basis risk to the farmer, while avoiding moral 
hazard problem. 
Bryan [2013] MEU MEU Field experiment 
Binswanger 
(Hypothetical) 
Provides a theory that implies ambiguity may decrease the 
adoption of novel technologies and limit the value of 
insurance. The effect of ambiguity aversion decreases 
with experience, a policy of short-term subsidization, and 
long-term insurance may help to alleviate low demand. 
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Leblois et al. [2014] MEU CE 
Field experiment and 
actual insurance sold 
Multiple Price List 
(Real) 
Length of cotton growing cycle is the best performing 
index considered. Gain from weather-index based 
insurance is lower than that of hedging against cotton 
price fluctuations provided by the national cotton 
company. 
Elabed and Carter 
[2015] 
Willingness-to-pay 
for agricultural 
index insurance 
CE Field experiment 
Binswanger and sMPL 
(Real) 
Allowing for compound risk aversion would significantly 
decrease the expected demand for insurance with a 
downside basis risk. 
McIntosh et al. [2015] 
WTP for 
probabilistic 
insurance 
CE Field experiment 
Choices to purchase 
insurance (Real) 
Average WTP for insurance increases as the loss severity 
increases, even if the payout is constant, which causes the 
insurance coverage to be more partial. Average WTP 
decreases, however, when payouts are more probabilistic, 
so that the probability the insurance fails to pay for an 
adverse event increases. Offering insurance on a group 
level does not increase demand for index insurance.  
Clarke [2016] MEU MEU Theory  
A model for rational demand for index insurance 
products is presented which explains two puzzles 
regarding index insurance demand: why demand for 
index insurance is lower than expected and why demand 
is low for more risk averse individuals. 
 
 
C. Welfare Measured by Risk Reduction Proxies 
 
Skees et al. [2001] 
Reduced revenue 
volatility of 
rainfall insurance 
Coefficient of 
variation (CV) of 
expected revenue 
Simulation on past 
data 
 
A drought insurance program based on rainfall contracts 
would have reduced relative risk in Morocco. 
Hess [2003] 
Allowing risky 
farmers to 
maintain access to 
credit during 
drought and 
smooth income 
Value-at-risk (VaR) 
Simulation on past 
data 
 
Integrated scheme can help banks reduce their lending 
volume while bringing down default rates and transaction 
costs. It can also help farmers stabilize their incomes and 
possible access to greater credit line from enhanced 
collateral 
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Vedenov and Barnett 
[2004] 
Efficiency: 
Reducing 
exposure to yield 
risk 
Mean root square of 
loss, VaR and CE of 
revenue 
Simulation on past 
data 
 
Weather derivatives may reduce risk, but complicated 
combinations of derivatives are needed to achieve 
reasonable fits (basis risk is not transparent). Results from 
in-sample do not translate to out-sample data. 
Giné et al. [2007] 
Reduced exposure 
to rainfall risk 
Variance Household survey  
There are large diversification benefits from holding a 
portfolio of insurance contracts, even though all 
insurance payouts are driven by rainfall in the same 
Indian state. 
Breustedt et al. [2008] 
Risk reduction on 
farm level yields 
(vs regional level) 
Mean-variance and 
second-degree 
stochastic 
dominance 
Simulation on past 
data 
 
Out of weather index, area yield index and farm yield 
insurance, none provide statistically significant risk 
reduction for every farm.  
Giné and Yang [2009] 
Take-up of loan to 
adopt new 
technology 
Average Actual insurance sold  
Packaging rainfall insurance with loan to purchase high-
yielding seed decreases take-up of loan for Maize and 
groundnut farmers in Malawi. This could be due to 
implicit insurance from limited liability in loan contract. 
Hill and Viceisza 
[2012] 
Take-up of 
fertilizer (input) 
Average Actual insurance sold  
Presence of (mandated) insurance increases take-up of 
fertilizer. Take-up also depends on initial wealth and 
previous weather realizations that affect subjective beliefs 
of weather outcomes. 
Carter and Janzen 
[2012] 
Less costly risk 
management 
behavior 
Average 
Actual insurance sold 
and survey 
 
Insured households anticipate making cash flow choices 
which will increase welfare over uninsured households 
anticipated cash flow choices. These decisions include 
maintaining consumption levels, and less reliance on 
assistance. 
Cole et al. [2013] 
Improved risk 
sharing of weather 
shocks - which 
should affect 
income variability 
Average 
Actual insurance sold 
and survey 
Binswanger (Real) 
Insurance demand is significantly price sensitive, with an 
elasticity of around unity. There is evidence that limited 
trust and understanding of the product, product salience 
and liquidity constraints also limit insurance take-up and 
demand.  
Chantarat et al. [2013] 
Reduction of 
livestock mortality 
risk 
Average 
Survey and 
household data 
 
By addressing serious problems of covariate risk, 
asymmetric information, and high transactions costs that 
have precluded the emergence of commercial insurance 
in these areas to date, IBLI offers a novel opportunity to 
use financial risk transfer mechanisms to address a key 
driver of persistent poverty 
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Mobarak and 
Rosenzweig [2013] 
Take-up of risky 
technologies and 
wage risk 
reduction for 
landless 
population 
Average 
Actual insurance sold 
and survey 
 
As basis risk increases, index insurance take-up increases 
if there is also informal risk sharing. Although informal 
risk sharing in caste groups reduces the sensitivity of 
profit and output to rainfall, relative to index insurance, it 
also reduces average returns. Landless households are 
more likely to purchase index insurance if cultivators are 
also offered weather insurance.  
McIntosh et al. [2013] 
Take-up of 
fertilizer input 
Average 
Actual insurance sold 
and survey 
 
Farmers in Ethiopia are subject to credit constraints that 
limit their fertilizer use, which is also sensitive to risk-
related variables. Actual weather index insurance take-up 
is not correlated with hypothetically-stated WTP, and is 
sensitive to vouchers for insurance purchase. 
Karlan et al. [2014] 
Increase in 
investments in a 
risky input 
Average 
Actual insurance sold 
and survey 
 
Uninsured risk is a binding constraint on farmer ex ante 
investment, but the liquidity constraints are not as 
binding as typically thought, so that credit markets alone 
are not sufficient to generate higher farm investments. 
Another finding is that there is sufficient demand for 
rainfall insurance, but factors such as basis risk, trust in 
the insurance company, and farmer’s recent experience, 
affected their demand for insurance.  
Jensen et al. [2016] 
Reduction of basis 
risk of IBLI 
Stochastic 
dominance, mean-
variance, OLS, semi-
variance 
Actual insurance sold 
and survey 
 
Covariate risk is spatially sensitive to the covariate region, 
resulting in spatial adverse selection. Basis risk, mainly 
idiosyncratic risk, is substantial, so insurance reduces risk 
but offers partial coverage. 
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2.10 Appendix E: Additional Figures 
Figure 2.30 Probability Weighting and Decision Weights  
 
 
 
Figure 2.31 Proportion of Actual Take -Up to Predicted Choices (II) 
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Figure E1: Proportion of Actual Take-Up to
Predicted Choices (II) 
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Figure 2.32 Proportion of Actual Take -Up to Predicted Choices (AE) 
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Figure E2: Proportion of Actual Take-Up to
Predicted Choices (AE) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.33 Proportion of Actual Take-Up to Predicted Choices (II-C) 
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2.11 Appendix F: Additional Tables  
Table 2.13 Average Marginal Effects of Factors Affecting Welfare 
Assuming Source-Dependent EUT in AE Treatment 
 
 
 
 Take-up Choice CS Efficiency 
     
Risk Aversion 0.411 0.0591 0.331 0.0902 
 (0.128) (0.985) (0.325) (0.414) 
(Risk Aversion)^2 -0.212 -0.195 -0.823* -0.288* 
 (0.389) (0.985) (0.015) (0.026) 
Correlation -0.0177 0.307 1.457***  
 (0.752) (0.985) (<0.001)  
Premium -0.0783*** -0.117 -0.479***  
 (<0.001) (0.985) (<0.001)  
Loss Probability 1.114*** 1.628 7.833***  
 (<0.001) (0.985) (<0.001)  
ROCL Violation Count 0.0110 -0.00133 -0.00354 0.00374 
 (0.468) (0.986) (0.832) (0.569) 
Young -0.232 -0.0970 -0.184 -0.0744 
 (0.072) (0.985) (0.463) (0.206) 
Female -0.0405 -0.0219 -0.128 -0.0480 
 (0.511) (0.984) (0.064) (0.080) 
Black -0.232* 0.0379 0.0746 0.0270 
 (0.030) (0.984) (0.568) (0.459) 
Asian -0.220 0.0483 0.0679 0.0457 
 (0.051) (0.984) (0.586) (0.417) 
Business Major 0.0132 -0.0224 -0.0611 -0.0269 
 (0.831) (0.992) (0.232) (0.359) 
Freshman -0.0784 0.0618 0.220 0.0746* 
 (0.296) (0.984) (0.065) (0.011) 
Senior 0.0208 0.0937 0.312*** 0.122*** 
 (0.786) (0.985) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
High GPA -0.0461 0.00634 0.0689 0.0112 
 (0.426) (0.991) (0.255) (0.691) 
Christian 0.0143 -0.0693 -0.305** -0.121** 
 (0.887) (0.985) (0.008) (0.004) 
Insured -0.0482 -0.0492 -0.222* -0.0897** 
 (0.415) (0.985) (0.014) (0.005) 
     
p-values in parentheses     
* p<0.05    ** p<0.01    *** p<0.001    
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Table 2.14 Average Marginal Effects of Factors Affecting Welfare 
Assuming Source-Dependent EUT in II Treatment 
 
 Take-up Choice CS Efficiency 
     
Risk Aversion 0.00230 0.0183 0.163 0.0504 
 (0.982) (0.684) (0.228) (0.422) 
(Risk Aversion)^2 0.113 -0.00581 0.0262 -0.0273 
 (0.504) (0.929) (0.900) (0.750) 
Correlation 0.0580 -0.00108 0.0629  
 (0.428) (0.984) (0.836)  
Premium -0.0739*** -0.000435 -0.0119  
 (<0.001) (0.976) (0.883)  
Loss Probability 1.534*** 0.892*** 3.475*  
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.015)  
ROCL Violation Count 0.00411 -0.0146** -0.0501** -0.0178* 
 (0.674) (0.003) (0.001) (0.010) 
Young -0.241** 0.117* 0.491 0.182** 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.139) (0.001) 
Female -0.0224 -0.00404 -0.0293 -0.00412 
 (0.620) (0.873) (0.499) (0.903) 
Black -0.0926 -0.0671* -0.231** -0.0819* 
 (0.165) (0.029) (0.009) (0.039) 
Asian -0.140 -0.0338 -0.164 -0.0446 
 (0.079) (0.412) (0.125) (0.401) 
Business Major -0.0162 -0.000711 0.0330 0.0100 
 (0.714) (0.979) (0.628) (0.776) 
Freshman -0.0436 -0.0480 -0.128 -0.0450 
 (0.411) (0.130) (0.085) (0.300) 
Senior -0.0927 -0.0327 -0.0705 -0.0234 
 (0.086) (0.315) (0.428) (0.587) 
High GPA -0.0332 -0.00767 0.0246 0.00670 
 (0.389) (0.753) (0.676) (0.846) 
Christian -0.0811 -0.0426 -0.147* -0.0519 
 (0.130) (0.098) (0.037) (0.102) 
Insured 0.118** 0.0197 0.104 0.0337 
 (0.008) (0.480) (0.158) (0.391) 
     
p-values in parentheses     
* p<0.05    ** p<0.01    *** p<0.001    
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Table 2.15 Average Marginal Effects of Factors Affecting Welfare Using Standard 
Methodology in AE Treatment 
     
 Take-up Choice CS Efficiency 
     
Correlation 0.00208 0.291*** 1.987***  
 (0.970) (<0.001) (<0.001)  
Premium -0.0768*** -0.0947*** -0.570***  
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)  
Loss Probability 1.160*** 1.334*** 9.211***  
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)  
ROCL Violation Count -0.00247 0.00760 -0.0393 0.00388 
 (0.848) (0.285) (0.150) (0.697) 
Young -0.257* 0.191*** -1.143 -0.0402 
 (0.021) (<0.001) (0.195) (0.504) 
Female -0.0263 -0.0921** -0.657*** -0.106** 
 (0.663) (0.006) (<0.001) (0.005) 
Black -0.0770 -0.00130 -0.0355 0.0195 
 (0.346) (0.977) (0.801) (0.731) 
Asian -0.0905 -0.0514 -0.326* -0.0595 
 (0.403) (0.338) (0.027) (0.460) 
Business Major -0.00470 -0.0406 -0.214* -0.0377 
 (0.936) (0.248) (0.015) (0.302) 
Freshman -0.0277 0.0118 0.0497 0.0316 
 (0.694) (0.787) (0.683) (0.524) 
Senior 0.0378 0.0398 -0.0853 0.0266 
 (0.628) (0.265) (0.389) (0.524) 
High GPA -0.0122 -0.0322 -0.134* -0.0152 
 (0.817) (0.349) (0.039) (0.695) 
Christian -0.00183 -0.0566 -0.381*** -0.103 
 (0.985) (0.228) (<0.001) (0.090) 
Insured -0.0328 -0.0325 -0.267* -0.0611 
 (0.552) (0.245) (0.020) (0.081) 
     
p-values in parentheses     
* p<0.05    ** p<0.01    *** p<0.001    
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Table 2.16 Average Marginal Effects of Factors Affecting Welfare Using Standard 
Methodology in AE Treatment 
     
     
 Take-up Choice CS Efficiency 
     
RDU Classification 0.107 0.0566 0.657*** 0.0794* 
 (0.077) (0.112) (<0.001) (0.025) 
Risk Aversion 0.0865 -0.0481 -0.445** -0.0768* 
 (0.198) (0.182) (0.005) (0.049) 
(Risk Aversion)^2 0.00772 -0.00696* -0.0538*** -0.0101* 
 (0.243) (0.050) (<0.001) (0.011) 
Correlation 0.00206 0.290*** 1.987***  
 (0.970) (<0.001) (<0.001)  
Premium -0.0771*** -0.0948*** -0.570***  
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)  
Loss Probability 1.163*** 1.333*** 9.211***  
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)  
ROCL Violation Count 0.00352 0.0136* -0.00288 0.00991 
 (0.804) (0.022) (0.917) (0.174) 
Young -0.227* 0.192*** -0.894 -0.0116 
 (0.045) (<0.001) (0.303) (0.819) 
Female -0.00826 -0.0826** -0.621*** -0.103*** 
 (0.896) (0.005) (<0.001) (0.001) 
Black -0.0816 -0.00571 -0.0831 0.0230 
 (0.272) (0.889) (0.558) (0.607) 
Asian -0.0690 -0.0651 -0.396** -0.0697 
 (0.543) (0.152) (0.003) (0.260) 
Business Major 0.000496 -0.0485 -0.220** -0.0391 
 (0.993) (0.143) (0.010) (0.220) 
Freshman -0.0411 0.0398 0.244 0.0730 
 (0.549) (0.294) (0.085) (0.073) 
Senior 0.0285 0.0667 0.169 0.0713 
 (0.715) (0.053) (0.068) (0.059) 
High GPA 0.00872 -0.0150 0.0256 0.0117 
 (0.869) (0.662) (0.680) (0.737) 
Christian 0.0142 -0.0413 -0.188 -0.0745 
 (0.884) (0.302) (0.089) (0.093) 
Insured -0.0467 -0.0307 -0.204 -0.0477 
 (0.383) (0.247) (0.068) (0.111) 
     
p-values in parentheses     
* p<0.05    ** p<0.01    *** p<0.001    
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Table 2.17 Average Marginal Effects of Factors Affecting Welfare Using Standard 
Methodology in II Treatment 
     
 Take-up Choice CS Efficiency 
     
Correlation 0.0396 -0.0613 0.186  
 (0.583) (0.221) (0.530)  
Premium -0.0756*** -0.000543 -0.0450  
 (<0.001) (0.966) (0.560)  
Loss Probability 1.504*** 0.948*** 4.504**  
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.001)  
ROCL Violation Count 0.000952 -0.00981* -0.0645*** -0.0168* 
 (0.915) (0.044) (<0.001) (0.025) 
Young -0.230** -0.292*** -1.571*** -0.334*** 
 (0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Female -0.0212 -0.0119 0.00705 -0.0110 
 (0.600) (0.632) (0.894) (0.751) 
Black -0.0800 -0.0721* -0.180 -0.0439 
 (0.227) (0.021) (0.137) (0.259) 
Asian -0.138 -0.0742 -0.234 -0.0594 
 (0.067) (0.068) (0.134) (0.278) 
Business Major -0.00331 0.0136 -0.0261 0.00884 
 (0.936) (0.598) (0.738) (0.812) 
Freshman -0.0475 -0.0388 -0.0974 -0.0511 
 (0.343) (0.199) (0.324) (0.266) 
Senior -0.0772 -0.0314 0.0117 -0.0195 
 (0.154) (0.306) (0.926) (0.659) 
High GPA -0.0328 -0.00524 -0.106 0.00253 
 (0.379) (0.821) (0.120) (0.940) 
Christian -0.0836 -0.0585* -0.199* -0.0746* 
 (0.103) (0.028) (0.019) (0.028) 
Insured 0.113* 0.0381 0.0630 0.0343 
 (0.011) (0.158) (0.453) (0.386) 
     
p-values in parentheses     
* p<0.05    ** p<0.01    *** p<0.001    
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Table 2.18 Average Marginal Effects of Factors Affecting Welfare Using Standard 
Methodology in II Treatment 
     
 Take-up Choice CS Efficiency 
     
RDU Classification 0.0540 0.0236 0.386*** 0.0522 
 (0.163) (0.356) (0.001) (0.134) 
Risk Aversion 0.0991 0.0558* 0.310** 0.0753 
 (0.086) (0.037) (0.004) (0.054) 
(Risk Aversion)^2 -0.0398 -0.0894** -0.437*** -0.130*** 
 (0.506) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Correlation 0.0394 -0.0614 0.186  
 (0.585) (0.220) (0.530)  
Premium -0.0756*** -0.000563 -0.0450  
 (<0.001) (0.965) (0.560)  
Loss Probability 1.505*** 0.948*** 4.504**  
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.001)  
ROCL Violation Count 0.00172 -0.0117* -0.0606** -0.0190** 
 (0.853) (0.016) (0.002) (0.008) 
Young -0.163 -0.293*** -1.353*** -0.325*** 
 (0.063) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Female -0.0385 -0.0275 -0.0916 -0.0364 
 (0.342) (0.250) (0.161) (0.265) 
Black -0.0574 -0.0595 -0.0130 -0.0194 
 (0.380) (0.069) (0.910) (0.648) 
Asian -0.116 -0.0590 -0.103 -0.0354 
 (0.122) (0.172) (0.491) (0.549) 
Business Major -0.0164 0.00528 -0.0949 -0.00386 
 (0.693) (0.839) (0.231) (0.921) 
Freshman -0.0714 -0.0485 -0.204* -0.0672 
 (0.141) (0.119) (0.041) (0.148) 
Senior -0.0831 -0.0387 -0.0105 -0.0309 
 (0.111) (0.190) (0.933) (0.462) 
High GPA -0.0386 -0.0137 -0.122 -0.00558 
 (0.297) (0.541) (0.071) (0.864) 
Christian -0.0780 -0.0492 -0.159 -0.0639 
 (0.124) (0.084) (0.052) (0.095) 
Insured 0.114** 0.0361 0.0687 0.0325 
 (0.009) (0.180) (0.419) (0.416) 
     
p-values in parentheses     
* p<0.05    ** p<0.01    *** p<0.001    
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Table 2.19 Average Marginal Effects of Factors Affecting Welfare Assuming Recursive RDU 
in AE Treatment 
     
 Take-up Choice CS Efficiency 
     
Correlation 0.0155 0.185** 2.370***  
 (0.804) (0.002) (<0.001)  
Premium -0.0820*** -0.0661*** -0.820***  
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)  
Loss Probability 1.154*** 0.932*** 15.26***  
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)  
ROCL Violation Count -0.0168 -0.0112 -0.359*** -0.00962 
 (0.138) (0.254) (<0.001) (0.351) 
Young -0.320** -0.403*** -3.640*** -0.495*** 
 (0.003) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Female 0.0283 0.0844 1.227*** 0.0915 
 (0.657) (0.105) (<0.001) (0.080) 
Black -0.0581 -0.110 0.359 -0.118 
 (0.443) (0.119) (0.182) (0.104) 
Asian -0.176 -0.143 -0.624 -0.123 
 (0.092) (0.064) (0.067) (0.145) 
Business Major -0.0125 0.0304 0.113 0.0290 
 (0.837) (0.583) (0.599) (0.573) 
Freshman 0.0651 0.130 1.941*** 0.178** 
 (0.374) (0.069) (<0.001) (0.007) 
Senior 0.0934 0.176* 1.747*** 0.235*** 
 (0.215) (0.020) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
High GPA -0.0429 -0.0763 -0.810** -0.0674 
 (0.452) (0.122) (0.005) (0.168) 
Christian -0.164 -0.166* -1.737*** -0.231** 
 (0.083) (0.026) (<0.001) (0.001) 
Insured -0.0850 -0.121** -1.776*** -0.158*** 
 (0.131) (0.002) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
     
p-values in parentheses     
* p<0.05    ** p<0.01    *** p<0.001    
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Table 2.20 Average Marginal Effects of Factors Affecting Welfare Assuming Recursive RDU 
in AE Treatment 
     
 Take-up Choice CS Efficiency 
     
Risk Aversion -0.0378 -0.101* -1.449*** -0.0911* 
 (0.439) (0.019) (<0.001) (0.025) 
(Risk Aversion)^2 -0.0231 -0.0373** -0.497*** -0.0348** 
 (0.105) (0.003) (<0.001) (0.004) 
Correlation 0.0156 0.185** 2.370***  
 (0.802) (0.002) (<0.001)  
Premium -0.0818*** -0.0660*** -0.820***  
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)  
Loss Probability 1.152*** 0.932*** 15.26***  
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)  
ROCL Violation Count -0.0231 -0.0236* -0.529*** -0.0207 
 (0.072) (0.036) (<0.001) (0.081) 
Young -0.322** -0.423*** -3.999*** -0.501*** 
 (0.003) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Female 0.0231 0.0656 0.949*** 0.0758 
 (0.723) (0.197) (<0.001) (0.145) 
Black -0.0411 -0.0609 1.046*** -0.0677 
 (0.589) (0.368) (<0.001) (0.315) 
Asian -0.170 -0.103 -0.0459 -0.0785 
 (0.105) (0.174) (0.901) (0.351) 
Business Major -0.0257 0.0213 0.0104 0.0187 
 (0.670) (0.675) (0.963) (0.696) 
Freshman 0.0775 0.159* 2.352*** 0.200*** 
 (0.295) (0.012) (<0.001) (0.001) 
Senior 0.0845 0.172* 1.747*** 0.227*** 
 (0.229) (0.011) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
High GPA -0.0411 -0.0562 -0.484 -0.0522 
 (0.468) (0.215) (0.083) (0.263) 
Christian -0.153 -0.165* -1.774*** -0.222*** 
 (0.090) (0.010) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Insured -0.0604 -0.0808 -1.251*** -0.119** 
 (0.325) (0.051) (<0.001) (0.005) 
     
p-values in parentheses     
* p<0.05    ** p<0.01    *** p<0.001    
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Table 2.21 Average Marginal Effects of Factors Affecting Welfare Assuming Recursive RDU 
in II Treatment 
     
 Take-up Choice CS Efficiency 
     
Correlation 0.0325 0.121 1.347**  
 (0.684) (0.064) (0.003)  
Premium -0.0756*** -0.0127 -0.393***  
 (<0.001) (0.382) (0.001)  
Loss Probability 1.643*** 0.669** 10.06***  
 (<0.001) (0.005) (<0.001)  
ROCL Violation Count -0.000343 0.00162 0.0132 -0.00507 
 (0.973) (0.850) (0.683) (0.590) 
Young -0.185* 0.0323 0.410 0.208** 
 (0.016) (0.654) (0.265) (0.009) 
Female 0.000735 -0.0371 -0.133 -0.0583 
 (0.985) (0.230) (0.402) (0.113) 
Black -0.0313 0.0213 0.384 0.0285 
 (0.564) (0.633) (0.392) (0.548) 
Asian -0.0836 -0.0351 -0.696 -0.0137 
 (0.243) (0.569) (0.206) (0.838) 
Business Major -0.0173 -0.0349 -0.274 -0.0586 
 (0.674) (0.309) (0.156) (0.139) 
Freshman -0.0997 -0.0686 -1.065*** -0.0679 
 (0.083) (0.169) (<0.001) (0.202) 
Senior -0.128* 0.00182 0.154 -0.00875 
 (0.028) (0.967) (0.548) (0.869) 
High GPA 0.00954 -0.00444 0.203 0.00877 
 (0.804) (0.884) (0.245) (0.809) 
Christian -0.102* -0.0238 -0.220 -0.0318 
 (0.046) (0.535) (0.236) (0.447) 
Insured 0.136** 0.0295 0.112 0.0159 
 (0.005) (0.393) (0.609) (0.696) 
     
p-values in parentheses     
* p<0.05    ** p<0.01    *** p<0.001    
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Table 2.22 Average Marginal Effects of Factors Affecting Welfare Assuming Recursive RDU 
in II Treatment 
     
 Take-up Choice CS Efficiency 
     
Risk Aversion 0.166** 0.119** 1.468*** 0.135*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (<0.001) (0.001) 
(Risk Aversion)^2 -0.149** -0.163*** -1.702*** -0.168*** 
 (0.007) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Correlation 0.0318 0.120 1.347**  
 (0.690) (0.064) (0.003)  
Premium -0.0757*** -0.0127 -0.393***  
 (<0.001) (0.382) (0.001)  
Loss Probability 1.643*** 0.669** 10.06***  
 (<0.001) (0.005) (<0.001)  
ROCL Violation Count -0.00348 -0.000988 -0.0176 -0.00801 
 (0.702) (0.895) (0.597) (0.331) 
Young -0.131* 0.0609 0.825* 0.241** 
 (0.049) (0.344) (0.035) (0.001) 
Female -0.0335 -0.0641* -0.461** -0.0886* 
 (0.402) (0.034) (0.003) (0.011) 
Black -0.0767 -0.0115 -0.0172 -0.00914 
 (0.161) (0.776) (0.968) (0.847) 
Asian -0.126 -0.0647 -1.068* -0.0483 
 (0.090) (0.273) (0.041) (0.460) 
Business Major -0.0132 -0.0308 -0.233 -0.0544 
 (0.736) (0.352) (0.224) (0.159) 
Freshman -0.114* -0.0748 -1.173*** -0.0764 
 (0.043) (0.128) (<0.001) (0.144) 
Senior -0.166** -0.0282 -0.208 -0.0423 
 (0.002) (0.502) (0.395) (0.411) 
High GPA 0.00619 -0.0139 0.125 -0.000265 
 (0.868) (0.658) (0.441) (0.994) 
Christian -0.0866 -0.00998 -0.0657 -0.0167 
 (0.076) (0.796) (0.706) (0.691) 
Insured 0.138** 0.0331 0.145 0.0187 
 (0.002) (0.297) (0.514) (0.626) 
     
p-values in parentheses     
* p<0.05    ** p<0.01    *** p<0.001    
 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3  
 
 
 
 
Welfare Effects of  Insurance Contract Non-Performance 
 
by Glenn W. Harrison and Jia Min Ng 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT.  
 
Non-performance lies at the heart of much of the regulation that insurance companies face. 
Consumers’ concerns about non-performance of the insurance provider have also been cited as a 
possible explanation for low demand of microinsurance. We provide a behavioral evaluation of the 
welfare effects of non-performance risk, keeping close to the canonical theoretical framework of 
Doherty and Schlesinger [1990]. We test the hypothesis that the presence of non-performance risk 
negatively impacts not just take-up of insurance but more importantly the welfare of the insurance 
choices made. The results show that take-up is significantly lower when there is non-performance 
risk, but more importantly the percentage of “incorrect” choices is significantly lower. There is a 
significant reduction in efficiency, the preferred measure of welfare in this instance, when there is 
non-performance risk.  We also test if violations of the Reduction of Compound Lotteries axiom or 
accounting for individual’s subjective beliefs on non-performance risk could drive this decrease in 
take-up and welfare. The results show that the compound risk characteristic of non-performance 
risk does not significantly decreases the welfare of insurance choices made by individuals when we 
do not make that assumption in our calculation of consumer surplus. Allowing for subjective beliefs 
over non-performance risk does not significantly impact the welfare of insurance choices. Take-up 
once again is not a reliable proxy for welfare, and the drivers of take-up are again not the same 
drivers of welfare. These results provide a structural behavioral insight to inform normative policy 
design. 
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3.1 Introduction 
An insurance contract is a promise by one party to pay the other party some money if unfortunate 
events lead to losses by the first party. Sometimes promises are not kept. In that case the premium is 
lost, and only some fraction of the claim is paid. How important is contract non-performance for 
the welfare effects of insurance purchase decisions? We consider the theoretical and empirical issues 
involved in answering that question, and provide some initial behavioral evidence from controlled 
laboratory experiments. Contract non-performance is obviously a concern of insurance regulators: 
the probability of non-performance is directly tied to reserving and solvency policies, as well as other 
issues such as misrepresentation and outright fraud.45 
 The primary theoretical model of the effects of insurance contract non-performance on 
demand is due to Schlesinger and Schulenburg [1987] and Doherty and Schlesinger [1990].46 
Assuming insurance purchases consistent with Expected Utility Theory (EUT), this model 
establishes several core results for the simplest case in which the risk of non-performance is known.  
 The most important theoretical result is that the demand for insurance might decrease with 
greater risk aversion, contrary to the standard results for traditional indemnity products. The 
intuition is simple enough. In the absence of the risk of non-performance, such products only 
reduce the final, post-claim variability of income (or income-equivalent) of the person purchasing 
the contract and facing the known loss contingency. Under EUT such products are always welfare-
improving for the agent facing the loss contingency. But non-performance raises the possibility that 
the final, post-claim and post-performance variability of income might be larger than in the status quo, 
when the product is not available or purchased. Hence, for sufficiently risk averse EUT agents, it 
                                                 
 
45 See Cummins, Grace and Phillips [1999] and Cummins, Doherty and Lo [2002]. 
46 Tapeiro, Kahane and Jacque [1986] established the basic theoretical results for the actuarial determination of loading 
factors in the presence of non-performance risk. 
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might be rational not to purchase the product. 
 This result is used in discussions of the welfare effects of index insurance contracts by 
Clarke [2016]. The idea of an index contract is that the insured gets coverage for an idiosyncratic risk 
of loss that they face that is positively correlated with some easily observed and verifiable index.47 
Payment of a claim depends solely on outcomes with respect to the index, not with respect to 
outcomes that are specific to the insured. However, compared to a conventional indemnity product, 
an index contract makes the worst possible outcome even worse, and makes the best possible 
outcome even better.48 Thus the added risk of an index contract is akin to non-performance risk, but 
is two-sided. An immediate application of the formal results on non-performance risk from 
Schlesinger and Schulenburg [1987] and Doherty and Schlesinger [1990] establishes that sufficiently 
risk averse EUT agents may rationally choose not to purchase index contracts. 
 One empirical question, then, is whether the risk of non-performance is empirically relevant. 
How risk averse do EUT agents have to be in order for these rational non-purchase outcomes to be 
observed, and are these levels of risk aversion observed? Schlesinger and Schulenburg [1987; p.314] 
provide a numerical example to suggest that this counter-intuitive result might not be practically 
relevant, requiring levels of risk aversion that are implausibly high. Of course, such examples depend 
on reliable characterization of the risks of loss and non-performance, and these are generally poorly 
known; we return to this issue in the conclusion.  
 Even if plausible levels of risk aversion for EUT agents do not reverse the usual qualitative 
result that insurance purchase is attractive, they might seriously mitigate the welfare gains to agents 
of insurance. Moreover, what happens when agents exhibit risk preferences that are not consistent 
                                                 
 
47 The use of an index differentiates index insurance from “area-yield” insurance, which defines the loss to the insured 
by the average yield in some geographic area. The advantages of index contracts are that claims can be instantly 
adjudicated without costly assessment procedures, there is no opportunity for moral hazard or adverse selection, and 
transparency concerns that are particularly severe in developing countries can be mitigated. 
48 The worst possible outcome is if the insured experiences a loss but the index is not triggered, and the best possible 
outcome is if the insured suffers no loss and the index is triggered so that a payment to the insured is made. 
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with EUT, or just make “mistakes” relative to the model of risk preferences that best characterizes 
them? These are empirical questions, as much as theoretical questions. We show how to answer 
them, using controlled laboratory experiments. 
 Demand for microinsurance is also claimed to be notoriously low, particularly by academic 
researchers: see Giné et al. [2008], Giné and Yang [2009], Cole, Stein and Tobacman [2014] and 
Clarke [2016]. Many factors have been cited as possible explanations of such low take-up, such as 
lack of understanding, risk aversion, prior experience with insurance, basis risk, and premium. Cai et 
al. [2015] suggest that a lack of trust in the insurance provider decreases take-up in microinsurance, 
and Liu and Myers [2016] find that perceived insurance default together with liquidity constraints 
decrease microinsurance take-up. But worrying about “low take-up” surely presumes what we need 
to determine, whether there is an expected consumer surplus from purchasing the product in the 
first place. Our analysis provides answers as to what “low” and “high” might conceptually mean for 
products with non-performance, particularly when we study actual behavior.   
 We evaluate the expected welfare of one-sided contract non-performance in a simple setting 
in which we can control all potential confounds and yet still observe behavioral responses, a 
laboratory experiment. Given the importance of the issue for policies towards risk management in 
developing countries, and the unblinking enthusiasm of many policy-makers and non-governmental 
agencies for microinsurance, we make no apology for starting this evaluation in a laboratory. The 
confounds of field evaluations of the effects of insurance and the demand for the product make it 
impossible to make clean, simple evaluations of the welfare effects of the policy. Most evaluations, 
in fact, only talk about whether take-up is “too low” or “about right,” with no coherent sense of 
what take-up is appropriate for the insured.49 We view our laboratory experiment as a necessary 
                                                 
 
49 Many evaluations actually dodge the issue of the welfare effect of the index contract as insurance by focusing on 
whether it is correlated with increased utilization of services or activities that are insured. That is not what insurance is 
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precursor to informative and powerful field experiments. 
 A decided advantage of undertaking a controlled experimental evaluation, whether in the 
laboratory or the field, is that we can investigate the structural reasons for welfare losses from 
decisions about insurance non-performance.50 We say “decisions” rather than take-up, since it is 
possible that losses arise from not taking up the product when the individual should do so. 
Conversely, admitting that behavior is not always consistent, take up of the product is not even a 
reliable indicator of a welfare gain. In the case of insurance non-performance, the focus of 
theoretical attention has to be the compound risk that the contract generates. In theoretical terms 
this draws attention to violations of the Reduction of Compound Lotteries (ROCL) axiom, which 
has been implicated in many experimental evaluations of EUT.51 If non-performance risk has the 
same impact on welfare as basis risk, we would expect violations of the ROCL axiom to decrease 
expected welfare gain from purchase choices made on insurance (Harrison, Martínez-Correa, Ng 
and Swarthout [2016]). 
 Biener, Landmann and Santana [2017] and Liu and Myers [2016] suggest that perceived non-
performance risk significantly decreases microinsurance take-up. We extend our current model 
following Cummins and Mahul [2003], to allow the insurance company and buyers of insurance to 
have divergent subjective probabilities about the non-performance risk.52 We further allow non-
performance risk to be a probability distribution, potentially allowing agents to exhibit uncertainty 
aversion by taking into account the confidence with which they subjectively perceive that risk. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
traditionally designed to influence, and is at most a secondary benefit or cost of insurance as a risk management 
instrument. 
50 References to “non-performance” henceforth refer to one-sided non-performance, in which there is some risk that a 
subjectively valid claim is not paid. Harrison, Martínez-Correa, Ng and Swarthout [2016] use similar methods to evaluate 
the welfare effects of the two-sided non-performance risk found in index insurance contracts.  
51 The ROCL axiom is that a decision-maker is indifferent between a compound lottery and the actuarially-equivalent 
simple lottery in which the probabilities of the two stages of the compound lottery have been multiplied out. 
52 Contrary to Cummins and Mahul [2003; p.121] this assumption does not require that the risks be uncertain. It could 
just be that the two groups have different priors or data, leading to different (posterior) subjective probabilities even if 
both apply Bayes Rule.  
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Following Harrison [2011; §4] we define uncertainty aversion as occurring when agents “boil down” 
probability distributions using some aspect of the distribution other than the weighted average. 
Following Cummins and Mahul [2003], if this weighted average of the distribution of the probability 
of non-performance is less (greater) than the objective non-performance probability, we would 
expect the expected welfare gain from the insurance to decrease (increase). If agents employ ROCL 
then they evaluate such distributions as if they are a well-defined point-mass distribution exactly 
equal to that weighted average. We assume that ROCL applies, that there is no uncertainty aversion, 
and that agents behave as if they use the weighted average of their subjective beliefs to make 
decisions about purchasing insurance. 
 We lay out the basic theory of insurance non-performance in section 3.2, identifying the role 
of ROCL, compound risk, risk preferences and uncertainty in welfare evaluation. By “risk 
preferences” we mean both the level of risk aversion that an individual exhibits in choice behavior as 
well as the type of psychological processes underlying that level of risk aversion. To keep matters 
simple, we focus on EUT and Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU) Theory. In section 3.3 we set out the 
experimental design motivated by this theory, to allow us to identify welfare gains and losses at the 
individual level. A central subtlety of this design to undertake normative inferences, discussed by 
Harrison and Ng [2016], is that we must have a measure of risk preferences of the individual that is 
separate from the insurance choices, even if that might be viewed by some as descriptively restrictive. 
Section 3.4 presents our results, section 3.5 compares our results with related literature, and section 
3.6 draws conclusions and discusses important extensions. 
 Our results show that the compound risk characteristic of non-performance risk significantly 
decreases the welfare of insurance choices made by individuals. When we do not assume the ROCL 
axiom in our calculations of consumer surplus, the impact of the violation of the ROCL axiom by 
individuals on welfare when there is non-performance risk is not statistically significant. Allowing for 
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subjective beliefs over non-performance risk does not significantly impact the welfare of insurance 
choices. We can also identify demographic characteristics of individuals that appear to be correlated 
with less efficient choices, pointing to how normative policies might be efficiently designed. The 
drivers of welfare from non-performance risk are not the same drivers of take-up, so take-up is (yet 
again) not even a useful proxy for guiding policy to improve welfare in the face of this type of 
contract risk. 
3.2 Theory 
We follow the formal set-up in Doherty and Schlesinger [1990]. An individual starts out with an 
initial endowment of A and is faced with a chance p of losing L. The individual could purchase 
insurance for π, which would fully compensate for the loss. There is a chance q that the insurance 
company will stay solvent, so there is a (1 - q) chance that the insurance company would default. In 
the case of default the insurance company would only repay a fixed proportion τ of the loss should 
the loss occur.53 The possible monetary outcomes and their corresponding probabilities are 
summarized in Figure 3.1. 
 There are 5 possible states, depending on the permutations of binary outcomes if the 
individual chooses to purchase insurance {I1, I0}, if a loss occurs {L1, L0}, and if the insurance 
company defaults {D1, D0}.  For instance, if the individual chooses not to purchase insurance (I0), 
and a loss occurs (L1), the individual would also experience a loss (I0L1) and be left with A-L. If she 
does not experience a loss (I0L0) she would keep A. 
 If the individual chooses to purchase insurance (I1) the outcomes are slightly more complex. 
                                                 
 
53 Mahul and Wright [2004] consider the variant in which there is some probability that the indemnified claim is paid and 
where the probability depends on the size of the indemnified claim. This corresponds to a situation in which the 
insurance company suffers bankruptcy and receivers are able to repay claims on a “cents on the dollar basis” for certain, 
privileged claims It also corresponds to a situation in which a government partially bails out a company, with rules for 
recovery rates that vary with claim value. 
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If a loss does not occur (I1L0) she keeps her initial endowment less the premium paid, A-π. However 
if a loss occurs (L1) the insurance company may not be able to pay on a loss claim. If the insurance 
company remains solvent (I1L1D0) they can pay on the loss claim and the individual keeps her initial 
endowment less the premium paid, A-π. If the insurance company defaults (I1L1D1) they are only 
able to repay a fixed proportion τ of the loss instead of the entire loss, hence the individual only 
receives her initial endowment less her insurance premium less the portion of the loss not covered 
by the insurance company when it defaults, A – π – (1-τ)× L. This is the non-performance risk which 
creates a compound risk, hence ROCL must be considered when evaluating the welfare of insurance 
decisions in the presence of non-performance risk.  
 
Figure 3.1 Insurance Purchase Decision Tree with Non-Performance Risk 
 
 
3.2.1 Evaluating Welfare 
Doherty and Schlesinger [1990] assume EUT, and hence assume ROCL, in their analysis of optimal 
insurance decisions by agents. Assuming EUT initially, the methodology to calculate consumer 
surplus (CS) is as follows. Let A denote initial wealth, L denote the loss amount, π denote the 
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insurance premium, p denote the probability of a loss, q denote the non-performance risk of the 
insurer, and U(⋅ ) denote the utility function of the individual. The expected utility (EU) of the 
choice to not purchase insurance is 
 EU0 =  p U(I0L1) + (1-p) U(I0L0) = p U(A-L) + (1-p) U(A).  
The EU of the choice to purchase insurance is: 
  EU1  = [p × (1-q)] U(I1L1D1) + (p × q) U(I1L1D0) + (1-p) U(I1L0) 
   = [p × (1-q)] U[W-π-(1-τ)×L] + (p × q) U(W-π) + (1-p) U(W-π). 
 
We can define the Certainty Equivalent (CE) as the non-stochastic wealth level that is equivalent to 
a lottery, so the CE of not purchasing insurance CE0 is defined by U(CE0) = EU0, and the CE of 
purchasing insurance CE1 is defined by U(CE1) = EU1. Expected welfare gain is measured by the CS 
from the option of purchasing insurance. This is the difference between the CE of purchasing 
insurance and the CE of not purchasing insurance: CS = CE1 - CE0. 
 We relax the assumption of EUT and assume that individuals can have preferences that 
violate the Compound Independence Axiom.54 We represent those preferences by the RDU model. 
If we assume RDU as the decision-making model, the calculation of CS is similar once we calculate 
the corresponding CE values. The only complication is keeping track of how probabilities are 
transformed into decision weights, explained by Harrison and Swarthout [2016; Appendix B].55 The 
RDU of not purchasing insurance is then defined as RDU0, and the RDU of purchasing insurance 
defined as RDU1. The CE are then defined similarly, but using RDU instead of EU, so CE0 is 
defined by U(CE0) = RDU0, and CE1 is defined by U(CE1) = RDU1. The expected welfare gain is 
                                                 
 
54 The CIA states that a compound lottery formed from two simple lotteries by adding a positive common lottery with 
the same probability to each of the simple lotteries will exhibit the same preference ordering as the simple lotteries. 
55 In brief, the highest-ranked monetary outcome has a decision weight equal to the weighted probability, where the 
weighting function is yet to be defined. In our insurance choices there are only two monetary outcomes in each implied 
lottery. In this special case the decision weight on the smallest-ranked monetary outcome is 1 minus the decision weight 
on the highest-ranked monetary outcome. The probabilities of the top two monetary prizes are added prior to 
probability weighting, as are the probabilities of the bottom two monetary prizes. Thereafter the RDU is evaluated as if 
it only had two outcomes. 
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then calculated again as CS = CE1 - CE0.  Since RDU0 need not equal EU1, and RDU1 need not 
equal EU1, and both will typically be quite different for a subject best characterized by RDU, the 
expected welfare gain of the option of purchasing insurance will depend on the characterization of 
risk preferences for the individual. 
 The same logic for evaluating the welfare gain extends to other variants on EUT, such as 
Dual Theory, Disappointment Aversion and Regret Theory. We do not consider Prospect Theory, 
since all outcomes were in the gain domain in our experiments, but the logic extends immediately. 
3.2.2 Welfare and Solvency Risk 
How does the CS from purchasing insurance vary as the solvency risk varies? To provide concrete 
illustrations, assume utility follows the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) model so that U(x) = 
x(1−r)/(1−r), where x is the monetary outcome and r≠1 is a parameter to be estimated. Thus r is the 
coefficient of CRRA under EUT: r=0 corresponds to risk neutrality, r<0 to risk loving, and r>0 to 
risk aversion. Values between 0.3 and 0.7 are typical for our subjects and monetary stakes. 
 Figure 3.2 shows how the CS varies as solvency risk varies for this insurance product, 
assuming the individual has EUT preferences.56 If the insurance company defaults there is no 
payment in case of a claim. Regardless of the probability of solvency, CS from insurance is higher 
when the individual is more risk averse. This follows from the fact that more risk averse individuals 
are willing to pay more for insurance. When there is no non-performance risk, and the probability of 
solvency is 100%, a more risk averse individual would have a positive CS from insurance and a less 
risk averse individual would have a negative CS from insurance. A decrease in the probability of 
solvency, which is an increase in non-performance risk, decreases the CS from insurance. In the 
absence of non-performance risk, a decision to purchase insurance would have a positive CS for the 
                                                 
 
56 Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 all assume that the insurance decision is for an initial endowment of $20 with a 10% chance of 
losing $15, with a cost of $1.80 to fully insure against the loss.  
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more moderately risk averse. With the presence of non-performance risk, a decision to purchase 
insurance would have a negative CS for sufficiently low solvency risk (e.g., below 0.85 for the risk 
preferences in Figure 3.2). Between solvency risk levels of 0.85 and 1, the level of risk aversion 
determines if there is a positive CS from purchasing the insurance product or not. Clearly the risk 
preferences of the individual and non-performance risk of the insurer can affect whether the 
individual’s decision to purchase insurance would result in an expected welfare gain or loss. 
 Figure 3.3 shows how CS varies as solvency risk varies assuming an RDU decision-making 
model with a Power probability weighting function ω(p) = pγ. In this case γ≠1 is consistent with a 
deviation from EUT. The probability weighting parameter γ spans our expected range of 0.7 to 1.3, 
and the CRRA coefficient r is held constant at 0.6. Convexity of the probability weighting function, 
with γ>1, is said to reflect “pessimism” and generates, if one assumes for simplicity a linear utility 
function, a risk premium since ω(p) < p  ∀p and hence the “RDU EV” weighted by ω(p) instead of 
p has to be less than the EV weighted by p. The converse is true for γ<1, and is said to reflect 
“optimism.” When there is no non-performance risk, and the probability of solvency is 100%, 
pessimism underweights the probability of no loss that generates a risk premium, which increases 
the expected welfare gain of purchasing insurance. Conversely, optimism overweights the probability 
of no loss and has the opposite effect of decreasing the expected welfare gain of purchasing 
insurance. This trend persists even in the presence of non-performance risk. Just as in the EUT 
model, an increase in non-performance risk decreases the expected welfare gain of purchasing 
insurance regardless of γ. Once again, not only do the probability weighting parameters impact 
whether the expected welfare gain is positive or negative, and hence whether or not the “correct” 
decision estimated for the individual is to purchase or not to purchase insurance, it also affects how 
much the insurance product will or will not benefit the individual. 
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Figure 3.2 Impact of Non-Performing Risk on Consumer Surplus Assuming EUT 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Impact of Non-Performing Risk on Consumer Surplus Assuming RDU with a 
Power Probability Weighting Function 
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Figure 3.4 Impact of Non-Performance Risk on Consumer Surplus Assuming RDU and an 
Inverse-S Probability Weighing Function 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.4 shows how the CS is affected if we vary the parameter of an inverse-S probability 
weighting function ω(p) = pγ / ( pγ + (1-p)γ )1/γ for an RDU decision making model while varying the 
probability of solvency. This function exhibits inverse-S-shaped probability weighting (optimism for 
small p, and pessimism for large p) for γ<1, and S-shaped probability weighting (pessimism for small 
p, and optimism for large p) for γ>1. Once again the probability weighting parameter γ spans our 
expected range of 0.7 to 1.3, and the CRRA coefficient r is held constant at 0.6. Inverse-S-shaped 
probability weighting reflects an overweighting of the probabilities of extreme outcomes, while S-
shaped probability weighting reflects an underweighting of the probabilities of extreme outcomes. In 
the absence of non-performance risk, when the probability of solvency is 100%, inverse-S-shaped 
probability weighting overweights the probability of no loss that generates a risk premium, which 
decreases the expected welfare gain of purchasing insurance. And S-shaped probability weighting 
underweights the probability of no loss and has the opposite effect of increasing the expected welfare 
gain of purchasing insurance. This trend persists even in the presence of non-performance risk. Just 
as in the RDU model with a power probability weighting function, an increase in non-performance 
 187 
 
risk decreases the expected welfare gain of purchasing insurance regardless of γ. 
3.2.3 Eliciting Subjective Beliefs 
Here we describe the Quadratic Scoring Rule (QSR) that we use to incentivize subjects when 
eliciting their subjective beliefs. Let the decision maker report his subjective beliefs in a discrete 
version of a QSR for continuous distributions (Matheson and Winkler [1976]).57 The QSR is the 
most popular scoring rule in practice, and all of the practical issues of recovering beliefs can be 
directly examined in that context.58  
Partition the domain into K intervals, and denote as rk the report of the likelihood that the 
event falls in interval k = 1, …, K. Assume for the moment that the decision maker is risk neutral, 
and that the full report consists of a series of reports for each interval, {r1, r2, …, rk,…, rK} such that 
rk ≥ 0 k and ∑i=1…K (ri ) = 1. If k is the interval in which the actual value lies, then the payoff score 
is defined by Matheson and Winkler [1976; p.1088, equation (6)]: S = ( 2 × rk ) − ∑i=1…K (ri )
2. So the 
reward in the score is a doubling of the report allocated to the true interval, and the penalty depends 
on how these reports are distributed across the K intervals. The subject is rewarded for accuracy, but 
if that accuracy misses the true interval the punishment is severe. The punishment includes all 
possible reports, including the correct one.  
Take some examples, assuming K = 4. What if the subject has very tight subjective beliefs 
and allocates all of the weight to the correct interval? Then the score is S = (2 × 1) − (12 + 02 + 02 + 
02 ) = 2 − 1 = 1, and this is positive. But if the subject has tight subjective beliefs that are wrong, the 
score is S = (2 × 0) − (12 + 02 + 02 + 02 ) = 0 − 1 = −1, and the score is negative. So we see that 
this score would have to include some additional “endowment” to ensure that the earnings are 
                                                 
 
57 Our experimental set-up only requires that our intervals are discrete integers between 0 and 9, but that is just a specific 
form of this set-up. Hence the derivations here apply to our experimental set-up. 
58 For instance, Andersen, Fountain, Harrison and Rutström [2014] show that behavior under a Linear Scoring Rule and 
QSR are behaviorally identical when applied to elicit subjective probabilities for binary events, after one undertakes 
calibration for the different effects of risk aversion and probability weighting on the two types of scoring rules. 
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positive. Assuming that the subject has very diffuse subjective beliefs and allocates 25% of the 
weight to each interval, the score is less than 1: S = (2 × ¼) − ((¼)2 + (¼)2 + (¼)2 + (¼)2 ) = ½ − 
¼ = ¼ < 1. So the tradeoff from the last case is that one can always ensure a score of ¼, but there 
is an incentive to provide less diffuse reports, and that incentive is the possibility of a score of 1. To 
ensure complete generality, and avoid any decision maker facing losses, allow some endowment, α, 
and scaling of the score, β. We then get the following scoring rule for each report in interval k 
α + β [ (2 × rk) − ∑i=1…K (ri )
2 ], 
where we initially assumed α=0 and β=1. We can assume α>0 and β>0 to get the payoffs to any 
positive level and units we want.  
Let pk represent the underlying, true, latent subjective probability of an individual for an 
outcome that falls into interval k. We restate Lemma 2 from Harrison and Ulm [2016]. This lemma 
allows us to backward induce the latent subjective beliefs by accounting for EUT or RDU risk 
preferences:  
Lemma 2: Let pk represent the underlying subjective probability of an individual for 
outcome k and let rk represent the reported probability for outcome k in a given scoring rule. Let 
θ(k) = α + β2r k - ∑i=1…K (ri )
2 be the scoring rule that determines earnings θ if state k occurs. Assume 
that the individual uses some probability weighting function ω(•), leading to decision weights w(•) 
defined in the standard decumulative fashion of  
 
wj = ω(pj + ... + pJ) - ω(pj+1 + ... + pJ) 
for j=1,... , J-1, and 
wj = ω(pj) 
for j=J, with the subscript j ranking outcomes from worst to best. Assume that the individual 
behaves consistently with RDU, applied to subjective probabilities. If the individual has a utility 
function u(•) that is continuous, twice differentiable, increasing and concave and maximizes rank-
dependent utility over weighted subjective probabilities, the actual and reported probabilities must 
obey the following system of equations: 
w(pk) × ∂u/∂θ |θ= θ(k) − ∑i=1, K { w(pj)× rj × ∂u/∂θ |θ= θ(j) } = 0, k = 1,…, K 
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 The implication of Lemma 2 is that we must estimate the risk preferences of an individual, 
allowing those to be RDU if that is appropriate. Since EUT is nested in RDU, Lemma 2 covers the 
case in which the subject does not, as an empirically significant matter, probability weight. Lemma 2 
then allows one to recover the latent subjective belief distribution implied by the QSR reports and 
the estimated risk preferences.  
3.3 Experimental Design 
Our experimental design has two essential tasks: one to elicit the risk preferences of the individual, 
and the other to elicit insurance choices. We varied the task eliciting insurance choices across three 
treatments. In the control treatment subjects were asked for their preferences on purchasing a 
simple indemnity insurance product that has no chance of default. In the non-performance (NP) 
treatment subjects are offered the same insurance choices except that now there is a probability of 
non-performance of the insurance company. In the subjective beliefs (SB) treatment an additional 
task is added to elicit subjective beliefs on the non-performance risk. All instructions are provided in 
Appendix A. At the end of each task, one choice is randomly selected from the task and played out 
for payment. 
3.3.1 Risky Lottery Choices 
Each subject was asked to make choices for each of 60 pairs of lotteries in the gain domain, 
designed to provide evidence of risk aversion as well as the tendency to make decisions consistently 
with EUT or RDU models. The battery is based on designs from Loomes and Sugden [1998] to test 
the CIA and designs from Harrison, Martínez-Correa and Swarthout [2015] to test the ROCL 
axiom. Each subject faced a randomized sequence of choices from this 60. The analysis of risk 
attitudes given these choices follows Harrison and Rutström [2008]. The typical interface used is 
shown in Figure 3.5, and all lottery pairs are documented in Appendix B.  
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Figure 3.5 Interface for Risk Aversion Lottery Choice 
 
 
 
 
 The key insight of the Loomes and Sugden [1998] design is to vary the “gradient” of the 
EUT-consistent indifference curves within a Marschak-Machina (MM) triangle.59 The reason for this 
design feature is to generate some choice patterns that are more powerful tests of EUT for any given 
risk attitude. Under EUT the slope of the indifference curve within a MM triangle is a measure of 
risk aversion. So there always exists some risk attitude such that the subject is indifferent, as stressed 
by Harrison [1994], and evidence of Common Ratio (CR) violations in that case has virtually zero 
power.60  
                                                 
 
59 In the MM triangle there are always one, two or three prizes in each lottery that have positive probability of occurring. 
The vertical axis in each panel shows the probability attached to the high prize of that triple, and the horizontal axis 
shows the probability attached to the low prize of that triple. So when the probability of the highest and lowest prize is 
zero, 100% weight falls on the middle prize. Any lotteries strictly in the interior of the MM triangle have positive weight 
on all three prizes, and any lottery on the boundary of the MM triangle has zero weight on one or two prizes. 
60 EUT does not, then, predict 50:50 choices, as some casually claim. It does say that the expected utility differences will 
not explain behavior, and that then allows all sorts of psychological factors to explain behavior. In effect, EUT has no 
prediction in this instance, and that is not the same as predicting an even split. 
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 The beauty of this design is that even if the risk attitude of the subject makes the tests of a 
CR violation from some sets of lottery pairs have low power, then the tests based on other sets of 
lottery pairs must have higher power for this subject. By presenting subjects with several such sets, 
varying the slope of the EUT-consistent indifference curve, one can be sure of having some tests for 
CR violations that have decent power for each subject, without having to know a priori what their 
risk attitude is. Harrison, Johnson, McInnes and Rutström [2007] refer to this as a “complementary 
slack experimental design,” since low-power tests of EUT in one set mean that there must be 
higher-power tests of EUT in another set. 
 
 A simple variant on these tests for a CR violation allow one to detect an empirically 
important pattern known as “boundary effects.” These effects arise when one nudges the lottery 
pairs in CR and Common Consequence tests of EUT into the interior of the MM triangle, or moves 
them significantly into the interior. The striking finding is that EUT often performs better when one 
does this. Actually, the evidence is mixed in interesting ways. Camerer [1992] generated a remarkable 
series of experiments in which EUT did very well for interior lottery choices, but his data was 
unfortunately from hypothetical choices. These lotteries were well off the border, and can be 
contrasted with those in Camerer [1989] that were on the border, and where there were significant 
EUT violations. But Harless [1992] found that just nudging the lotteries off the boundary did not 
improve behavior under EUT for real stakes. So one natural question is whether the CR tests lead to 
EUT not being rejected when we are in the interior triangle, and to EUT being rejected when we are 
have choices on the boundary. Our battery replicates several of the sets of boundary CR tests 
originally proposed by Loomes and Sugden [1998], but with all lotteries moved into the interior of 
the MM triangle: we include 15 lottery pairs based on Loomes and Sugden [1998] and a 
corresponding 15 lottery pairs that are interior variants of those 15 that are “on the border.”  
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 Harrison, Martínez-Correa and Swarthout [2015] designed a battery to test ROCL by posing 
lottery pairs that include an explicit compound lottery and a simple (non-compound) lottery. These 
lottery pairs have a corresponding set of pairs that replace the explicit compound lottery with its 
actuarially equivalent simple lottery. Thus a ROCL-consistent subject would make the same choices 
in the first and second set. The compound lotteries are constructed by visually presenting two simple 
lotteries, but having some “double or nothing” option for one of them. We employ 30 lottery pairs 
from this battery. 
 
Figure 3.6 Interface for Insurance Choice Without Non-Performance Risk 
 
 
3.3.2 Insurance Choices 
We are primarily interested in observing how subjects’ choices vary as the non-performance risk 
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varies across insurance choices, and how they compare to the traditional indemnity insurance 
product with no such risk studied by Harrison and Ng [2016]. In the control treatment subjects start 
with a $20 endowment and a 10% or 20% chance of losing $15. Each individual is offered 16 
choices, displayed in Table 3.1, where the premium of indemnity insurance with full coverage is 
varied from $0.50 to $4.70 in 7 increments, and for each premium decide if they want to purchase 
insurance or not. With the loss probability 0.1 (0.2) the actuarially fair premium is $1.50 ($3.00). The 
typical interface used is shown in Figure 3.6. 
 
Table 3.1 Insurance Contracts and Parameters in the Control Treatment 
 
Choice Premium ($)
Loss 
Probability
Initial 
Endowment 
($) Loss ($)
1 0.50 0.1 20 15
2 1.20 0.1 20 15
3 1.80 0.1 20 15
4 2.30 0.1 20 15
5 2.90 0.1 20 15
6 3.50 0.1 20 15
7 4.10 0.1 20 15
8 4.70 0.1 20 15
9 0.50 0.2 20 15
10 1.20 0.2 20 15
11 1.80 0.2 20 15
12 2.30 0.2 20 15
13 2.90 0.2 20 15
14 3.50 0.2 20 15
15 4.10 0.2 20 15
16 4.70 0.2 20 15  
 
  In the NP treatment we use a 2×2×4×2 framework for a total of 32 choices, displayed in 
Table 3.2. The solvency probability q takes on values 0.8 or 0.5, so the non-performance probability 
is 0.2 = 1-0.8 or 0.5 = 1-0.5; the repayment proportion τ takes on the values 0 and 0.4; the premium 
varies over $0.50, $1.20, $1.80 and $3.50; and the loss probability is either 0.1 or 0.2. The far right 
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column of Table 3.2 shows the actuarially fair premium, given the solvency probability, repayment 
proportion, and loss probability. The typical interface used is shown in Figure 3.7. Our subjects are 
unable to control the size of the CS from an insurance purchase by selecting a level of 
indemnification or deductible: their only margin of choice is the binary decision to purchase or not 
purchase the product. 
 
Figure 3.7 Interface for Insurance Choice With Non-Performance Risk 
 
 
 
 In the SB treatment we vary the loss probability, non-performance risk and premium in a 
2×2×8 framework for a total of 32 choices, displayed in Table 3.3. The loss probabilities and 
premium match those used in the control treatment, and the solvency probabilities used to elicit 
subjective beliefs were based on the solvency probabilities used in the NP treatment. The repayment 
proportion was set at 0 across all insurance choices in the SB treatment. The next section describes 
in more detail how the subjective beliefs of the non-performance risk were elicited. The typical 
interface used for this treatment is shown in Figure 3.8.  
 195 
 
Figure 3.8 Interface for Insurance Choice With Subjective Beliefs on Non-Performance 
 
 
 
 
 All of the insurance choices came before the risk aversion task, and were presented to each 
individual in an individually-randomized order rather than the order shown in the tables. The 
experiment was programmed and conducted with the z-Tree software developed by Fischbacher 
[2007]. 
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Table 3.2 Insurance Contracts and Parameters in the Non-Performance Treatment 
 
Choice
Solvency 
Probability
Repayment 
Proportion
Premium 
($)
Loss 
Probability
Initial 
Endowment 
($) Loss ($)
Actuarially 
Fair Premium 
($)
1 0.8 0 0.50 0.1 20 15 1.20
2 0.5 0 0.50 0.1 20 15 0.75
3 0.8 0.4 0.50 0.1 20 15 1.32
4 0.5 0.4 0.50 0.1 20 15 1.05
5 0.8 0 0.50 0.2 20 15 2.40
6 0.5 0 0.50 0.2 20 15 1.50
7 0.8 0.4 0.50 0.2 20 15 2.64
8 0.5 0.4 0.50 0.2 20 15 2.10
9 0.8 0 1.20 0.1 20 15 1.20
10 0.5 0 1.20 0.1 20 15 0.75
11 0.8 0.4 1.20 0.1 20 15 1.32
12 0.5 0.4 1.20 0.1 20 15 1.05
13 0.8 0 1.20 0.2 20 15 2.40
14 0.5 0 1.20 0.2 20 15 1.50
15 0.8 0.4 1.20 0.2 20 15 2.64
16 0.5 0.4 1.20 0.2 20 15 2.10
17 0.8 0 1.80 0.1 20 15 1.20
18 0.5 0 1.80 0.1 20 15 0.75
19 0.8 0.4 1.80 0.1 20 15 1.32
20 0.5 0.4 1.80 0.1 20 15 1.05
21 0.8 0 1.80 0.2 20 15 2.40
22 0.5 0 1.80 0.2 20 15 1.50
23 0.8 0.4 1.80 0.2 20 15 2.64
24 0.5 0.4 1.80 0.2 20 15 2.10
25 0.8 0 3.50 0.1 20 15 1.20
26 0.5 0 3.50 0.1 20 15 0.75
27 0.8 0.4 3.50 0.1 20 15 1.32
28 0.5 0.4 3.50 0.1 20 15 1.05
29 0.8 0 3.50 0.2 20 15 2.40
30 0.5 0 3.50 0.2 20 15 1.50
31 0.8 0.4 3.50 0.2 20 15 2.64
32 0.5 0.4 3.50 0.2 20 15 2.10  
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Table 3.3 Insurance Contracts and Parameters in the Subjective Beliefs Treatment 
 
Choice
Urn for 
Solvency 
Probability
Repayment 
Proportion Premium ($)
Loss 
Probability
Initial 
Endowment 
($) Loss ($)
Actuarially 
Fair Premium 
($)
1 A 0 0.50 0.1 20 15 1.20
2 B 0 0.50 0.1 20 15 0.75
3 A 0 0.50 0.2 20 15 2.40
4 B 0 0.50 0.2 20 15 1.50
5 A 0 1.80 0.1 20 15 1.20
6 B 0 1.80 0.1 20 15 0.75
7 A 0 1.80 0.2 20 15 2.40
8 B 0 1.80 0.2 20 15 1.50
9 A 0 2.90 0.1 20 15 1.20
10 B 0 2.90 0.1 20 15 0.75
11 A 0 2.90 0.2 20 15 2.40
12 B 0 2.90 0.2 20 15 1.50
13 A 0 4.10 0.1 20 15 1.20
14 B 0 4.10 0.1 20 15 0.75
15 A 0 4.10 0.2 20 15 2.40
16 B 0 4.10 0.2 20 15 1.50
17 A 0 1.20 0.1 20 15 1.20
18 B 0 1.20 0.1 20 15 0.75
19 A 0 1.20 0.2 20 15 2.40
20 B 0 1.20 0.2 20 15 1.50
21 A 0 2.30 0.1 20 15 1.20
22 B 0 2.30 0.1 20 15 0.75
23 A 0 2.30 0.2 20 15 2.40
24 B 0 2.30 0.2 20 15 1.50
25 A 0 3.50 0.1 20 15 1.20
26 B 0 3.50 0.1 20 15 0.75
27 A 0 3.50 0.2 20 15 2.40
28 B 0 3.50 0.2 20 15 1.50
29 A 0 4.70 0.1 20 15 1.20
30 B 0 4.70 0.1 20 15 0.75
31 A 0 4.70 0.2 20 15 2.40
32 B 0 4.70 0.2 20 15 1.50  
3.3.3 Subjective Beliefs 
The non-performance risk in the SB treatment is provided as an uncertain distribution in order to 
elicit subjects’ subjective beliefs on the probability of the insurance company not paying out in the 
event of a loss. The probability of non-performance is represented by the proportion of red balls in 
an urn filled with red and white balls. We present subjects with two urns, one with 20 red balls and 
80 white balls and the other with 50 red balls and 50 white balls, to represent the solvency 
probabilities of 0.8 and 0.5 respectively. The urns are covered, and subjects are not given the 
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distribution of balls in each urn. Prior to each belief elicitation, we draw 9 balls from each urn and 
reveal to the subjects the sample distribution of 9 balls drawn from each urn. This is the only 
information subjects receive regarding the distribution of balls in each urn, prior to the initial belief 
elicitation. The number of red balls drawn out of 9 balls drawn represents the probability of non-
performance of the insurance company, and we ask subjects for their beliefs on the number of red 
balls drawn out of the 9 balls drawn for each urn. Subjects allocate their tokens into 10 bins 
according to their beliefs on the distribution of the number of red balls drawn, where each bin 
represents the number of red balls drawn ranging from 0 to 9. A sample of the interface used is 
shown in Figure 9. Payouts for each bin are calculated using QSR described previously in section 
3.2.3 with  =  = 25. Earnings for this task range from $0 to $50. 
 
Figure 3.9 Interface of Subjective Beliefs   
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 The beliefs task was presented to the subjects before the insurance task. There were two 
rounds of the beliefs task and insurance task conducted in the SB treatment, to allow for updating of 
beliefs. The 32 choices in the insurance task were split into half. Choices 1 to 16 were presented in 
the first half in a randomized order, and choices 17 to 32 were presented in the second half in a 
randomized order to allow for an even spread of premium variability between the two halves. 
3.4 Experimental Evidence 
3.4.1 Risk Preferences 
Overall, the proportion of model classifications as EUT or RDU is similar to previous experiments 
with this population. Figure 3.10 displays the classifications, based on tests of the null hypothesis 
that ω(p) = p and a 5% significance level. These estimates and hypothesis tests are undertaken for 
each subject. Slightly over half the subjects are classified as EUT, with the next most common model 
being the RDU specification with a Prelec probability-weighting function. 
 
Figure 3.10 Classifying Subjects as EUT or RDU 
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 It is important that we assign the appropriate model of risk preferences to each subject, since 
the model classification influences the expected welfare calculated for each insurance choice. To 
illustrate, consider subject #70. The risk parameters were estimated based on his choices on lotteries 
in the risk task, and are displayed in Figure 3.11. If subject #70 was classified as EUT, he would be 
risk averse with a modestly concave utility function (r = 0.60). However, the preferred model is 
based on the log-likelihood and the hypothesis test that ω(p) = p, and for subject #70 that is the 
RDU model with the Prelec probability weighting function. Classifying subject #70 as RDU (Prelec) 
means the utility function is more concave (r=0.90), and the probability weighting function implies 
that the subject will overweight the better outcomes since it has a characteristically “optimistic” 
shape. Hence the subject would overestimate the probability of not experiencing a loss, and would be 
willing to pay a lower premium to purchase the insurance. This overweighting of the probability of 
no loss offsets the increase in risk aversion attributable to the more concave utility function under 
RDU, compared to when the risk premium is characterized entirely by curvature of the utility 
function under EUT. 
 
Figure 3.11 Estimated Risk Parameters for Subject #70 
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 Figures 3.12 and 3.13 illustrate the importance of this classification for the welfare 
calculations of subject #70. Each chart shows the CS calculated for each insurance choice made by 
subject #70. Light blue bars indicate that subject had chosen to purchase insurance and red bars 
indicate that subject had chosen not to purchase insurance. Figure 3.12 shows the CS distribution if 
we had assumed subject #70 had EUT risk preferences, and Figure 3.13 shows the CS distribution 
assuming subject #70 had RDU risk preferences with Prelec probability weighting function, the 
preferred model. Different models of risk preference type can lead to different insurance decisions 
being recommended. For choices 1 through 4 under EUT, subject #70’s choices 1 and 3 to 
purchase insurance resulted in a positive CS, while choices 2 and 4 to not purchase insurance 
resulted in a negative CS. Under RDU, however, the expected welfare gains from these same choices 
are reversed: choices 1 and 3 resulted in a negative CS, while choices 2 and 4 resulted in a positive 
CS. Similarly for choices 9, 11 to 16 and choices 21 to 24: choices to purchase insurance resulted in 
positive CS under EUT but negative CS under RDU, while choices not to purchase insurance 
resulted in negative CS under EUT but positive CS under RDU. 
 
Figure 3.12 Consumer Surplus of Choices of Subject #70 
EUT Risk Preferences 
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Figure 3.13 Consumer Surplus of Choices of Subject #70 
RDU (Prelec) Risk Preferences 
 
 
 Using a different model of risk preference type can also impact the size of the expected 
welfare gain from an insurance choice, and not just the sign. Choices 5 and 6 to take up insurance 
are more beneficial when subject #70 is classified as EUT compared to RDU (Prelec). Similarly 
choices 7 and 8 to not take up insurance are more detrimental when subject #70 is classified as EUT 
compared to RDU (Prelec). Again, subject #70 made one set of choices over the risky lotteries, so it 
is the classification of latent preferences given those choices that is driving these differences in 
implied CS. Structural theory is essential to making the correct calculations about the sign and size 
of welfare. 
3.4.2 Insurance Take-Up 
The overall distribution of insurance choices is displayed in Figure 3.14. We define a “correct” 
choice as one in which the subject makes the choice to purchase or not purchase the insurance 
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product on offer that is predicted by correctly applying the risk preferences we estimate for that subject.61 In 
other words, if the certainty-equivalent of the consumer surplus is positive when purchasing the 
insurance product, the “correct” decision is to purchase it; otherwise, the “correct” decision is not to 
purchase it.62 
 
Figure 3.14 Proportion of Actual Take-Up to Predicted Choices for All Subjects 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
61 These calculations employ the point estimates of the preferred specification of risk preferences for each subject. 
Harrison and Ng [2016; p.110ff.] demonstrate how to allow for the sampling distribution of these estimates. Assuming a 
multivariate normal distribution on the estimated risk parameters, 500 draws on the risk parameters for each individual 
can be used to calculate the expected CS for each decision. Each decision can be tested to determine if it was statistically 
significantly “incorrect.” In other words, for decisions where insurance was actually purchased, was the expected CS 
significantly negative? And if insurance was not actually purchased, was the expected CS significantly positive? Even 
after allowing for bootstrapping of the calculated welfare, the conclusion remained the same. Comparable findings apply 
to our results when one uses the same methods, and in fact we find a stronger effect from the non-performance risk 
treatment. In the control we find that 73% of the choices where take-up was predicted actually occurred, whereas only 
51% actually occurred in the case of non-performance risk. 
62 We use quotation marks for the word correct here, because our definition rests on theory and econometric inference 
about the risk preferences of individuals, and both of those might be wrong. But we firmly reject the view that one can 
determine what a correct insurance purchase decision is in the absence of some assumed theoretical and econometric 
structure. 
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 Subjects generally make the “correct” choice to purchase insurance when take-up is 
predicted, and to not purchase insurance when take-up is not predicted. Overall 63% of the choices 
are “correct” choices. There appears to be no significant pattern when the estimated risk preferences 
predict that the subject should not purchase insurance (the right panel). A Fisher Exact test indicates 
that one can claim that these patterns of correct and incorrect decisions are significantly different 
across the two take-up predictions. 
 This pattern persists across our treatments, with two slight differences.  The first difference 
across the treatments is that, conditional on take-up being predicted, 72% of choices in the control 
treatment with no mention of non-performance risk made the “correct” choice to purchase 
insurance, but in the treatment with non-performance risk only 57% of the insurance choices to 
purchase insurance are “correct.” Overall 70% of choices in the control treatment are “correct,” 
whereas only 60% of the choices in the treatment with non-performance risk are “correct.” A Fisher 
Exact test shows that the percentage of choices that result in positive CS is significantly different 
across treatments. The second difference is that 60% of the control treatment choices involved the 
purchase of insurance, but only 49% of the non-performance treatment choices involved the 
purchase of insurance. Using a Fisher Exact test, this second difference shows that the presence of 
non-performance risk significantly decreases the take-up of insurance. The breakdown of 
distribution of insurance choices by treatment can be found in Appendix C. 
3.4.3 Consumer Surplus and Efficiency 
The breakdown by treatment of actual choices compared to predicted choice provides an initial 
insight into potential welfare losses. But it does not weight these correct choices and incorrect 
choices: it is possible that all of the mistakes are de minimus in the sense that they entail minuscule 
losses in consumer surplus, and that the correct choices garner substantial consumer surplus, or vice 
versa. To address this issue we have to calculate and compare consumer surplus from all choices. 
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 In Figure 3.15 we compare the distribution of expected CS calculated from each insurance 
choice made in the control treatment to the expected CS calculated from each insurance choice 
made in the treatment with non-performance risk. The average CS in the control is indeed 
statistically significantly greater than the average CS in the treatment with non-performance risk, 
with a t-test showing a p-value < 0.01. It is important to stress that the mere existence of non-
performance risk per se does not lower consumer surplus, although it might mean that there is less 
consumer surplus possible from correct choices. 
 
Figure 3.15 Consumer Surplus Distribution 
 
 
 
 A more informative metric in this case is efficiency, defined as the sum of the actual CS each 
subject earns from all their insurance choices as a ratio of the total CS they could have earned if they 
had made every choice consistently with their risk preferences. The efficiency metric was developed 
by Plott and Smith [1978], and is defined at the level of the individual subject, whereas the expected 
CS is defined at the level of each choice by each subject. Efficiency provides a natural normalization 
of expected CS by comparing to the maximal expected CS that choice and subject. Both metrics are 
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of interest, and are complementary. Figure 3.16 displays the efficiency comparisons, with the same 
conclusion as with the CS comparisons: the control leads to significantly greater efficiency over the 
treatment with non-performance risk.  
 
Figure 3.16 Comparison of Efficiency Distribution 
 
 
3.4.4 Factors Affecting Welfare 
A regression analysis is useful in understanding what is driving the typical differences in the 
efficiency of insurance contracts in the presence of non-performance risk. We are interested in the 
impact of parameters that vary across insurance choices, which are the solvency probability, the 
recovery fraction, the loss probability, and the premium. We are also interested in how demographic 
characteristics of our subjects might influence their welfare choices.63 
                                                 
 
63 Knowing which demographic groups seem to need help with these insurance decisions could help in the design of 
normative policies. However, this guidance need not take the form of targeting certain demographic groups, which could 
run afoul of social and legal anti-discrimination policies. It could be as simple as over-sampling subjects in surveys 
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 One natural characteristic to also look at is how a subject’s behavior with respect to the 
ROCL axiom influences the welfare from choices over compound lotteries, which is what non-
performance risk entails. We measure violations of the ROCL axiom non-parametrically by making 
use of the 15 ROCL lottery pairs in our risk battery. Each subject was given 15 lottery choices 
between a simple lottery and a compound lottery, as well as 15 corresponding lottery choices 
between the same simple lottery and a simple lottery that was actuarially-equivalent to that 
compound lottery. If the subject was making ROCL-consistent choices, the choices in each lottery 
pair would match: either choose the simple lottery in both choices or choose the compound and 
actuarially-equivalent lottery. We count the number of pairs out of the 15 that each subject does not 
make these ROCL-consistent choices as a measure of the degree to which each subject deviates 
from the ROCL axiom. This method of measuring compound risk preferences does not differentiate 
between compound-loving or compound-risk averse preferences, and only measures if the lottery 
choice deviates from ROCL or not.  
 We use CS calculated for each insurance choice, as well as the efficiency of each subject, to 
estimate expected welfare gain from insurance. We also look at efficiency at the choice level 
(Choice), which is simply a binary variable indicating whether or not the “correct” choice was made 
to purchase insurance if it is expected to have positive welfare compared to the status quo, or not to 
purchase insurance if it is expected to have negative welfare compared to the status quo. Finally we 
also compare the results for the three welfare metrics to the results on take-up. Since Take-up and 
Choice are binary variables, a random effects probit model is used to measure the average marginal 
probability of insurance factors. Since CS is continuous, a random effects linear regression is used to 
measure the average marginal effect. A beta regression is applied to efficiency to measure the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
designed to assess the effects of regulatory policies, directing the dissemination of non-discriminatory information to 
different media, and so on. 
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average marginal probability, since efficiency is a continuous variable between 0 and 1.64 
 Table 3.4 presents these regression results. We find that repayment percentage, premium and 
loss probability all significantly affect take-up of the insurance product, in the a priori prediction 
directions.65 However, as Figure 3.14 makes apparent, take-up is most definitely not the same thing 
as welfare, which is what we are interested in. 
 The CS measure of welfare reflects a significant effect of repayment percentage, which is to 
be expected since repayment simply increases the potential expected payment in the event of a loss, 
ceteris paribus the premium. This is, again, why the efficiency measure is more informative for the 
evaluation of non-performance risk. The most striking finding is that efficiency is significantly and 
negatively impacted by the ROCL violation count, our proxy for each subject’s inconsistency with the 
ROCL axiom. To reverse signs, for each decrease in the violation count, which is an improvement in the 
ROCL consistency of decision-making, a subject is on average 1.4% more likely to make a “correct” 
choice (p-value = 0.040) that increases CS of that choice by $0.08 (p-value = 0.001) and increases the 
subject’s efficiency by 1.9% (p-value = 0.002). The same qualitative result is found by Harrison, 
Martínez-Correa, Ng and Swarthout [2016] with a comparable subject pool and experimental design 
with symmetric non-performance risk of the type found in an index insurance contract.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
64 Because all but one of these regression models are non-linear in the estimated parameters, it is possible for the margin, 
which is the derivative of the prediction function, to be greater than 1 due to numerical approximation. 
65 The effect of solvency probability has a p-value of 0.086, and the other factors have much lower p-values of 0.004 or 
less. 
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Table 3.4 Factors Affecting Welfare With Non-Performance Risk  
 
Take-up Choice CS Efficiency
Risk Aversion -0.0575 -0.0122 0.0733 0.0287
(0.622) (0.813) (0.667) (0.586)
(Risk Aversion)^2 -0.0139 0.00411 0.0313 0.0128
(0.820) (0.869) (0.731) (0.627)
Solvency Probability 0.196 0.141 0.374
(0.091) (0.157) (0.428)
Repayment percentage 0.272** 0.104 0.784*
(0.004) (0.228) (0.027)
Premium -0.0790*** 0.0594* 0.134*
(<0.001) (0.030) (0.046)
Loss Probability 0.855*** -0.114 0.151
(<0.001) (0.751) (0.915)
ROCL Violation Count 0.000115 -0.0138* -0.0773** -0.0194**
(0.994) (0.040) (0.001) (0.002)
Young -0.391** -0.0971 -0.575* -0.160
(0.003) (0.323) (0.020) (0.064)
Female 0.0504 0.0368 0.241* 0.0613
(0.649) (0.395) (0.022) (0.192)
Black 0.137 -0.0496 -0.317** -0.112*
(0.242) (0.382) (0.004) (0.038)
Asian -0.0639 0.0707 0.148 0.0383
(0.588) (0.175) (0.309) (0.480)
Business Major -0.108 0.0277 0.171 0.0477
(0.259) (0.625) (0.116) (0.404)
Freshman 0.0721 0.0520 0.191* 0.0575
(0.402) (0.213) (0.018) (0.196)
Senior -0.0659 0.0521 0.211 0.0725
(0.474) (0.176) (0.060) (0.079)
High GPA 0.153* -0.0179 -0.127 -0.0182
(0.031) (0.661) (0.369) (0.663)
Christian -0.225* 0.114 0.308** 0.113
(0.017) (0.084) (0.003) (0.061)
Insured 0.0726 -0.00314 0.0206 -0.00458
(0.447) (0.942) (0.870) (0.908)
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.05    ** p<0.01    *** p<0.001
Average marginal effects of appropriate regression models
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 Our results also show that there is an effect of age and race on the efficiency of insurance 
choices subject to non-performance risk. Younger subjects are more likely to make less efficient 
choices, as are black subjects. On the other hand, formal education, as measured by higher GPA, has 
no significant effect on the efficiency of decisions. Christians tend to make choices with higher 
expected welfare gain with respect to non-performance risk. This result, for downside non-
performance risk, stands in stark contrast to the significantly worse decisions Christians make in both 
CS and efficiency terms when faced with symmetric non-performance risk of the type found in an 
index insurance contract (see Harrison, Martínez-Correa, Ng and Swarthout [2016; Table F5]). In 
“carrot and stick” terms, it is as if the pure strategy frame of eternal damnation by itself has a greater 
behavioral effect on motivation than the mixed-strategy frame of eternal damnation and the promise 
of eternal salvation. These same results hold when we consider the marginal effects at the mean of 
the covariates, instead of the average marginal effects.   
3.4.5 Recursive Methodology 
Non-performance risk is a compound risk, as it is the risk of the insurance company defaulting in 
the event there is a payout in addition to the risk of a loss occurring. When the decision to purchase 
insurance involves a compound risk, we should consider how an individual’s adherence to the 
ROCL axiom impacts the welfare of their insurance choices. To do so we should obviously not 
assume ROCL when calculating the expected welfare gain of insurance choices.  
 We relax this assumption by using two models: the source-dependent EUT model used in 
Harrison, Martínez-Correa and Swarthout [2015] and the recursive RDU model from Segal 
[1988][1990]. We use a source-dependent EUT model that allows for an individual to have one risk 
attitude for a simple lottery and a different risk attitude for a compound lottery, and a recursive 
RDU model that calculates the CE of the second-stage lottery before replacing the second-stage 
lottery with the CE to calculate the CE of the first stage lottery. A more detailed explanation of 
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these two methods of calculating expected welfare gain can be found in Harrison, Martínez-Correa, 
Ng and Swarthout [2016]. 
 
Risk Preferences 
 Figure 3.17 shows the classification of individuals using the two models. This figure should be 
compared with Figure 3.10 where ROCL is assumed. A higher proportion of subjects are classified 
as source-dependent EUT (sdEUT). Only 13% of subjects are classified as recursive RDU (rRDU) 
with the Prelec probability weighting function. Since the sdEUT model cannot be nested in the 
rRDU model, non-nested hypothesis tests such as the Vuong test and Clarke test were used to 
determine if the sdEUT or rRDU model was a better fit.  
 
Figure 3.17 Classifying Subjects as Source-Dependent EUT or Recursive RDU  
Without Assuming ROCL 
 
 
  We also tested the impact of using the recursive methodology instead of the standard 
methodology. Assuming all subjects were classified as EUT, we tested if the risk aversion parameter 
for compound risks was equal to the risk aversion parameter for simple risks. Figure 3.18 shows that 
only 9% of subjects had choices that used significantly different levels of risk aversion for simple 
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risks and compound risks at a 5% significance level. Hence the sdEUT model effectively collapses to 
the EUT model for the majority of subjects. 
 
Figure 3.18 Tests of Source Independence of EUT 
 
 
Comparison of Insurance Take-Up 
 Relaxing ROCL in the calculation of welfare does not change our conclusions on the distribution of 
insurance choices (Figure 3.19). The movement of insurance choice count between buckets is small, 
and the largest shift is from choices to take-up insurance: the number of insurance choices that 
matched the prediction to take-up insurance decreased by 41, from 713 to 672. Relaxing ROCL 
changes the “sign” of the expected welfare benefits. If the sign assuming ROCL is positive 
(negative) but changes to negative (positive) when relaxing ROCL, then the choice will switch from 
predicted to take-up (not take-up) to predicted to not take-up (take-up). The results show that when 
we relax the ROCL assumption, there is a net shift in predicted choices from taking up insurance to 
not taking up insurance.  
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Figure 3.19 Proportion of Actual Take-Up to Predicted Choices for All Subjects 
Without Assuming ROCL 
 
 
 
Figure 3.20 Comparison of Consumer Surplus Distribution, Without Assuming ROCL 
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Figure 3.21 Comparison of Efficiency Distribution, Without Assuming ROCL 
 
 
Comparison of Consumer Surplus and Efficiency 
 When we relax the ROCL assumption, Figures 3.20 and 3.21 respective show that the CS of 
insurance choices and efficiency of subjects’ choices are statistically significantly lower in the 
treatment with non-performance risk than in the control treatment. This result matches the 
conclusion when ROCL was assumed to calculate the expected welfare gain of purchasing insurance.  
 Once again we look to an individual’s welfare benefits from choices on insurance to illustrate 
the impact of relaxing the ROCL assumption. Figures 3.22 and 3.23 show the calculated CS for each 
insurance choice based on the risk model estimated for subject #58 with and without the ROCL 
assumption, respectively. When ROCL is assumed, subject #58 is classified as EUT with risk neutral 
risk preferences. When we relax the ROCL assumption, however, subject #58 is classified as 
recursive RDU with a Prelec probability weighting function with a slightly concave utility function 
and a probability function that underweighs extreme outcomes.  
 When we relax the ROCL assumption, the choice to not purchase insurance in choices 1 to 
4, 11, 13 to 16, 21, 23 and 24 go from being “incorrect” to “correct.” For other choices such as 
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choices 17 to 20 and 29 to 32, we still infer that the decision to not purchase insurance resulted in 
positive expected welfare benefits when we relax the ROCL assumption. However, those benefits 
are greater for these decisions when the ROCL assumption is relaxed. This is also seen in the 
efficiency calculated for subject #58, which is only 0.31 if ROCL is assumed but 0.92 if it is not. 
Again, the persistent theme here is that latent, structural theory is needed to get the correct welfare 
evaluations. 
Figure 3.22 Consumer Surplus of Choices of Subject #58 
EUT Risk Preferences 
 
Figure 3.23 Consumer Surplus of Choices of Subject #58 
Recursive RDU (Prelec) Risk Preferences 
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Factors Affecting Welfare 
Again, we can see the variation in the calculated expected welfare benefits with and without the 
ROCL assumption in the results of the regression analysis. Table 3.5 shows the regression results 
assuming subjects have source-dependent EUT preferences. Actuarial parameters such as repayment 
percentage, loss probability and premium in the non-performance treatment still significantly impact 
take-up of insurance without significantly impacting the welfare of the insurance choices. When we 
remove the ROCL assumption to calculate expected welfare benefits, however, we see that subjects’ 
consistency with ROCL no longer significantly impacts the welfare measures of “correct” choice, CS 
of choices or efficiency of subjects’ choices. Age, race and religion no longer significantly impact the 
efficiency of insurance choices.  
 Another natural characteristic of interest is a subject’s attitude towards risk. We include a 
variable for the level of risk aversion for each subject, which is the risk parameter r, estimated 
assuming all subjects have CRRA utility functions and behave according to EUT. In this respect we 
only use EUT descriptively, to provide a measure of the overall risk aversion of the subject, and not 
to claim that the subject is best characterized by EUT. We stress that these risk aversion 
characteristics are being considered heuristically here, since they are point estimates from a 
distribution and not data. For this reason we present the results of considering them separately. The 
average marginal effects for all other variables were calculated excluding the point estimates for risk 
attitudes. When we relax the ROCL assumption, we see that risk aversion increases our welfare 
measures of CS of choices and efficiency of subjects’ choices.  
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Table 3.5 Factors Affecting Welfare With Non-Performance Risk Without Assuming ROCL 
 
Take-up Choice CS Efficiency
Risk Aversion -0.139 0.139 0.482*** 0.203***
(0.108) (0.991) (<0.001) (<0.001)
(Risk Aversion)^2 0.454 0.000857 -0.00280 -0.0660
(0.058) (0.993) (0.992) (0.312)
Solvency Probability 0.183 0.136 0.529
(0.134) (0.140) (0.258)
Repayment percentage 0.277** 0.0395 0.266
(0.005) (0.546) (0.449)
Premium -0.0801*** 0.0317 0.0920
(<0.001) (0.273) (0.204)
Loss Probability 0.857*** 0.129 1.321
(0.001) (0.725) (0.347)
ROCL Violation Count 0.00434 0.0164 -0.00313 -0.00701
(0.767) (0.311) (0.851) (0.481)
Young -0.401** -0.0511 -0.268 -0.111
(0.002) (0.432) (0.205) (0.057)
Female 0.0179 -0.0745 -0.143 -0.0455
(0.878) (0.170) (0.093) (0.461)
Black 0.146 -0.0249 -0.119 -0.0422
(0.223) (0.622) (0.189) (0.459)
Asian -0.00902 0.0609 0.117 0.0511
(0.935) (0.205) (0.247) (0.311)
Business Major -0.0802 0.0193 0.126 0.0573
(0.415) (0.695) (0.092) (0.258)
Freshman 0.0493 -0.0179 0.103 0.0568
(0.596) (0.777) (0.172) (0.250)
Senior -0.109 -0.00826 0.0973 0.0688
(0.255) (0.853) (0.327) (0.109)
High GPA 0.168* 0.0871 0.0827 0.0129
(0.014) (0.245) (0.528) (0.782)
Christian -0.229* 0.00575 0.0575 0.0394
(0.011) (0.906) (0.567) (0.497)
Insured 0.0743 -0.0543 -0.0897 -0.0408
(0.464) (0.287) (0.420) (0.428)
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.05    ** p<0.01    *** p<0.001
Average marginal effects of appropriate regression models
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 The difference in results when we use the standard methodology and when we use the 
recursive methodology that relaxes the ROCL axiom shows the importance of using the correct 
methodology to evaluate welfare. When we relax the ROCL axiom to evaluate welfare, we find that 
making decisions consistent with the ROCL axiom no longer significantly improves welfare. Instead 
level of risk aversion is now the factor that significantly increases our welfare measures. Using the 
inappropriate methodology could have policy implications. If the standard methodology was used to 
evaluate the welfare of choices made by this subject pool on insurance with non-performance risk, 
policies to improve welfare would have focused on educating consumers on how to make ROCL-
consistent choices. Using the recursive methodology to evaluate the expected welfare gain of 
insurance choices with non-performance risk would change the focus to policies that promote such 
insurance to the more risk averse, and consider other risk management strategies for the less risk 
averse.  
3.4.6 Subjective Beliefs 
Solvency Probabilities 
 When we allow for non-performance risk to be measured by subjects’ beliefs on the 
distribution of balls drawn from a cage, the risk of contract non-performance is represented by the 
weighted average of the number of red balls the subject believes that will be drawn from the cage. 
Solvency risk is then simply 1 less the default risk. Using the weighted average of balls based on the 
subjective beliefs requires that we assume ROCL. The subject’s beliefs also depend on their risk 
preferences. It is known from Winkler and Murphy [1970] that risk aversion can affect the incentives 
to correctly report true subjective probability. We account for this by using the risk preferences, 
probability weighting parameters and winning decision-making model estimated for each subject in 
the risk task to induce the latent probability distribution in the beliefs task (Harrison and Ulm 
[2016]). We do not consider uncertainty aversion in our analysis, since we do not consider the spread 
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of subjects’ beliefs, but that can be a natural immediate extension of our analysis.  
 The solvency probability may also be measured as the probability inferred from the 
distribution of balls in the sample draws of balls from the urns during the experiment. If we assume 
that the probabilities are updated in the second draw perfectly using Bayesian probability theory, 
there is a solvency probability that is objective across all subjects that represents the information the 
subjects were provided with. We assume that all subjects start out with a diffuse prior, and update 
their beliefs based on the results of each sample draw using Bayes rule. Since we are asking for 
beliefs on the number of red balls when we draw 9 balls from an urn without replacement, the 
likelihood follows a hypergeometric distribution, which means the conjugate prior follows a beta-
binomial distribution. Hence we use the mean for a beta-binomial distribution to calculate the 
solvency probability from the sample draws of balls from the urns. The actual draws for each urn for 
both sample draws in both sessions conducted can be found in Appendix D.  
 Finally, the solvency probability can also be measured as the non-performance risks that 
determined the composition of red and white balls in each urn. Urn A was filled with 20 red balls 
and 80 white balls which represents a solvency probability of 0.8, and urn be was filled with 50 red 
balls and 50 white balls which represents a solvency probability of 0.5. These population solvency 
probabilities correspond with the solvency probabilities used in the NP treatment, where the 
probabilities were just given to the subjects and treated as known.  
 Table 3.6 shows the distribution of the three different ways of measuring solvency 
probability. The subjective solvency probability here is the average subjective probability across all 
subjects. The probabilities from the actual draws did not stray too far from the population 
probabilities. The largest deviation is for Urn B in the second draw in the second session which is 
15% higher than the population probability. The subjective probabilities for urn B following that 
draw were higher accordingly. The average subjective solvency probabilities for Urn A are higher 
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than that subjective solvency probabilities for Urn B, but the difference is not as great as the 
difference in solvency probabilities from the sample draws. The subjective probabilities are closer to 
0.5. Uncertain subjects will want to spread out their tokens more which would bring the weighted 
average of their beliefs closer to 0.5.  
 Although we are for now only considering the weighted average in our subjective beliefs 
analysis, we also look at the percentage of subjects that allocated tokens in each bin for each beliefs 
elicitation question. Each bin represents a number of red balls out of nine balls that could have been 
drawn from the urn, as per the sample display shown in Figure 3.9. The detailed allocation to each 
bin can be found in Appendix D. It shows that the beliefs of the subjects were quite spread out 
across the bins. Generally the modal allocation in Urn B was higher than the modal allocation in Urn 
A. This corresponds to the distribution of balls in each urn.  
 
Table 3.6 Summary of Solvency Probabilities 
 
Session 1
Draw Population Sample
Subjects' 
Beliefs (Ave)
Subjects' 
Beliefs (SD) Population Sample
Subjects' 
Beliefs (Ave)
Subjects' 
Beliefs (SD)
1 0.8 0.7 0.63 0.11 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.1
2 0.8 0.75 0.66 0.11 0.5 0.5 0.55 0.09
Session 2
Draw Population Sample
Subjects' 
Beliefs (Ave)
Subjects' 
Beliefs (SD) Population Sample
Subjects' 
Beliefs (Ave)
Subjects' 
Beliefs (SD)
1 0.8 0.9 0.69 0.14 0.5 0.6 0.58 0.07
2 0.8 0.85 0.68 0.14 0.5 0.65 0.62 0.09
Urn A Urn B
Urn A Urn B
 
 
Varying Solvency Probabilities in SB treatment 
 We consider the impact of using different methods to represent solvency probability on the 
expected welfare gain of subjects’ insurance choices in the SB treatment. The three solvency 
probabilities are the population solvency probability which is either 0.8 or 0.5, the posterior 
probabilities based on the actual sample draw of balls from the urns assuming perfect application of 
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Bayes rule, and the subjective beliefs on solvency estimated for each individual which is represented 
by the weighted average of the distribution of their beliefs on the outcome adjusted for their risk 
preferences.  
 Figure 3.24 compares the distribution of efficiency of the insurance choices, calculated using 
the population probabilities, to the distribution of efficiency of the insurance choices calculated 
using the posterior probabilities based on the sample draws from the urn. This allows us to see the 
effect that the uncertain draws had on our predicted results. Figure 3.25 compares the efficiency 
distribution when the posterior probabilities from the sample draws are used to the efficiency 
distribution when the subjective beliefs based on subjects’ token allocations are used. This allows us 
to see the impact of each subject’s behavior, where “behavior” here refers to the process each 
subject used to update their prior beliefs, which might not have followed Bayes’ rule.  
 Figures 3.24 and 3.25 show that neither the impact of using uncertain draws to represent 
solvency probability nor the impact of subjective beliefs on solvency probability have a statistically 
significant impact on the distribution of the estimated efficiency of subjects’ insurance choices. This 
shows that although the solvency probabilities differ, as explained in the previous section, the 
numerical impact of using different solvency probabilities to estimate expected welfare gain from 
insurance is not the cause of difference in expected welfare gain observed across treatments. As 
discussed below, the regression analysis will show that the difference between the subjective 
solvency probabilities and the solvency probabilities based on the urn draws do not significantly 
impact efficiency. 
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Figure 3.24 Comparison of Efficiency Distribution for Population 
and Sample Solvency Risks 
 
 
 
Figure 3.25 Comparison of Efficiency Distribution for Subjective 
and Sample Solvency Risks 
 
 
 
Impact on Expected Welfare Gain between Treatments 
 Figure 3.26 shows the distribution of decision-making models based on the risk preferences 
elicited in the risk task in the SB treatment. It is similar to the distribution for subjects in the NP 
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treatment. 
Figure 3.26 Classifying SB Subjects as EUT or RDU 
 
 
 Figure 3.27 shows the distribution of the actual insurance choices made in the SB treatment 
to the predicted choices based on the CS calculated from their estimated risk preferences and 
subjective solvency probabilities. There is a larger proportion of insurance choices in the SB 
treatment where subjects are predicted not to take-up insurance, as compared to the control 
treatment of the NP treatment. This is due to the factors of insurance choices in the SB treatment 
that contain both the higher premiums used in the control treatment and the non-performance risk 
used in the NP treatment.  
 The focus of Figure 3.27, however, should be on the proportion of “correct” and 
“incorrect” choices. The overall proportion of choices in the SB treatment that are “correct” is 59%: 
insurance was purchased when it was predicted to be purchased, and insurance was not purchased 
when it was predicted to not be purchased. Conditional on take-up predicted, the proportion of 
choices in the SB treatment that are “correct” is 57%. These proportions are very similar to the 
proportions in the NP treatment, which were 60% and 57% respectively. These proportions still 
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hold even if we only compared the insurance choices with actuarial parameters that are common 
across all three treatments.66   
 
Figure 3.27 Proportion of Actual Take-Up to Predicted Choices (SB) 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.28 compares the distribution of CS of insurance choices in the SB treatment to the 
distribution of CS of insurance choices in the NP treatment. Although the average CS in the SB 
treatment is not statistically significantly different from the average CS in the NP treatment, the 
distribution of CS in the SB treatment is more spread out than the distribution of CS in the NP 
treatment. A significantly different distribution of CS in the SB treatment would indicate that 
allowing subjective beliefs would result in significantly different welfare estimated for purchasing 
choices on insurance than if we assumed the population solvency risks.  
 The distribution on efficiency shows similar results, shown in Figure 3.29. Although a t-test 
shows that the average efficiency of each subject’s insurance choices is not significantly different 
                                                 
 
66 There were a total of 16 choices with loss probability of 10% and 20%, premium of $0.50, $1.20, $1.80, and $3.50, 
solvency probability of 80% and 50%, and repayment percentage of 0% that were common between the NP and SB 
treatments. 
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between the NP and SB treatments, Figure 29 shows that the efficiency distribution for the SB 
treatment is more spread out (Kolmorogov-Smirnov test p-value < 0.001) and the Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test is weakly significant for the two treatments having different distributions (p-value = 
0.021). Again the results hold when we only compare the insurance choices that are common across 
both treatments. 
 
Figure 3.28 Comparison of Consumer Surplus Distribution for NP and SB Treatments 
 
 
 
Figure 3.29 Comparison of Efficiency Distribution for NP and SB Treatments 
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 Table 3.7 shows the results of the regression analysis on the insurance choices in the SB 
treatment. In addition to the factors considered in the control and NP treatments, there are other 
factors unique to the SB treatment that are also considered. “Urn B” shows that whether the 
solvency probabilities were from draws from Urn A or Urn B does not have a significant effect on 
welfare and take-up, and “Second Draw” shows that insurance choices made in the second round of 
drawing balls from the urn have an expected welfare gain that is weakly significantly higher over 
choices made in the first round.  
 Allowing for subjective solvency probabilities does impact welfare. The difference between 
the subjective solvency probability for each insurance choice and the Bayesian probability for that 
choice increases CS, with strong statistical significance. This means that when subjects are 
optimistic, that is their beliefs on solvency probability are higher than the solvency probability 
calculated from the actual draws from the urn assuming perfect Bayesian updating, they make 
insurance choices with higher CS. Conversely pessimistic subjects make choices with lower CS. This 
optimism does not significantly impact efficiency.  Although we are not formally taking into account 
uncertainty aversion when estimating the subjective solvency probabilities, the standard deviation of 
subjects’ beliefs of solvency probability, “Solvency Probability Spread”, shows us that how spread 
out beliefs are does not significantly impact take-up or welfare of insurance choices.  
 The demographic factors that significantly impact welfare are different from the factors that 
significantly impact welfare in the NP treatment. ROCL violation is not a significant factor on 
welfare measures, which supports the consistency of requiring the ROCL assumption to represent 
the subjective solvency probability with the weighted averages of subjects’ beliefs. Being Christian is 
no longer significant, however subjects who have prior experience with insurance, freshmen, and 
females make choices that have significantly higher CS. 
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Table 3.7 Factors Affecting Welfare With Subjective Non-Performance Risk 
 
Take-up Choice CS Efficiency
Risk Aversion 0.0931 -0.0182 -0.106 -0.0626
(0.061) (0.616) (0.269) (0.135)
(Risk Aversion)^2 0.0114* -0.00297 -0.0153 -0.00785
(0.037) (0.460) (0.157) (0.122)
Difference between Subjective -0.384 0.482* 2.689*** 0.116
and Drawn Probabilities (0.065) (0.014) (<0.001) (0.686)
Solvency Probability Spread 0.0376 0.0138 0.0553 0.388
(0.879) (0.954) (0.924) (0.485)
Solvency Probability 0.0838 0.136 -0.357
(0.439) (0.177) (0.468)
Urn B -0.0290 0.0190 -0.000805
(0.192) (0.326) (0.996)
Premium -0.0646*** 0.0417** 0.325***
(<0.001) (0.002) (<0.001)
Loss Probability 1.478*** -0.930*** -5.795***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Second Draw 0.0771*** 0.0489** 0.131
(<0.001) (0.005) (0.411)
ROCL Violation Count -0.00642 0.00156 0.0110 0.00265
(0.689) (0.846) (0.501) (0.819)
Female -0.163** 0.0853* 0.288** 0.0948*
(0.007) (0.032) (0.002) (0.047)
Black 0.0188 -0.0469 -0.192 -0.0363
(0.846) (0.420) (0.055) (0.599)
Asian -0.0555 -0.0105 -0.0412 -0.000167
(0.639) (0.866) (0.724) (0.998)
Business Major 0.0500 -0.0266 -0.0921 -0.0194
(0.511) (0.536) (0.200) (0.736)
Freshman -0.0144 0.0514 0.322*** 0.0674
(0.857) (0.288) (<0.001) (0.224)
Senior 0.0485 0.00642 0.106 0.0336
(0.549) (0.888) (0.353) (0.611)
High GPA 0.0820 -0.0692 -0.212* -0.0683
(0.215) (0.079) (0.013) (0.147)
Christian -0.0409 -0.00943 0.155 0.0314
(0.582) (0.835) (0.169) (0.567)
Insured -0.0487 0.0688 0.303*** 0.0896
(0.461) (0.075) (<0.001) (0.070)
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.05    ** p<0.01    *** p<0.001
Average marginal effects of appropriate regression models
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3.5  Related Literature 
Kahneman and Tversky [1979; p. 269] introduced a concept of “probabilistic insurance,” which 
incorporates the essential features of non-performance risk. Their hypothetical example also, 
however, allowed for the probabilistic reimbursement of the premium, which changes predictions 
from the pure non-performance risk case. Wakker, Thaler and Tversky [1997] considered the case of 
pure non-performance risk, and showed that the same prediction under EUT applied: that a small 
risk of non-performance should not lead to a large change in willingness to pay for the product. 
 Kahneman and Tversky [1979], Wakker, Thaler and Tversky [1997] and Zimmer, Schade and 
Gründl [2009], inter alia, report survey responses to suggest that subjects do not behave consistently 
with EUT, and appear to dislike probabilistic insurance in each of the forms proposed. Hypothetical 
survey responses are known to be generally unreliable, and the primary focus of these surveys was to 
question the empirical validity of EUT rather than evaluate the welfare effects of performance risk. 
Segal [1988] demonstrates that this “puzzle” from the perspective of EUT can be explained easily 
using RDU or Recursive RDU, where the latter is a model of Segal [1990] that allow one to relax 
ROCL while assuming the CIA. Wakker et al. [1997] also show that the “puzzle” can be resolved by 
RDU, even when probabilistic insurance is presented in the pure form. 
 Herrero, Tomás and Villar [2006] is the first experimental study to examine probabilistic 
insurance using real rewards applied in an incentive-compatible manner. They examined the original 
version of probabilistic insurance from Kahneman and Tversky [1979], and compared demand for 
what they refer to as No Insurance (NI), Full Insurance (FI) and Probabilistic Insurance (PI).  They 
used an elegant design to first elicit the loss probability that made an individual subject indifferent 
between NI and PI for the same final outcomes, but without ever framing choices in terms of NI, 
FI or PI to subjects. For instance, a subject might have a choice between $0 with probability λ and x2 
with probability (1-λ) or x1 for sure. The x1 for certain option is interpreted by the experimenters as 
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FI, since it reflects the outcome of a full indemnity insurance contract with no deductible. Assume 
that the elicited probability for this subject and these outcomes is λ*. The subject was then given a 
series of binary choices between NI, FI and PI, defined simply as 3-prize lotteries: 
 NI is where 0 is received with probability λ*/2, 0 is received with λ*/2, and x1 is received 
with probability 1-λ*. 
 FI is where x2 is received with probability λ*/2, x2 is received with probability λ*/2, and x2 is 
received with probability 1-λ*. 
 PI is where 0 is received with probability λ*/2, x2 is received with probability λ*/2, and 
(x1+x2)/2 is received with probability 1-λ*. 
 
Subjects were incentivized with a subtle method that is indeed incentive-compatible, although that 
might not seem apparent.67 They find that subjects tend to prefer FI to PI, where the loss probability 
is the one that this subject revealed to make her indifferent between FI and NI, and that the subjects 
tend to prefer PI to NI. The preference for FI over PI is inconsistent with EUT, and consistent with 
RDU; but the preference for PI over NI is consistent with EUT and inconsistent with RDU. Both 
patterns are consistent with the Regret Theory of Loomes and Sugden [1982][1987]. 
 Zimmer, Gründl, Schade and Glenzer [2017] conduct the first framed lab experiment to 
examine probabilistic insurance using real rewards applied in an incentive-compatible manner. They 
framed the instructions in terms of insurance products, to make it easier for subjects to understand 
the task. As the exposition of the design of Herrero, Tomás and Villar [2006] illustrates, unframed 
experiments can seem very different than insurance decisions, perhaps disconnecting behavioral 
responses from field counterparts. Their experiments used a design which gave subjects a 1-in-200 
chance of being paid: while a probability of 0.005 might satisfy a theorist as constituting a strictly 
                                                 
 
67 One choice was selected at random to be paid. If that choices was a direct binary choice of one lottery over another, 
the chosen lottery was paid out (the same method used in our experiments). If that choice was one in which the loss 
probability was elicited that made the subject indifferent, the subject would be paired with another subject. If the other 
subject reported a loss probability that was smaller (larger) than the subject being rewarded, the subject to be rewarded 
got to play the NI (FI) option. In effect, this is a variant on the Becker, DeGroot and Marschak [1964] elicitation 
method well-known to experimental economists, since the first subject does not know what probability the paired 
subject will state, and can only harm himself by stating a probability that is higher or lower than his true indifference 
probability. In practice, this logic is not obvious to subjects. 
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positive probability of reward, it is surely a concern that subjects might have viewed this as 
“effectively hypothetical” given the low chance of being rewarded. However, if rewarded, the stakes 
were high: up to €800. Subjects were told that there was a 5% loss probability, and that the loss 
would be complete, resulting in earnings of €0. Four full indemnity contracts were offered, with 
non-performance risks of 0%, 1%, 2% and 3%.68  
 Subjects were asked to state their maximum willingness to pay for the insurance contract. 
The Becker, DeGroot and Marschak [1964] elicitation method was used, with a well-known 
variation in which the random “buying price” is pre-selected and placed in an envelope. Although 
formally incentive compatible, this elicitation method is widely avoided by experimental economists 
since subjects often fail to understand it without a great deal of hands-on training: see Plott and 
Zeiler [2005; p.537]. Moreover, even if subjects understand the incentives, the mechanism is known 
to generate extremely weak incentives for accurate reports: see Harrison [1992][1994]. Despite these 
caveats, the evidence suggests a sharp reduction in the valuation of insurance for small increases in 
non-performance risk, generally inconsistent with EUT. 
 Biener, Landmann and Santana [2017] conducted the first artefactual field experiments on 
insurance with non-performance risk. They presented subjects in the Philippines with insurance 
contracts that had a 10% default risk for an insurance product that had a loss probability of 30% and 
a premium of 50 Philippine Pesos, and asked if they wanted to purchase the product. Another 
product had a 0% defailt risk for the same loss probability and a premium of 60 Philippine Pesos. 
Their design does not allow a clean identification of the effect of default risk on take-up, since 
                                                 
 
68 The instructions did present the possibility of default with an unusually aggressive flourish, using the (translated) text: 
“Default risk. 3%, i.e., the insurer pays its valid claims in 97 out of 100 cases, and in the 3 out of 100 cases the insurer 
does not pay!” The use of exclamation marks is culturally-specific, and Germans often use them for imperative sentences 
conveying simple advice. Given that the subjects were German, this exclamation mark should not be seen as biasing 
responses against the purchase of contracts with a default risk. 
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premium was varied as well, but the effect appears to be to reduce demand by at least 22.3%.69 The 
effect of adding default risk is likely larger, since premiums were lowered as well, leading to an 
understatement of the pure effect of default risk. No evaluation of choices beyond take-up is 
provided. 
 No previous experiments evaluated the risk preferences of subjects in a way that would 
allow an evaluation of the CS that their decisions about insurance with non-performance risk would 
imply. 
3.6  Conclusions 
Non-performance lies at the heart of much of the regulation that insurance companies face. Our 
results provide a behavioral evaluation of the welfare effects of non-performance risk, keeping close 
to the canonical theoretical framework of Doherty and Schlesinger [1990]. We find that there is a 
reduction in efficiency, our preferred measure of welfare in this instance, when there is non-
performance risk. We stress that this measure does not just reflect the obvious fact that a less 
reliable product should be valued less by (risk averse) agents, ceteris paribus. Instead, efficiency 
normalizes the consumer surplus gains and losses from observed choices to naturally account for the 
fact that insurance that is subject to non-performance risk is a less reliable product than insurance 
that is free of that risk. Our behavioral comparison also matches the clean insights from theory, 
since in the field one would typically only see variations in non-performance risk if other factors 
were varied, such as reserving levels and premia. 
 Our behavioral evaluation goes beyond the EUT used in the previous theory, by allowing for 
individuals to be characterized by risk preferences that relax the Compound Independence axiom in 
the manner characterized by RDU. Indeed, this specification accounts for just under 45% of our 
                                                 
 
69 This is the estimate from the correct probit specification for a binary dependent variable (Table C1, p. 50), with 
numerous controls. 
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sample, and makes a difference to the size and sign of consumer surplus impacts of observed 
choices.  
 We show here that the methodology used to estimate risk preferences and calculate the 
consumer surplus of insurance choices matters, and care must be taken to use suitable methodology. 
The initial result of violation of the ROCL axiom decreasing the expected welfare gain of insurance 
choices with non-performance risk is no longer significant if we relax the ROCL assumption in our 
estimation of risk preferences and calculation of consumer surplus. Allowing for subjective beliefs 
over non-performance risk does not significantly impact the welfare of insurance choices.  
 Four extensions to the theory and behavioral evaluation of non-performance risk would be 
valuable. 
 First, we can extend the analysis of subjective beliefs to include uncertainty aversion. This 
would involve using the ambiguity model developed in Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji [2005], in 
the spirit of Peter and Ying [2016] and Biener, Landmann and Santana [2017] in the context of 
insurance contract non-performance. 
 Second, the core theorem of the probabilistic insurance thought experiment of Kahneman 
and Tversky [1979] does not survive generalization to relax the perfect asset integration assumption. 
That assumption is that agents treat wealth, income and loss amounts as perfect substitutes. In this 
case the intuition behind the claim that EUT agents always prefer probabilistic insurance stems from 
the fact that risk has a second-order effect under EUT and agents prefer a sure gain (from a cheaper 
policy) since it has a first-order effect: see the general case for the familiar optimality-of-deductibles 
theorem in Gollier and Schlesinger [1996]. In the theoretical framework employed in §2, this 
assumption amounts to defining U(A, π, L) = A - π - L if insurance is purchased at premium π and 
loss L occurs. However, a generalization proposed by Cox and Sadiraj [2006] allows these arguments 
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of the utility function to be less than perfect substitutes.70 It is easy to show that in this general case 
that the EUT agent does not always prefer probabilistic insurance to a traditional non-probabilistic 
full indemnity contract.71 Hence it would be valuable to consider the welfare evaluation of insurance 
contracts with non-performance risk when these generalizations are allowed. 
 Third, our insurance contract did not allow individuals to choose the level of 
indemnification, other than the binary decision to purchase the product or not. Particularly when 
decision-making is undertaken with subjects exhibiting uncertainty aversion, such margins of choice 
might serve to mitigate the efficiency cost of poor decision. Of course, the reverse is true: such 
margins might lead subjects to make the right choice in terms of when to purchase the product, but 
not to optimally indemnify. 
 Finally, non-performance often reflects a breakdown of trust between insured and insurance 
company, or between insured and insurance regulator. Behavioral responses to trust in other agents 
might be processed differently than behavioral responses to objective or even subjective 
probabilities of on-performance,72 and affect the efficiency of insurance decisions. 
 
                                                 
 
70 Some claim that EUT requires perfect asset integration, but this is not true. On the other hand, whether or not EUT 
does require this assumption is irrelevant for present purposes. 
71 For simplicity we consider the original probabilistic insurance contract proposed by Kahneman and Tversky [1979], in 
which the premium is returned with some probability. Consider the functional form used by Andersen, Cox, Harrison, 
Lau, Rutström and Sadiraj [2016], in which v(A, π, L) is a Constant Elasticity of Substitution function, and U(v) is the 
usual CRRA function U(v) = v(1−r)/(1−r) over the composite good. This specification allows perfect asset integration, 
null asset integration, and partial asset integration as special cases. Andersen et al. [2016] show that the evidence for adult 
Danes supports the partial asset integration case. And the only case in which the probabilistic insurance contract 
dominates, with partial asset integration, is when A and L are perfect substitutes.  
72 Bohnet and Zeckhauser [2004] call this “betrayal aversion,” as distinct from risk aversion. 
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3.7 Appendix A: Instructions  
3.7.1 Risk Preferences 
Choices Over Risky Prospects 
 
 This is a task where you will choose between prospects with varying prizes and chances of 
winning. You will be presented with a series of pairs of prospects where you will choose one of 
them. For each pair of prospects, you should choose the prospect you prefer to play. You will 
actually get the chance to play one of the prospects you choose, and you will be paid according to 
the outcome of that prospect, so you should think carefully about which prospect you prefer. 
 
 Here is an example of what the computer display of such a pair of prospects might look like. 
 
 
 
  
The outcome of the prospects will be determined by the draw of a random number between 
1 and 100. Each number between, and including, 1 and 100 is equally likely to occur. In fact, you will 
be able to draw the number yourself using two 10-sided dice. 
 
Although not shown in this example, in the top left corner of your computer screen you can 
see how many choices you will be asked to make today. 
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 In this example the left prospect pays five dollars ($5) if the number drawn is between 1 and 
40, and pays fifteen dollars ($15) if the number is between 41 and 100. The blue color in the pie 
chart corresponds to 40% of the area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be 
between 1 and 40 and your prize will be $5. The orange area in the pie chart corresponds to 60% of 
the area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be between 41 and 100 and your 
prize will be $15. 
  
 Now look at the pie in the chart on the right. It pays five dollars ($5) if the number drawn is 
between 1 and 50, ten dollars ($10) if the number is between 51 and 90, and fifteen dollars ($15) if 
the number is between 91 and 100. As with the prospect on the left, the pie slices represent the 
fraction of the possible numbers which yield each payoff. For example, the size of the $15 pie slice 
is 10% of the total pie. 
 
 Each pair of prospects is shown on a separate screen on the computer. On each screen, you 
should indicate which prospect you prefer to play by clicking on one of the buttons beneath the 
prospects.  
 
 You could also get a pair of prospects in which one of the prospects will give you the chance 
to play “Double or Nothing.” For instance, the right prospect in the next screen image pays 
“Double or Nothing” if the Green area is selected, which happens if the number drawn is between 
51 and 100. The right pie chart indicates that if the number is between 1 and 50 you get $10. 
However, if the number is between 51 and 100 a coin will be tossed to determine if you get double 
the amount. If it comes up Heads you get $40, otherwise you get nothing. The prizes listed 
underneath each pie refer to the amounts before any “Double or Nothing” coin toss. 
 
 
 After you have worked through all of the pairs of prospects, raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come over. You will then roll two 10-sided dice until a number comes up to 
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determine which pair of prospects will be played out. If there are 40 pairs we will roll the dice until a 
number between 1 and 40 comes up, if there are 80 pairs we will roll until a number between 1 and 
80 comes up, and so on. Since there is a chance that any of your choices could be played out for 
real, you should approach each pair of prospects as if it is the one that you will play out. Finally, you 
will roll the two ten-sided dice to determine the outcome of the prospect you chose, and if necessary 
you will then toss a coin to determine if you get “Double or Nothing.” 
 
 For instance, suppose you picked the prospect on the left in the last example. If the random 
number was 37, you would win $0; if it was 93, you would get $20. 
 
 If you picked the prospect on the right and drew the number 37, you would get $10; if it was 
93, you would have to toss a coin to determine if you get “Double or Nothing.” If the coin comes 
up Heads then you get $40. However, if it comes up Tails you get nothing from your chosen 
prospect. 
 
 It is also possible that you will be given a prospect in which there is a “Double or Nothing” 
option no matter what the outcome of the random number. This screen image illustrates this 
possibility. 
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 Therefore, your payoff is determined by four things: 
 
 by which prospect you selected, the left or the right, for each of these pairs; 
 by which prospect pair is chosen to be played out in the series of pairs using the two 10-
sided dice;  
 by the outcome of that prospect when you roll the two 10-sided dice; and  
 by the outcome of a coin toss if the chosen prospect outcome is of the “Double or 
Nothing” type. 
 
 Which prospects you prefer is a matter of personal taste. The people next to you may be 
presented with different prospects, and may have different preferences, so their responses should 
not matter to you. Please work silently, and make your choices by thinking carefully about each 
prospect. 
 
 All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the show-up fee that you receive just for being 
here.  
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3.7.2 Control Treatment for Insurance Choices 
 
Choices Over Insurance Prospects 
In this task you will be asked to make a series of insurance decisions. For each decision, you 
will start off with an initial amount of money. You will then be presented with the probability and 
value of a potential loss, as well as the price of the insurance you could purchase to avoid that loss. 
You have to decide if you want to purchase the insurance that would protect you if that loss should 
occur. There are 16 decisions to be made in this task. After all the decisions have been made, you 
will actually get the chance to play out one of the insurance decisions you make. You will be paid 
according to the outcome of that event, so you should think carefully about how much the insurance 
is worth to you. 
Here is an example of what your decision would look like on the computer screen. 
 
In this lottery, there is a 10% chance you will experience a loss of fifteen dollars ($15) that 
corresponds with the red portion of the pie, and a 90% chance you will experience no loss ($0) that 
corresponds with the green portion of the pie. Since you start out with $20, this means there is a 
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90% chance your earnings remain at $20, but there is a 10% chance you will lose $15, which would 
leave you with $5.  
You are given the option to buy insurance to protect yourself against the potential loss in 
this lottery. You should decide if you want the insurance before you know if a loss will occur. In this 
example, the insurance will cost you $1.80. This is full insurance: if you purchase the insurance and a 
loss should occur, the insurance will cover the full loss and your net earnings will be your initial 
earnings of $20 less the price paid for the insurance, $1.80, which is $18.20. If you choose to 
purchase insurance and there was no loss you would still need to pay for the $1.80 insurance, and 
your net earnings will be $18.20. 
 Each decision you have to make is shown on a separate screen on the computer. For each 
decision, you should indicate your choice to purchase, or not purchase the insurance, by clicking on 
your preferred option.   
 We will use die rolls to determine the outcome of the lottery. After everyone has worked 
through all of the insurance decisions, please raise your hand and wait in your seat, and an 
experimenter will come to you.  
You will then roll a 20-sided die to determine which insurance decision will be played out. 
Since there are only 16 decisions, you will keep rolling the die until a number between 1 and 16 
comes up. There is an equal chance that any of your 16 choices could be selected, so you should 
approach each decision as if it is the one that you will actually play out to determine your payoff. 
Once the decision to play out is selected, you will roll the 10-sided die to determine the 
outcome of the lottery. In this example the probability of experiencing a loss is 10%. If a 0 is rolled 
on the die, a loss event has occurred. If a number 1 to 9 is rolled, then there is no loss. If the 
probability of experiencing a loss is 20%, then a loss event has occurred if the die roll is a 0 or 1, and 
no loss has occurred if the die roll is from 2 to 9, and so on. 
 In the example, if you had chosen not to purchase insurance and you rolled a 7 on the die, 
you would receive $20. If you had rolled a 0, you would receive $5.  
If you had chosen to purchase insurance, you would receive $18.20.   
Therefore, your payoff is determined by three factors: 
 whether or not you chose to buy insurance for each of the 16 decisions; 
 the decision selected to actually be played out using a 20-sided die; and 
 whether or not there is a loss based on the die roll from a 10-sided die. 
 
 Whether or not you prefer to buy the insurance is a matter of personal taste. You may 
choose to buy insurance on some or all of your 16 choices, or none of the choices. The people next 
to you may be presented with different choices, and may have different preferences, so their 
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responses should not matter to you. Please work silently, and make your choices by thinking 
carefully about each prospect. 
 All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the show-up fee that you receive just for being 
here, as well as any other earnings in other tasks. 
 Are there any questions? 
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3.7.3 Non-performance Treatment for Insurance Choices 
 
Choices Over Insurance Prospects 
In this task you will be asked to make a series of insurance decisions. For each decision, you 
will start off with an initial amount of money. You will then be presented with the probability and 
value of a potential loss, as well as the price and payout of the insurance you could purchase to avoid 
that loss. You have to decide if you want to purchase the insurance that would protect you if that 
loss should occur. There are 32 decisions to be made in this task. After all the decisions have been 
made, you will actually get the chance to play out one of the insurance decisions you make. You will 
be paid according to the outcome of that event, so you should think carefully about how much the 
insurance is worth to you. 
Here is an example of what your decision would look like on the computer screen.  
 
In this lottery, there is a 10% chance you will experience a loss of fifteen dollars ($15). The possible 
outcomes for you correspond with the possible outcomes in the red and green pie. In this example 
the red portion of the pie represents the 10% chance that you will experience a $15 loss and be left 
with $5, and the green portion of the pie corresponds to the 90% chance that you will experience no 
loss ($0) and your earnings will remain at $20. 
You are given the option to buy insurance to protect yourself against the potential loss in 
this lottery. You should decide if you want the insurance before you know if a loss will occur. In this 
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example, the insurance will cost you $1.80 and will fully cover the loss. Regardless of the loss 
outcome, your net earnings will be your initial earnings of $20 less the price paid for the insurance, 
$1.80, which is $18.20. There is a chance, however, that the insurance company may go bankrupt. If 
that happens, the insurance company will not be able to fully compensate for the loss if a loss 
occurs. In this example if the insurance company goes bankrupt it will only pay out 40% of the loss 
should a loss occur, which is $6 (40% × $15 = $6). If you experience a loss and the insurance 
company goes bankrupt your final earnings will be your initial earnings less the premium paid less 
the loss and adding back any payout received from the insurance company, which is $9.20 in this 
example ($20 - $1.80 - $15 + $6 = $9.20). 
The blue pie shows the bankruptcy probabilities of the insurance company. In this example 
the light blue portion of the pie represents the 20% chance that the insurance company goes 
bankrupt. If there is a loss, the company can only pay out 40% of the losses and you will be left with 
$9.20. The dark blue portion of the pie corresponds to the 80% chance that the insurance company 
does not go bankrupt. If there is a loss, the insurance company will fully compensate for the $15 loss 
and your earnings will be your initial earnings of $20 less the premium of $1.80, which is $18.20. If 
there is no loss, your earnings will remain at $18.20 regardless of the outcome of the bankruptcy. 
The bankruptcy event is independent of the loss. The probability of bankruptcy is not affected by 
the probability of loss and vice versa.  
 Each decision you have to make is shown on a separate screen on the computer. For each 
decision, you should indicate your choice to purchase, or not purchase the insurance, by clicking on 
your preferred option.  
 We will use die rolls to determine the outcome of the lottery. After everyone has worked 
through all of the insurance decisions, please raise your hand and wait in your seat, and an 
experimenter will come to you.  
You will then roll two 10-sided dice to determine which insurance decision will be played 
out. Since there are only 32 decisions, you will keep rolling the dice until a number between 1 and 32 
comes up. There is an equal chance that any of your 32 choices could be selected, so you should 
approach each decision as if it is the one that you will actually play out to determine your payoff.  
Once the decision to play out is selected, you will roll the 10-sided die to determine the loss 
outcome. In this example the probability of experiencing a loss is 10%. If a 0 is rolled on the die, a 
loss event has occurred. If a number 1 to 9 is rolled, then there is no loss. If the probability of 
experiencing a loss is 20%, then a loss has occurred if the die roll is a 0 or 1, and no loss has 
occurred if the die roll is from 2 to 9, and so on.  
If you have chosen to purchase insurance and a loss event has occurred, you will roll the 10-
sided die to determine the bankruptcy outcome. In this example the probability of bankruptcy is 
20%. If a 0 or 1 is rolled on the die, the insurance company has experienced bankruptcy. If a 
number 2 to 9 is rolled, then the insurance company has not experienced bankruptcy. 
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Suppose you had chosen not to purchase insurance in the example. If you rolled a 7 on 
the die, for instance, you would receive $20; if you rolled a 0, you would receive $5. 
 If you had chosen to purchase insurance and rolled a 7, you would receive $18.20; if you 
rolled a 0, you would have to roll the die a second time to determine the bankruptcy outcome. If you 
had rolled a 6 for instance for the second roll you would receive $18.20; if you had rolled a 1 you 
would receive $9.20. 
Therefore, your payoff is determined by four factors: 
 whether or not you chose to buy insurance for each of the 32 decisions; 
 the decision selected to actually be played out using two 10-sided dice; 
 whether or not there is a loss based on the die roll from a 10-sided dice; and  
 whether or not there is bankruptcy based on the die roll from a 10-sided die. 
 
 Whether or not you prefer to buy the insurance is a matter of personal taste. You may 
choose to buy insurance on some or all of your 32 choices, or none of the choices. The people next 
to you may be presented with different choices, and may have different preferences, so their 
responses should not matter to you. Please work silently, and make your choices by thinking 
carefully about each prospect. 
 All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the show-up fee that you receive just for being 
here, as well as any other earnings in other tasks. 
 Are there any questions? 
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3.7.4 Subjective Beliefs Instructions 
 
Instructions 
This section of the experiment is made up of two tasks that are related. The first task is 
asking you how accurate your beliefs are about certain things, and the second task is asking you 
about your preferences for purchasing insurance. You will receive a payout from each stage, so make 
your choices for each stage carefully. It is important that you understand all instructions before 
making your choices in this experiment. 
The general instructions for the first task are as follows. 
This is a task where you will be paid according to how accurate your beliefs are about certain 
things. You will be presented with some questions and asked to place some bets on your beliefs 
about the answers to each question. You will be rewarded for your answer to one of these questions, 
so you should think carefully about your answer to each question. The question that is chosen for 
payment will be determined after you have made all decisions, and that process is explained below. 
 
Here is an example of what the computer display of a question might look like. We pick a 
question that is not going to be asked of you, just for illustration. 
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The display on your computer will be larger and easier to read. You have 10 sliders to adjust, 
shown at the bottom of the screen, and you have 100 tokens to allocate across the sliders. Each 
slider allows you to allocate tokens to reflect your belief about the answer to this question. You must 
allocate all 100 tokens, and in this example we start with 0 tokens allocated to each slider. As you 
allocate tokens, by adjusting sliders, the payoffs displayed on the screen will change. Your earnings 
are based on the payoffs that are displayed after you have allocated all 100 tokens. 
 
You can earn up to $50 in this task. 
 
Where you position each slider depends on your beliefs about the correct answer to the 
question. Note that the bars above each slider correspond to that particular slider. In our example, 
the tokens you allocate to each bar will naturally reflect your beliefs about the proportion of left-
handed Presidents. The first bar corresponds to your belief that the proportion is between 0% and 
9%. The second bar corresponds to your belief that the proportion is between 10% and 19%, and so 
on. Each bar shows the amount of money you could earn if the true proportion is in the interval 
shown under the bar. 
 
To illustrate how you use these sliders, suppose you think there is a fair chance the true 
answer is just under 50%. Then you might allocate the 100 tokens in the following way: 50 tokens to 
the interval 40% to 49%, 40 tokens to the interval 30% to 39%, and 10 tokens to the interval 20% to 
29%. So you can see in this picture that if indeed the proportion of left-handed Presidents is 
between 40% and 49% you would earn $39.50. You would earn less than $39.50 for any other 
outcome. You would earn $34.50 if the proportion of left-handed Presidents is between 30% and 
39%, $19.50 if it is between 20% and 29%, and for any other proportion you would earn $14.50. 
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You can adjust the allocation as much as you want to best reflect your personal beliefs about 
the proportion of left-handed Presidents.  
 
Your earnings depend on your reported beliefs and, of course, the true answer. For instance, 
suppose you allocated your tokens as just shown. The true answer is that there are 8 left-handed 
Presidents out of 44, so the true proportion is 18.2%, and we would round that to 18%. So if you 
had reported these beliefs, you would have earned $14.50. 
 
Suppose you had put all of your eggs in one basket, and allocated all 100 tokens to the 
interval corresponding to a proportion between 10% and 19%. Then you would have faced the 
earnings outcomes shown here: 
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Note the “good news” and “bad news” here. Since the proportion of left-handed Presidents 
is indeed between 10% and 19%, you earn the maximum payoff, shown here as $50. But if the true 
proportion had been 20%, you would have earned nothing in this task. 
 
It is up to you to balance the strength of your personal beliefs with the possibility of them 
being wrong. There are three important points for you to keep in mind when making your decisions: 
 
• First, your belief about the correct answer to each question is a personal judgment 
that depends on the information you have about the topic of the question. 
• Second, depending on your choices and the correct answer you can earn up to $50. 
• Third, your choices might also depend on your willingness to take risks or to 
gamble. 
 
The decisions you make are a matter of personal choice. Please work silently, and make your choices 
by thinking carefully about the questions you are presented with. 
 
When you are satisfied with your decisions, you should click on the Submit button and 
confirm your choices. When you are finished we will roll dice to determine which question will be 
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played out. The experimenter will record your earnings according to the correct answer and the 
choices you made. 
 
All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the show-up fee that you receive just for being 
here, as well as any other earnings in the session today. 
 
We will now have a video demonstration of how you make decisions in this task, using the 
same hypothetical example. You can then raise your hand if you need more explanation, or replay 
these instructions. The actual questions we will ask you to state your beliefs about will be presented 
after we explain the next task. Here is the video demonstration... 
 
The question we will be asking concerns your beliefs on the composition of colored balls in 
an urn. You will be presented with 2 urns, urn A and urn B. Each urn contains 100 ping-pong balls 
which are either red or white. The mixture of colored balls in each urn will remain constant 
throughout all the tasks. The exact mix of red and white balls in each urn will be unknown to you, 
but you will receive information about the mixture.  
At the end of these two tasks, we will draw 9 balls from each urn. The question you will 
answer by using the sliders to allocate tokens is “Out of 9 balls drawn from the urn in the final draw, 
how many balls will be red?” The number of red balls in this final draw will determine your 
earnings in each of the two tasks. There will be 2 rounds of these tasks. Each round will be 
essentially the same.  
In the first round we will draw 9 balls each from urn A and urn B and announce the number 
of red balls and white balls drawn from each urn. This sample information is the only information 
you will receive in the first round on the composition of balls in each urn. You will then get the 
chance to allocate your tokens across the sliders for each urn to reflect your belief about the number 
of red balls that will be drawn in a final draw. This sample draw is not the final draw that will 
determine your earnings.  
After everyone has completed the first task, you will use your beliefs of the composition of 
balls in urns A and B to help you make a series of decisions to purchase insurance or not in the 
second task.  
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In this second task you will be asked to make a series of insurance decisions, just like the 
ones shown here. For each decision, you will start off with $20. You will then be presented with the 
probability and value of a potential loss, as well as the price and payout of the insurance you could 
purchase to avoid that loss. You have to decide if you want to purchase the insurance that would 
protect you if that loss should occur. After all the decisions have been made, you will actually get the 
chance to play out one of the insurance decisions you make. You will be paid according to the 
outcome of that event, so you should think carefully about how much the insurance is worth to you. 
This is an example of what your decision would look like on the computer screen, using urn 
A as an example.  
 
In this lottery, there is a 10% chance you will experience a loss of fifteen dollars ($15). The possible 
outcomes for you correspond with the possible outcomes in the yellow and green pie. In this 
example the yellow portion of the pie represents the 10% chance that you will experience a $15 loss 
and be left with $5, and the green portion of the pie corresponds to the 90% chance that you will 
experience no loss ($0) and your earnings will remain at $20. 
You are given the option to buy insurance to protect yourself against the potential loss in 
this lottery. You should decide if you want the insurance before you know if a loss will occur. In this 
example, the insurance will cost you $1.80 and will fully cover the loss. Regardless of the loss 
outcome, your net earnings will be your initial earnings of $20 less the price paid for the insurance, 
$1.80, which is $18.20. There is a chance, however, that the insurance company may go bankrupt. If 
that happens, the insurance company will not compensate for the loss if a loss occurs. If you 
experience a loss and the insurance company goes bankrupt your final earnings will be your initial 
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earnings less the premium paid less the loss, which is $3.20 in this example ($20 - $1.80 - $15 = 
$3.20). 
The probability of the insurance company going bankrupt depends on the distribution of the 
9 final balls drawn from either urn A or urn B. In this example the balls will be drawn from urn A. 
The probability of the insurance company going bankrupt is represented by the number of red balls 
among the 9 balls drawn from urn A in the final draw. If there is a loss, the insurance company 
does not compensate for the $15 loss and you will be left with $3.20. The probability of the 
insurance company not going bankrupt is represented by the number of white balls among the 9 
balls drawn from urn A in the final draw. If there is a loss, the insurance company will fully 
compensate for the $15 loss and your earnings will be your initial earnings of $20 less the premium 
of $1.80, which is $18.20.  
If there is no loss, your earnings will remain at $18.20 regardless of the outcome of the 
bankruptcy. The bankruptcy event is independent of the loss. The probability of bankruptcy is not 
affected by the probability of loss and vice versa.  
 Each decision you have to make is shown on a separate screen on the computer. For each 
decision, you should indicate your choice to purchase, or not purchase the insurance, by clicking on 
your preferred option.  
 We will conduct 2 rounds of both tasks. The second round will be just like the first. We will 
replace the first round sample of 9 balls in each urn, and then draw a new sample of 9 balls. We will 
again tell you the mix of red and white balls in this new sample draw. You will then again report 
your beliefs about the number of red balls in the final draw, which will occur at the end of the 
second round. You will also make another series of insurance decisions.  
Once both rounds are completed we will conduct the final draw of 9 balls from urns A and 
B to determine the number of red balls drawn from each urn. We will then use die rolls to select a 
choice from each task that we will actually play out to determine your payoffs. After all the stages are 
completed, you will then roll dice to determine which insurance decision will be played out for this 
stage. There is an equal chance that any of your choices could be selected, so you should approach 
each decision as if it is the one that you will actually play out to determine your payoff.  
Once the decision to play out for this stage is selected, you will roll the 10-sided die to 
determine the loss outcome. In this example the probability of experiencing a loss is 10%. If a 0 is 
rolled on the die, a loss event has occurred. If a number 1 to 9 is rolled, then there is no loss. If the 
probability of experiencing a loss is 20%, then a loss has occurred if the die roll is a 0 or 1, and no 
loss has occurred if the die roll is from 2 to 9, and so on.  
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If you have chosen to purchase insurance and a loss event has occurred, you will roll the 
10-sided die to determine the bankruptcy outcome. The probability of bankruptcy is determined by 
the number of red balls out of the 9 balls drawn in the final draw. In this example the 9 balls drawn 
from urn A will be used. If the die roll is less than the number of red balls drawn, the insurance 
company has experienced bankruptcy. If a number larger than or equal to the number of red balls is 
rolled, then the insurance company has not experienced bankruptcy.  
This table lists the bankruptcy outcomes for the die rolls, depending on the number of red 
balls drawn from the urn. 
Number of Red Balls 
Drawn from Urn 
Percentage Chance of 
Bankruptcy 
Die Rolls for 
Bankruptcy 
Die Rolls for No 
Bankruptcy 
0 0% - 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
1 10% 0 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
2 20% 0, 1 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
3 30% 0, 1, 2 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
4 40% 0, 1, 2, 3 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
5 50% 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
6 60% 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 6, 7, 8, 9 
7 70% 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
8 80% 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 8, 9 
9 90% 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 9 
 
Suppose you had chosen not to purchase insurance in the example. If you rolled a 7 on 
the die, for instance, you would receive $20; if you rolled a 0, you would receive $5. 
 If you had chosen to purchase insurance and rolled a 7, you would receive $18.20; if you 
rolled a 0, you would have to roll the die a second time to determine the bankruptcy outcome. If 
there were 4 red balls out of the 9 balls drawn from urn A and you rolled a 9 you would receive 
$18.20; if you rolled a 2 you would receive $3.20. 
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Therefore, your payoff is determined by five factors: 
 whether or not you chose to buy insurance for each of the decisions; 
 the decision selected to actually be played out using dice; 
 whether or not there is a loss based on the die roll from a 10-sided die;  
 the probability of bankruptcy based on the number of red balls out of the 9 balls drawn 
from the urn; and 
 whether or not there is bankruptcy based on the die roll from a 10-sided die compared to the 
number of red balls.  
 
 Whether or not you prefer to buy the insurance is a matter of personal taste. You may 
choose to buy insurance on some or all of your choices, or none of the choices. The people next to 
you may be presented with different choices, and may have different preferences, so their responses 
should not matter to you. Please work silently, and make your choices by thinking carefully about 
each prospect. 
 All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the show-up fee that you receive just for being 
here, as well as any other earnings in other tasks. 
 Are there any questions? 
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3.8 Appendix B: Risk Lottery Choices 
 
 
 
Table 3.8 Parameters for Double or Nothing Lotteries 
 
Also see text for the Lotteries in Table 3.7 
 
Lottery ID Prize 1 Probability 1 Prize 2 Probability 2 Prize 3 Probability 3 Prize 1 Probability 1 Prize 2 Probability 2 Prize 3 Probability 3
rdon1 $0 0.5 $10 0.5 $20 0 $0 0.5 $10 0.5 $20 0
rdon2 $0 0 $10 1 $20 0 $0 0.5 $10 0.5 $20 0
rdon3 $0 0 $10 1 $35 0 $0 0 $5 0.5 $18 0.5
rdon4 $0 0.25 $10 0.75 $70 0 $0 0 $35 1 $70 0
rdon5 $0 0 $10 1 $70 0 $0 0 $35 1 $70 0
rdon6 $0 0 $20 1 $35 0 $0 0 $10 0.5 $35 0.5
rdon7 $0 0 $20 0.5 $70 0.5 $0 0 $35 0.5 $70 0.5
rdon8 $0 0 $35 1 $70 0 $0 0 $35 0.5 $70 0.5
rdon9 $0 0 $20 0.5 $35 0.5 $0 0.5 $20 0 $70 0.5
rdon10 $0 0 $35 0.75 $70 0.25 $0 0 $35 1 $70 0
rdon11 $0 0 $20 1 $70 0 $0 0 $20 0.5 $35 0.5
rdon12 $0 0 $35 0.75 $70 0.25 $0 0 $35 0.5 $70 0.5
rdon13 $0 0.25 $10 0.75 $35 0 $0 0.5 $18 0.5 $35 0
rdon14 $0 0 $20 0.75 $35 0.25 $0 0 $18 0.5 $35 0.5
rdon15 $0 0 $20 0.75 $70 0.25 $0 0 $35 0.5 $70 0.5
Left Lottery Right Lottery
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Table 3.9 Text for Double or Nothing Lotteries 
Also see parameters for the Lotteries in Table 3.6 
 
 
Lottery ID Double or Nothing Text
rdon1 Double or Nothing if outcome 2 in right lottery
rdon2 Double or Nothing if outcome 2 in right lottery
rdon3 Double or Nothing for any outcome in right lottery
rdon4 Double or Nothing for any outcome in right lottery
rdon5 Double or Nothing for any outcome in right lottery
rdon6 Double or Nothing if outcome 2 in right lottery
rdon7 Double or Nothing if outcome 2 in right lottery
rdon8 Double or Nothing if outcome 2 in right lottery
rdon9 Double or Nothing if outcome 3 in left lottery
rdon10 Double or Nothing for any outcome in right lottery
rdon11 Double or Nothing if outcome 3 in right lottery
rdon12 Double or Nothing if outcome 2 in right lottery
rdon13 Double or Nothing if outcome 2 in right lottery
rdon14 Double or Nothing if outcome 2 in right lottery
rdon15 Double or Nothing if outcome 2 in right lottery  
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Table 3.10 Parameters for Actuarially-Equivalent Lotteries 
 
Lottery ID Prize 1 Probability 1 Prize 2 Probability 2 Prize 3 Probability 3 Prize 1 Probability 1 Prize 2 Probability 2 Prize 3 Probability 3
rae1 $0 0.5 $10 0.5 $20 0 $0 0.75 $10 0 $20 0.25
rae2 $0 0 $10 1 $20 0 $0 0.75 $10 0 $20 0.25
rae3 $0 0 $10 1 $35 0 $0 0.5 $10 0.25 $35 0.25
rae4 $0 0.25 $10 0.75 $70 0 $0 0.5 $10 0 $70 0.5
rae5 $0 0 $10 1 $70 0 $0 0.5 $10 0 $70 0.5
rae6 $0 0 $20 1 $35 0 $0 0.25 $20 0.25 $35 0.5
rae7 $0 0 $20 0.5 $70 0.5 $0 0.25 $20 0 $70 0.75
rae8 $0 0 $35 1 $70 0 $0 0.25 $35 0 $70 0.75
rae9 $0 0.25 $20 0.5 $70 0.25 $0 0.5 $20 0 $70 0.5
rae10 $0 0 $35 0.75 $70 0.25 $0 0.5 $35 0 $70 0.5
rae11 $0 0 $20 1 $70 0 $0 0.25 $20 0.5 $70 0.25
rae12 $0 0 $35 0.75 $70 0.25 $0 0.25 $35 0 $70 0.75
rae13 $0 0.25 $10 0.75 $35 0 $0 0.75 $10 0 $35 0.25
rae14 $0 0 $20 0.75 $35 0.25 $0 0.25 $20 0 $35 0.75
rae15 $0 0 $20 0.75 $70 0.25 $0 0.25 $20 0 $70 0.75
ls2_lr $10 0.3 $30 0 $50 0.7 $10 0.15 $30 0.25 $50 0.6
ls6_lr $10 0.6 $30 0 $50 0.4 $10 0 $30 1 $50 0
ls7_lr $10 0.6 $30 0 $50 0.4 $10 0.15 $30 0.75 $50 0.1
ls10_lr $10 0.5 $30 0 $50 0.5 $10 0.1 $30 0.8 $50 0.1
ls13_rl $10 0.5 $30 0.4 $50 0.1 $10 0.7 $30 0 $50 0.3
ls15_rl $10 0.4 $30 0.6 $50 0 $10 0.5 $30 0.4 $50 0.1
ls17_lr $10 0.1 $30 0 $50 0.9 $10 0 $30 0.25 $50 0.75
ls18_rl $10 0.1 $30 0.75 $50 0.15 $10 0.4 $30 0 $50 0.6
Left Lottery Right Lottery
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Table 3.11 Parameters for the Lotteries Based on Loomes and Sugden [1998]   
 
Lottery ID Prize 1 Probability 1 Prize 2 Probability 2 Prize 3 Probability 3 Prize 1 Probability 1 Prize 2 Probability 2 Prize 3 Probability 3
ls2_lr $10 0.3 $30 0 $50 0.7 $10 0.15 $30 0.25 $50 0.6
ls6_lr $10 0.6 $30 0 $50 0.4 $10 0 $30 1 $50 0
ls7_lr $10 0.6 $30 0 $50 0.4 $10 0.15 $30 0.75 $50 0.1
ls10_lr $10 0.5 $30 0 $50 0.5 $10 0.1 $30 0.8 $50 0.1
ls13_rl $10 0.5 $30 0.4 $50 0.1 $10 0.7 $30 0 $50 0.3
ls15_rl $10 0.4 $30 0.6 $50 0 $10 0.5 $30 0.4 $50 0.1
ls17_lr $10 0.1 $30 0 $50 0.9 $10 0 $30 0.25 $50 0.75
ls18_rl $10 0.1 $30 0.75 $50 0.15 $10 0.4 $30 0 $50 0.6
ls21_lr $10 0.7 $30 0 $50 0.3 $10 0.6 $30 0.25 $50 0.15
ls26_rl $10 0.2 $30 0.6 $50 0.2 $10 0.4 $30 0 $50 0.6
ls29_rl $10 0.5 $30 0.3 $50 0.2 $10 0.6 $30 0 $50 0.4
ls32_rl $10 0.7 $30 0.3 $50 0 $10 0.8 $30 0 $50 0.2
ls34_rl $10 0.1 $30 0.6 $50 0.3 $10 0.25 $30 0 $50 0.75
ls35_rl $10 0 $30 1 $50 0 $10 0.25 $30 0 $50 0.75
ls39_rl $10 0.5 $30 0.2 $50 0.3 $10 0.55 $30 0 $50 0.45
ls1i_lr $10 0.12 $30 0.05 $50 0.83 $10 0.03 $30 0.2 $50 0.77
ls3i_lr $10 0.27 $30 0.05 $50 0.68 $10 0.03 $30 0.45 $50 0.52
ls7i_lr $10 0.54 $30 0.1 $50 0.36 $10 0.18 $30 0.7 $50 0.12
ls9i_lr $10 0.08 $30 0.04 $50 0.88 $10 0.05 $30 0.1 $50 0.85
ls13i_lr $10 0.65 $30 0.1 $50 0.25 $10 0.55 $30 0.3 $50 0.15
ls16i_lr $10 0.88 $30 0.04 $50 0.08 $10 0.83 $30 0.14 $50 0.03
ls17i_rl $10 0.04 $30 0.15 $50 0.81 $10 0.08 $30 0.05 $50 0.87
ls18i_rl $10 0.14 $30 0.65 $50 0.21 $10 0.38 $30 0.05 $50 0.57
ls22i_lr $10 0.66 $30 0.1 $50 0.24 $10 0.54 $30 0.4 $50 0.06
ls28i_rl $10 0.12 $30 0.84 $50 0.04 $10 0.18 $30 0.66 $50 0.16
ls30i_rl $10 0.45 $30 0.45 $50 0.1 $10 0.55 $30 0.15 $50 0.3
ls31i_lr $10 0.48 $30 0.36 $50 0.16 $10 0.42 $30 0.54 $50 0.04
ls35i_lr $10 0.2 $30 0.2 $50 0.6 $10 0.1 $30 0.6 $50 0.3
ls36i_rl $10 0.02 $30 0.92 $50 0.06 $10 0.08 $30 0.68 $50 0.24
ls37i_lr $10 0.48 $30 0.28 $50 0.24 $10.0 0.44 $30.0 0.44 $50.0 0.12
Left Lottery Right Lottery
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3.9 Appendix C: Additional Figures 
 
 
Figure 3.30 Proportion of Actual Take-Up to Predicted Choices (NP) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.31 Proportion of Actual Take-Up to Predicted Choices (Control) 
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3.10 Appendix D: Additional Tables 
 
 
Table 3.12 Actual Number of Red Balls drawn from Urns during Experiment 
 
Session 1
Population
Urn Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2
A 3 2 3 2.5 2
B 6 4 6 5 5
Session 2
Population
Urn Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2
A 1 2 1 1.5 2
B 4 3 4 3.5 5
Sample Draws Bayesian Update
Sample Draws Bayesian Update
 
 
 
Table 3.13 Percentage of Subjects that Allocated Tokens in Each Bin 
 
Bin Urn A Urn B Urn A Urn B Urn A Urn B Urn A Urn B
1 10.8% 5.4% 5.4% 16.2% 51.4% 29.7% 32.4% 18.9%
2 54.1% 21.6% 56.8% 24.3% 89.2% 54.1% 81.1% 56.8%
3 75.7% 32.4% 89.2% 45.9% 91.9% 73.0% 89.2% 83.8%
4 91.9% 70.3% 91.9% 83.8% 83.8% 86.5% 91.9% 94.6%
5 91.9% 86.5% 89.2% 91.9% 70.3% 89.2% 73.0% 89.2%
6 75.7% 94.6% 64.9% 97.3% 64.9% 89.2% 56.8% 83.8%
7 51.4% 83.8% 35.1% 73.0% 51.4% 70.3% 45.9% 56.8%
8 29.7% 70.3% 24.3% 59.5% 51.4% 59.5% 43.2% 43.2%
9 16.2% 32.4% 16.2% 24.3% 29.7% 21.6% 24.3% 29.7%
10 10.8% 8.1% 5.4% 10.8% 24.3% 21.6% 18.9% 32.4%
Draw 1 Draw 2
Session 2
Draw 1 Draw 2
Session 1
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